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Summary 
 In all areas of psychological research, particularly in the area of implicit 
cognition, investigations depend on the tools of measurement. A central aim of the work 
presented in this thesis was to improve the accuracy and usability of tools that measure implicit 
cognition. This development was situated in the context of parasite-stress theory (PST) and 
racial prejudice.  
 Chapter 1 explains the origins of research on implicit cognition and what makes 
a measure implicit. Chapter 2 introduces PST, which predicts that increased exposure to 
infectious diseases will lead to avoidance of, or disdain towards, out-groups because such 
avoidance will reduce the likelihood of contracting an illness. This prediction was confirmed 
for both implicit and explicit attitudes, using complementary correlational and experimental 
methodologies.  
 The findings reported in Chapter 3 indicate that participants remember positive 
statements better than they remember negative statements and hence display a Positive Framing 
Bias (PFB) in the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). Chapter 4 introduces the 
Simple Implicit Procedure (SIP) which is user-friendly and is not subject to the PFB. Estimates 
of implicit attitudes obtained from the SIP correlate with explicit measures, provide increased 
specificity of where an individual’s implicit biases lie, have acceptable reliability and are not 
limited by practice/experience effects. The SIP can assist researchers in devising strategies 
aimed at understanding and ameliorating the precise mechanisms driving prejudice.     
 Chapter 5 describes how using nouns, verbs or adjectives in implicit measures 
can affect outcomes. In Chapter 6, the SIP was used to show that females’ racial biases remain 
stable over time, even when primed with diseases. Males appear to be particularly susceptible 
to expressing increased prejudice when primed with disease images.  
 In summary, this thesis identifies various response biases that can greatly 
influence the results obtained from measures of implicit attitudes. Recommendations for 
overcoming these biases are described.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Abstract 
The origins of one of the most studied topics in social psychology - Implicit Social Cognition 
- are discussed, as are the unobtrusive/indirect research methods used to overcome the 
problems (e.g., a tendency to make socially desirable responses) that are apparent when using 
explicit self-reports. The Implicit Association Test is introduced along with a brief overview 
of other popular implicit measures. It is precisely defined what an implicit measure is, 
emphasising that automaticity is a core feature. A section is devoted to explaining under what 
conditions implicit and explicit measures are or are not related. The value of using both 
measures to predict behaviour is also explained. I conclude by discussing some theoretical 
issues relating to implicit measures and end with an overview of the thesis.   
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Origins of research into implicit social cognition 
Most psychologists agree that to gain a comprehensive understanding of an individual’s 
behaviour one needs knowledge not only of the external contexts in which an individual is 
situated but also of their internal psychological attributes (i.e., attitudes, stereotypes and 
personality traits). The cognitive revolution of the 1960s and 70s challenged behaviourism’s 
grip on psychology and restored the scientific respectability of the study of internal 
psychological processes (Miller, 2003). Without this impetus, the study of implicit1 cognition 
and investigations into the importance of unconscious/unexpressed biases influencing 
behaviour could have been further delayed. 
The prominence in social psychology of the study of individuals’ attitudes was apparent 
as far back as the 1930s, when George Allport (1935), described attitudes as the “most 
distinctive and indispensable concept” in the discipline. In the 1940s the behaviourist Leonard 
Doob (1947, p.136) defined an attitude as “an implicit, drive-producing response considered 
socially significant in the individual's society”. It was generally accepted, albeit implicitly, that 
attitudes were influenced by unconscious mechanisms (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This 
(implicit) acceptance was likely due to psychoanalytic theory according to which attitudes 
could be influenced by unconscious processes. Although psychologists often want to dissociate 
                                                 
1 The term “implicit” is often used as a synonym for other labels such as “unconscious”, 
“unaware”, “intuitive”, “indirect” and “automatic”. Likewise, “explicit” often overlaps with 
“conscious”, “aware”, “analytic”, “direct” and “controlled”. The implicit-explicit distinction 
was used throughout this thesis. Additionally, the terms “implicit cognition”, “implicit 
attitudes”, “implicit social cognition” and “implicit bias” are synonyms of each other in this 
thesis.       
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themselves from Sigmund Freud’s controversial and often unfalsifiable ideas, he was one of 
the first individuals to bring the idea of the unconscious to the mainstream (Freud, 1915, 2005).    
Researchers aimed to measure attitudes using more objective methods such as 
questionnaires. Nevertheless, the near-universal use of self-report questionnaires throughout 
social psychology’s past has led to numerous problems. One of the major problems was 
construct validity weaknesses, as seen by the lack of correspondence between attitudes and 
behaviour (Greenwald, 1990, see also Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). For example, LaPiere (1934) 
reported that when he visited 251 accommodation venues with a Chinese couple, only one 
venue refused them admission. Following these visits, letters were sent to all 251 venues asking 
for a response to the question “Will you accept members of the Chinese race as guests in your 
establishment?” and over 90% responded that they would not. Regardless of the limitations of 
the study, (e.g., the Chinese couple was accompanied by an individual in a high-status 
profession; the person rejecting the letter request may have been different from the person who 
accepted their face to face request), LaPiere’s study emphasises the values of using 
unobtrusive/indirect2 research methods instead of confining oneself to explicit self-reports 
(direct measures). Sheeran (2002) provides a more recent review of the relationship between 
attitudes (intentions) and behaviour.     
                                                 
2 The terms “indirect” and “direct” are often used to describe the procedural characteristics of 
a measurement procedure, while the terms “implicit” and “explicit” are often used to describe 
the psychological features or attributes assessed by measurement procedures. These 
classifications follow recommendations by De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, and 
Moors (2009; see also De Houwer & Moors, 2010).  
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Unobtrusive and indirect research methods 
“Unobtrusive” refers to methods in which participants are generally unaware that their 
behavioural responses are under investigation, while the term “indirect” refers to when 
participants are aware their responses are being monitored but it is unclear exactly which aspect 
of their behaviour is being assessed (Banaji & Greenwald, 2016).  In the 1970’s, two social 
forces made unobtrusive research methods both more appealing and more popular: (1) The rise 
in the scientific study of prejudice across the US due to racial tensions, and (2) the growing 
realisations that participants often respond in a socially desirable manner when making explicit 
self-reports (Banaji & Greenwald, 2016; Jones & Sigall, 1971). The first two successful uses 
of unobtrusive methods relating to racial prejudice showed that when a black or white 
individual using a telephone called looking for help, white callers were more likely to receive 
assistance, and when an open unsent student application with a portrait photograph attached 
was left at an airport telephone booth, participants we more likely to voluntarily submit 
applications for the white students (Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976; Gaertner & Bickman, 
1971; for a review of unobtrusive methods see Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980 and for a recent 
example of the unobtrusive technique showing that white people offer less help to black relative 
to white individuals in an emergency situation, see Kunstman & Plant, 2008).  
 Crosby and colleagues (1980) indicated that discrimination is more prevalent than 
explicit self-reports would lead us to believe, and that remote (not face to face) interactions 
were more likely to give rise to stronger racial prejudice when unobtrusive methods were used.  
Unobtrusive methods reduce the Hawthorn effect (i.e., the fact that participants’ knowledge of 
being in an experiment modifies their behaviour from how they would have responded without 
that knowledge: Adair, 1984). However, unobtrusive methods can be ethically problematic, 
require more resources to run than simple questionnaires, and the context is more difficult to 
control (Blackstone, 2017). Of most relevance, they do not provide an adequate opportunity to 
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measure individual differences because asking participants to fill out questionnaires or 
demographic information would rouse suspicions. Indirect measures, such as implicit 
measures, were developed to overcome the limitation of unobtrusive methods not assessing 
individual differences.  
Selective attention and implicit memory 
Research relating to both selective attention and implicit memory greatly influenced the 
development of research into implicit social cognition (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). With 
respect to selective attention, a key distinction was one between controlled and 
automatic/involuntary modes of information processing (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). For 
example, our attention will be instantly drawn if we detect words of importance originating 
from unattended sources, such as hearing one’s name (Moray, 1959).  The development of 
sequential priming techniques (e.g., Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983) was strongly influenced 
by the selective attention literature (i.e., weakly learned associations need cognitive effort to 
retrieve but strong associations will be activated automatically)3. These sequential priming 
measures did however suffer from low reliability and produced small effect sizes (Payne & 
Gawronski, 2010), and the existence of these weaknesses could explain the popularity of other 
implicit measures (see below).      
Research on implicit memory pioneered by Jacoby and colleagues (e.g. Jacoby, Toth, 
Lindsay, & Debner, 1992) (for review see Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993) strongly 
                                                 
3 Since the focus of this thesis is not related to priming measures to estimate an individual’s 
implicit social cognition, these measures will not be discussed further. For more recent 
information on these types of measures see Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012; 
Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005 and Wentura & Degner, 2010) 
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influenced Greenwald and Banaji's (1995) seminal paper on implicit cognition (see also Banaji, 
2001). Essentially, studies of implicit memory showed that participants found it easier to 
perceive stimuli that they had previously seen (perceptual fluency) but attributed this ease to 
characteristics of the stimulus, rather than to the recent past encounter. These ideas led 
Greenwald and Banaji (1995) to coin the term “implicit cognition” and define it as “An implicit 
C is the introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) trace of past-experience that 
mediates R. In this template, C is the label for a construct (such as attitudes), and R names the 
category of responses (such as object evaluative judgements) assumed to be influenced by that 
construct” (p. 5). Their review focused on how implicit cognition was specifically related to 
attitudes, stereotypes and the self, and this relationship is also a major focus of this thesis.  
In implicit memory research, experimenters normally have perfect control over the 
stimuli previously presented, while in implicit cognition, experimenters generally have little 
control over previously presented stimuli (e.g., an individual’s life history) and, therefore, 
require more mentalistic explanations for behavioural responses (i.e.,  mental associations, 
particularly evaluative and semantic associations, see Greenwald et al., 2002; Hahn & 
Gawronski, 2015). An exception is when participants are exposed to completely new stimuli. 
Any attitude (both implicit and explicit) that subsequently develops following a positive or 
negative induction (i.e., through evaluative conditioning: see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, 
Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010) to novel stimuli (e.g., an unknown group or tribe), is most likely 
due to the controlled exposure rather than prior experiences (e.g., Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; 
Olson & Fazio, 2001). This experimental set up has been said to involve attitude formation and 
refers to the initial change from having no attitude towards an object to having some attitude, 
either positive or negative, towards it (Oskamp & Schultz, 2005). 
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The development of implicit measures 
Greenwald and Banaji (1995) asserted that the measurement of individual differences 
in implicit cognition is likely to be possible and described judgement latency (i.e., reaction time 
(RT)) measures as a potentially fruitful avenue to pursue this goal. They predicted that “when 
such measures become available, there should follow the rapid development of a new industry 
of research on implicit cognitive aspects of personality and social behaviour” (p. 20). Within 
three years, the same authors developed and published the first and still most popular RT task 
that aims to measure implicit attitudes, stereotypes and self-concept at the individual level. The 
measure was called the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998) and precisely as they predicted, this task led to an acceleration in research into implicit 
cognition, with the area being described as “one of the liveliest and most active research areas 
in social psychology” (Payne & Gawronski, 2010, p. 9). The initial IAT publication has to date 
(July 2017) been cited almost 9,000 times. Development of the IAT to run online through 
Project Implicit (https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/), the world’s largest online virtual 
laboratory greatly accelerated the speed at which the IAT could be validated (e.g., Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Nosek et al., 2007; Nosek, Banaji, & 
Greenwald, 2002; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007) .  
Millions of people from all over the world have completed various versions of the IAT 
through Project Implicit (e.g., Old-Young IAT, Fat-Thin IAT, European American-African 
American IAT). Participants are incentivised to complete IATs because after completing the 
task they are given their implicit bias score towards the categories to which they were 
responding.  In a typical IAT, such as the Young–Old IAT, participants are presented 
successively with various pictures of young and old individuals as well as positively and 
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negatively valenced words4, and must sort the items using the correct keypress. In one of the 
two critical blocks, participants should press the “E” key on a computer keyboard if a positive 
word or a picture of a young person appears and press the “I” key if a negative word or a picture 
of an old person appears (congruent block). In the other critical block, participants should press 
“E” if a positive word or a picture of an old person is shown and they must press the “I” key 
for a negative word or a picture of a young person (incongruent block).  
This task aims to measure biases participants have in associating concepts (old and 
young) with valenced words. The stronger the association, the more natural the sorting task 
will feel and hence, result in faster responses (congruent block), while weaker associations will 
result in a slowing down of processing, due to the need to make use of unaccustomed pairings 
in memory (incongruent block; Greenwald et al., 2002). Rather than using positive and 
negative valenced words to measure attitudes, stereotypical words could be used instead (e.g., 
healthy, lively, frail, slow, etc.) to measure stereotypes that individuals have. 
What is an implicit measure? 
Currently, the term ‘implicit social cognition’ is generally used to refer to research in 
social psychology that uses computerised RT measurement instruments to infer an individual’s 
psychological attributes (i.e., attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, etc.) without asking an 
individual to report their psychological attributes directly (Hahn & Gawronski, 2015). Implicit 
measures have been defined as “the outcome of a measurement procedure that results from 
automatic processes by which the to-be-measured attribute causally determines the outcome”  
                                                 
4 Throughout the thesis, “positively valenced words” will be used interchangeably with 
“positive words”. Examples of positive words include, happy, joy, love. Likewise, 
“negatively valenced words” will be used interchangeably with “negative words”. Examples 
of negative words include, evil, hurt, sick.    
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(De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009, p. 347). Automaticity has been 
argued to be one of the core features of an implicit measure and occurs when the impact of the 
“to be measured” attribute on an individual’s responses is uninfluenced by certain goals, 
substantial cognitive resources, awareness or substantial time (Bargh, 1994; De Houwer, 2006; 
De Houwer & Moors, 2012).  Therefore, quick and accurate reactions to stimuli are necessary 
to limit an individual’s ability to exercise strategic control over their responses. This 
automaticity aspect or feature distinguishes implicit measures from traditional instruments that 
rely on explicit self-reports (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014). Consequently, the speed or 
accuracy with which an individual responds to or associates stimuli in implicit measures is used 
to infer their psychological attributes (De Houwer, 2009; De Houwer, 2003; Nosek & Banaji, 
2001). With implicit measures (and also explicit measures), an inference must inevitably be 
used because it is not possible to directly observe psychological attributes.  
An ideal measure of implicit attitudes would provide an accurate index of the extent to 
which an individual possesses the psychological attributes that the measure was designed to 
capture (De Houwer et al., 2009).  To validate an implicit measure, there must be evidence that 
variation in the “to be measured” attribute (e.g. racial bias), causes variations in the 
measurement outcome (i.e., the measure’s score) but an understanding of how the measurement 
outcome is detecting variations in the psychological attribute is also necessary (Borsboom, 
Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004; Wentura & Rothermund, 2007). Both correlations and 
experimental approaches are useful when validating implicit measures. But collecting 
correlational data is the most time and cost effective way to validate an implicit measure (De 
Houwer et al., 2009). The more evidence that is accumulated showing that the implicit measure 
correlates in the expected manner with other measures of psychological attitudes (e.g., explicit 
self-reports), the more the likelihood that the correlations are due to a third factor is reduced 
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(e.g., Nosek & Smyth, 2007). Correlational analysis will be mainly used to validate the new 
implicit measure introduced in this thesis.  
Limitations of existing implicit measures. 
The period following the IAT’s first publication has been described as the “age of 
measurement” in social psychology, due to the development of various implicit measures each 
of which aimed to measure psychological attributes accurately (Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 
2011). New implicit measures were developed mainly because of limitations in the IAT. But 
these new measures were further challenged by the need to preserve the strong psychometric 
properties that the IAT achieves. The brief IAT (BIAT) was developed to give researchers a 
tool that could be used to measure implicit bias in a shorter amount of time. However, like the 
IAT, the BIAT only measures implicit biases relatively (e.g., attitudes to fat people relative to 
attitudes to thin people). It is therefore impossible to determine using these IATs whether this 
bias is the result of a strong/weak pro-thin bias, a strong/weak anti-fat bias, or some 
combination of the two (see Blanton & Jaccard, 2006; Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2010, 2011). Likewise, the IAT cannot be used to determine how interventions that aim to 
increase or reduce implicit biases have their effect (e.g., a difference in implicit attitudes could 
be reduced by acting on the “Thin Person” category, the “Fat Person” category, or both; see 
Lai et al., 2014). 
Another limitation of the IAT arises because some categories do not have an obvious 
comparison group. For example, when assessing implicit self-esteem, researchers can use the 
IAT to measure the positive and negative associations a person has with the self in comparison 
to a specified/unspecified other (or with “me” in comparison to “not me”). The type of 
comparison category (i.e., specified vs. unspecified other) used affects implicit self-esteem 
results (Karpinski, 2004). Therefore, a more appropriate approach would measure only 
evaluative associations with the self, without the need to use a complementary category. 
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To address these problems, RT tools that attempt to measure absolute attitudes and do not 
require a relative comparison to another group have been developed. For example, the go/no-
go (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) and the extrinsic affective Simon task (De Houwer, 2003b) both 
claim to measure implicit attitudes non-relatively/absolutely. However, both suffer from 
problems ranging from a high level of task difficulty to low reliability (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 
2014; De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007). Variations of the IAT that could be described as 
single concept IATs, such as the Single Target/Category IAT (e.g., Bluemke & Friese, 2008; 
Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) have, however, shown promise for measuring absolute implicit 
attitudes. The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP: Barnes-Holmes et al., (2006)) 
is another absolute implicit measures, but see Chapter 3 for limitations of the IRAP’s 
assessment of absolute implicit attitudes. 
The Single-Block  IAT (Sarah Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Rothermund, 2008), the 
Recoding Free IAT (Klaus, Rothermund, Teige-Mocigemba, Gast, & Wentura, 2009) and the 
Sorting Paired Features Task (Bar-Anan, Nosek, & Vianello, 2009) were developed to 
overcome the problem of block structure influencing the accurate measurement of implicit 
biases. For example, the order in which a participant completes the compatible and 
incompatible blocks can influence IAT score (see Nosek, et al., 2007; Teige-Mocigemba, 
Klauer, & Sherman, 2010). Efforts have been made to reduce the order effect in the IAT 
(Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005) but it is nevertheless difficult to determine the magnitude 
of order effects at the individual level and hence it is not possible to fully remove effects of 
this confound (De Houwer et al., 2009). Another reason for removing the block structure in the 
IAT was that the salience of the items within a block, not the associations between the items, 
can lead to an IAT effect (see Rothermund & Wentura, 2001, 2004). 
Several authors have identified “unwanted factors” (Friese & Fiedler, 2009, p. 230) or 
“nonassociative influences” (Rothermund & Wentura, 2010, p. 234) that influence the 
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magnitude of IAT effects. If IAT effects can be caused by processes other than just mental 
associations in memory, and if it is not clear which processes influence the IAT effect, then the 
meaning of the effect becomes ambiguous (see Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006). There is 
increasing evidence that findings relating to implicit measures can reflect several processes, 
such as salience of the stimuli (e.g., Houben & Wiers, 2006; Klaus Rothermund, Wentura, & 
De Houwer, 2005), similarity between the stimuli (De Houwer, Geldof, & De Bruycker, 2005) 
and cognitive ability of participants (e.g., Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2005; McFarland & 
Crouch, 2002). Greenwald et al.'s (2003) D-algorithm has greatly reduced the problem relating 
to cognitive ability because it accounts for an individual’s variation in responding across the 
IAT. More research is needed to explain the relative impact that salience and similarity can 
have on IAT scores (De Houwer et al., 2009, see Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & 
Groom, 2005, and Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007, for methods that can 
account for the influence of these various processes). IAT researchers have acknowledged these 
problems, emphasising that no measure is perfect but yet the measure can still be useful 
(Greenwald & Sriram, 2010): see  Fazio and Olson (2003), Gawronski (2009), Gawronski and 
De Houwer (2014), and Nosek et al. (2011), for reviews and lists of other implicit measures 
that have received less attention.  
Implicit and explicit correlations and predicting behaviour 
Correlations between implicit and explicit measures of attitudes vary widely, from 
weakly positive (r = .250; e.g. thin people-fat people) to strongly positive (r = .780; democrats-
republicans) with a median correlation of .48 found for 56 domains across 6000 participants 
(Nosek, 2007). There are a number of possible reasons for this disparity, with the most obvious 
being self-presentation/socially desirable responding. This is especially true for socially 
sensitive topics, where demand characteristics and/or impression management may distort self-
report responses (e.g. Fazio, 2007; Holtgraves, 2004). Implicit and explicit correlations have 
14 
 
been shown to be higher for affective responses (emotions and feelings about the attitude 
object) on explicit measures compared to more cognitive responses (thoughts and beliefs about 
the attitude object) on explicit measures (Smith & Nosek, 2011, for a review see Spence & 
Townsend, 2008). 
 Reducing the time allocated for a participant to think about their response on the explicit 
measures  produces higher correlations between implicit and explicit measures (Ranganath, 
Smith, & Nosek, 2008). Another crucial aspect to consider is that implicit and explicit 
correlations will be stronger for attitudes that are more familiar or beliefs that are important or 
well elaborated in memory, as opposed to ones that are rarely thought about or believed to be 
irrelevant (Nosek, 2007). Conceptual correspondence and structural fit between implicit and 
explicit measures increases the correlations between these two measures. Additionally, due to 
averaging out noise and the inclusion of more trials, relative scores (e.g., IAT scores) rather 
than absolute scores (e.g., SC-IAT scores) show stronger implicit and explicit correlations 
(Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008).  
Lack of a perfect correlation between implicit and explicit measures has been cited as 
evidence for the distinct constructs that these measures assess (Greenwald & Nosek, 2008; 
Nosek & Smyth, 2007). Yet the divergence could also be due to a number of other factors (e.g., 
awareness, need for cognition, structural features, for a review see Hofmann, Gschwendner, 
Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005). Importantly, much research demonstrates the practical value of 
implicit measures for predicting human behaviour (Perugini, Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2010),  
especially spontaneous behaviours (for review see Friese, Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2009) and 
shows that implicit measures can provide information that is distinct from explicit measures 
(Nosek et al., 2011).   
 Perugini, Richetin, and Zogmaister (2010) described how implicit measures could 
contribute to predicting behaviour over and above explicit measures. These include: (1) 
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separate patterns with implicit measures, but not explicit measures uniquely predicting 
behaviour (2) additive patterns in which both implicit and explicit measures contribute to 
predicting behaviour, (3) double dislocation patterns where both measures uniquely predict 
different types of behaviour (4) moderation patterns where both measures predict behaviour 
under different conditions, (5) multiplicative patterns where both measures interactively 
predict behaviour. All these patterns have been shown in the literature. However, the boundary 
conditions specifying when each will occur are not thoroughly understood, making it difficult 
to make a priori predictions (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014).  
 The most thorough evidence emphasising the value of implicit measures was provided 
by a meta-analysis of studies using the IAT, which showed it to predict stereotyping or racially 
prejudicial behaviour better (average r = .236) than did explicit self-report measures (average 
r = .118; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; see also Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, 
& Payne, 2012, relating to sequential priming). However, see Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, 
Jaccard, and Tetlock (2013), for a more critical view of the predictive validity of the IAT. They 
showed that that IAT only weakly predicted racial attitudes and stereotypes (r = .148) and 
stated that “the IAT provides little insight into who will discriminate against whom” (p. 188). 
For a recent defence of the IAT's predictive abilities see Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek (2015).     
If participants are tired, distracted or rushed, they are more likely to respond based on 
implicit biases than when they have energy, are concentrating, focused or unhurried (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). For example, Friese, Hofmann, and Wänke (2008) found that when 
participants’ self-regulation resources were reduced, they were more likely to respond 
behaviourally (eating or drinking) in accordance with their implicit attitudes. In contrast, when 
participants maintained these control resources, their behavioural responses were better 
predicted by their explicit attitudes. Furthermore, implicit measures have been shown to be 
better at predicting behaviours of individuals with a preference for intuitive thinking styles, 
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while explicit measures are better for those with a preference for rational thinking styles (e.g., 
Richetin, Perugini, Adjali, & Hurling, 2007).  
Other examples of the usefulness of implicit measures for predicting behaviour include: 
(1) countries with stronger implicit biases of associating males rather than females with science 
and maths, predict larger performance gaps between males and females in these disciplines 
(Nosek et al., 2009), (2) those with low self-esteem on implicit measures exhibit various 
defensive behaviours (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003) (3) more 
strongly associating the self with death prospectively predicted suicide ideation as well as 
suicide attempts (Nock et al., 2010; Nock & Banaji, 2007) and (4) higher implicit racial biases 
predicted increased job interview invitations to racial in-group members (Rooth, 2010). 
Importantly, neither implicit and explicit measures can be described as a “truer” measure of 
one’s beliefs, because both predict unique aspects of behaviour (Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 
2004). To clarify, explicit measures are generally better at predicting political preferences 
(Friese, Smith, Koever, & Bluemke, 2016) and consumer behaviour (Friese, Wänke, & 
Plessner, 2006), while implicit measures are particularly suited when addressing intergroup 
attitudes/interactions (Greenwald et al., 2009). The next section aims to explain why this may 
be the case.    
Theoretical basis of implicit measures 
The two most prominent theories aiming to explain correlations between implicit and 
explicit measures are the motivations and opportunity as determinants (MODE) model (Fazio 
& Olson, 2014; Fazio, 1990) and the Associative Propositional Evaluation (APE) model 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). Both these models make similar predictions but 
differ in a few subtle ways. Motivation (e.g., social desirability; Devine, Plant, Amodio, 
Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Dunton & Fazio, 1997) and the opportunity (e.g., self-
regulation resources; Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007) are the primary determinates 
17 
 
explaining implicit and explicit correlations in the MODE model. In the APE model, however, 
cognitive consistency (i.e., rejecting affective racial biases in favour of more explicit egalitarian 
values) is an important factor in explaining implicit and explicit correlations (Brochu, 
Gawronski, & Esses, 2011; Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008).  
The MODE model assumes that the same underlying representations are measured 
using direct and indirect methods, while the APE model assumes they are part of a distinct but 
mutually reinforcing processes (i.e., associative and propositional processes). The MODE 
model also assumes that deliberate processing reduces implicit and explicit correlations, while 
in the APE model deliberating on information that is consistent with an activated association 
(i.e., implicit bias) will increase implicit and explicit correlations (e.g., Galdi, Gawronski, 
Arcuri, & Friese, 2012; Peters & Gawronski, 2011). For a full review of the numerous dual 
process theories of human cognition see Chaiken and Trope (1999) and Strack and Deutsch 
(2004). 
Early theorising around implicit attitude measures assumed that they provide direct 
access to stable evaluative representations that have their roots in long-term socialisation 
experiences (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). However, new evidence has shown that 
implicit attitudes are highly susceptible to contextual influences (for a review see Blair, 
2002). Furthermore, the debate surrounding whether implicit biases represent person-based 
(e.g., personal attitudes; Fazio et al., 1995) or situational-based approaches (e.g., awareness of 
cultural stereotypes; Devine, 1989) has been going on for some time. More recently, this debate 
has re-emerged in the form of personal versus extra-personal associations in the IAT (e.g., 
Nosek & Hansen, 2008; Olson, Fazio, & Han, 2009). However, it has been argued that making 
a distinction between situational and personal views is not warranted due to the automatic 
effects of implicit views (Banaji, 2001; Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Nosek & Hansen, 2008a). 
It has also been stated that few arguments remain supporting the claim that IAT effects are 
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causally influenced by extra-personal views (De Houwer et al., 2009).The term “implicit” has 
often been used synonymously with “unconscious” but one must ask the question: Are implicit 
measures uncovering unconscious representations?  The available evidence challenges the 
notion that implicit measures offer a window into people’s unconscious processes (e.g., 
Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006; Hahn & Gawronski, 2014). To clarify, the majority of 
participants in Monteith, Voils, and Ashburn-Nardo's (2001) study expressed that they found 
the incongruent block on the Race IAT (Black-Positive) more challenging, and they felt guilty 
about it to the extent that they attributed the bias to racial prejudice. Therefore, individuals 
appear to have much greater introspective access to their mental representation than was 
originally assumed (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). For example, across five different social 
groups, participants were surprisingly accurate when predicting their implicit biases (Hahn, 
Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014), emphasising that participants can have introspective awareness of 
their implicit bias.    
Of note, the mental processes that result in conscious experience for introspection to 
occur are largely a mystery, and similarly, our knowledge of what implicit measures measure 
is less mature than our knowledge about what implicit measures do (Nosek et al., 2011).  
In summary, this introduction has highlighted some of the most relevant information 
related to implicit cognition because it is the central theme of this thesis. Almost every 
intellectual question in social psychology, and some outside it, have been shaped in some way 
by the methods and theories related to implicit social cognition (Payne & Gawronski, 2010).  
Overview of the thesis 
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to parasite-stress theory (PST). This theory will be 
used to explain how disease rates account for differences in racial prejudice across the US as 
well as across the world. This chapter reports three studies to determine whether environmental 
occurrences of diseases and being visually primed with diseases can increase an individual’s 
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prejudice towards a racial out-group. The first two studies use Race IAT data and explicit self-
reports made available through Project Implicit (secondary data), while the final study uses an 
experimental design to determine whether diseases are an important factor for increasing racial 
prejudice. These studies were limited in that the IAT can only report relative biases.    
    Chapter 3 presented the use of a recently developed implicit measure (IRAP) that aims 
to measure implicit biases towards separate categories (absolute biases) allowing the author to 
overcome the relative limitation of the IAT. However, further studies using the IRAP to 
measure racial biases after being primed with diseases had to be abandoned, because during 
testing a major flaw was discovered (a Positive Framing Bias: PFB) in the IRAP. This chapter 
explains why the PFB occurs and describes a comprehensive study of experimentally 
manipulating the PFB bias through framing techniques. The findings show that the IRAP 
overinflates positivity towards items and that experimenters could also inadvertently influence 
the estimates of implicit attitudes.  
 Chapter 4 introduces the Simple Implicit Procedure (SIP) which is a new measure 
designed to overcome the PFB limitation in the IRAP. This chapter presents three studies 
covering attitudes, stereotypes and self-concept with the aim of validating the SIP. A potential 
flaw in the SIP was detected and it occurs because participants were generally faster to press 
the affirming (“Yes”) than the negating (“No”) response key.  A functional method to remove 
this affirming bias is developed and discussed.  
 Chapter 5 explains across three studies why an affirming bias occurs in the SIP. Also, 
this chapter identifies other response biases participants can have when completing implicit 
measures. Specifically, the impact of using nouns, verbs and adjectives on response times in 
RT tasks is addressed.  
 Chapter 6 presents a study that uses the SIP and explicit self-reports to measure racial 
biases towards black and white people pre-and post a disease or terror threat condition.  Due to 
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sampling limitations, sufficient data were collected only from white females. Biases remained 
stable over time and were explained in terms of tending and befriending responses and sexual 
strategies.  
 Chapter 7 describes unanswered questions and further avenues of research that could 
be conducted using the SIP to address racial prejudice under disease threat. 
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Chapter 2: Disease rates are associated 
with racial prejudice across the US and 
the world 
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Abstract 
What factors increase or decrease racial tensions? According to the contact hypothesis 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), increased exposure to out-groups reduces prejudice towards those 
groups. Supporting this, black US individuals who have more contact with white people are 
less prejudiced towards whites. However, inconsistent with the hypothesis, white individuals 
who have more contact with black people express increased anti-black prejudice (Rae, 
Newheiser, & Olson, 2015). Here we offer a new account to explain this pattern: we propose 
that residence in a region with relatively more exposure to infectious diseases leads to 
avoidance of out-groups because such avoidance may reduce the likelihood of contracting 
illness (Thornhill & Fincher, 2014). We note that disease rates are typically higher in regions 
with more black people (Eppig, Fincher, & Thornhill, 2011). It is therefore possible that the 
increased anti-black prejudice typically shown by white people in regions with large black 
populations reflects the operation of an adaptive Behavioural Immune System (BIS; Schaller 
& Park, 2011) which acts against the effects of contact. We show that, consistent with the 
parasite-stress hypothesis (Thornhill & Fincher, 2014), white individuals (N > 702,000) living 
in US states with higher disease rates display increased implicit (automatic) and explicit 
(conscious) anti-black/pro-white prejudice. Similarly, black individuals (N > 149,000) living 
in states with higher disease rates show increased implicit and explicit anti-white/pro-black 
prejudice. These results survive the inclusion of several individual and state-level controls. We 
also report an analysis of 76 countries; this produced results consistent with the parasite-stress 
hypothesis. Finally, we show that white participants exposed to disease-related primes show 
increased implicit and explicit anti-black/pro-white prejudice. Reduction in disease rates may 
therefore, inter alia, improve relations between groups and foster intergroup integration.  
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Introduction 
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg has recently pledged to give 99% of his wealth to charity 
(Goel & Wingfield, 2015). One of the primary uses of this money will be for curing diseases, 
which is a goal similar to that of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (see 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/). One major reason for these investments is that infectious 
diseases have been the leading cause of death worldwide (Jones et al., 2008) throughout much 
of history. Because of this immense impact on human survival, it is likely that humans have 
developed strategies/mechanisms to minimise pathogen threat throughout evolution. One such 
strategy is an immunological response to salient threats. The immune system triggers a 
physiological response that is activated when a pathogen is detected (reactive response). Other 
strategies, such as hypervigilance towards out-groups and/or the strengthening of in-group ties 
(Brown, Fincher, & Walasek, 2016; Diamond, 1999; Reicher, Templeton, Neville, Ferrari, & 
Drury, 2016)  reflect the operation of the behavioural immune system (BIS; proactive response) 
which evolved to protect an individual from exposure to infectious diseases and potentially 
threatening stimuli (e.g., avoidance of decaying food or infected individuals, Murray & 
Schaller, 2016). 
Parasite stress theory (PST) 
The parasite-stress theory (PST; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014) hypothesis, which is strongly 
linked to BIS research, predicts that people will tend to avoid apparently infected individuals 
(Crandall & Moriarty, 1995; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). For example, comparably heightened 
avoidance behaviours and disgust responses were observed when participants were exposed to 
individuals with an infectious disease or superficial facial disfigurements compared with 
healthy controls (Ryan, Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2012). Although facial disfigurement can 
be an indicator of a genetic abnormality, normally no infections can be transmitted because of 
this abnormality. Therefore, this finding emphasises how humans are biased towards making 
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Type 1 errors such as incorrectly identifying and responding to non-existent threats (Error 
Management Theory; Haselton & Nettle, 2006) especially for infection diseases signals 
because it could increase their chances of survival. 
PST also predicts that when diseases are made more salient (e.g., by priming with 
pictures) people will express increase prejudice towards groups that are strongly associated 
with diseases (Duncan & Schaller, 2009; Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003; Park, Schaller, & 
Crandall, 2007). Such predictions have been confirmed. For example, participants in a disease 
priming condition showed increased prejudice (often on implicit measures such as the IAT) 
towards the elderly, people with physical disabilities and those who are obese compared to a 
control slideshow (for a review see Murray & Schaller, 2016). 
In addition, PST predicts that people will avoid, and express more negative attitudes 
towards, dissimilar others, such as people with foreign accents (Reid et al., 2012) or from 
distant regions (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006). These 
responses are based on the fact that people who look different (i.e., skin colour), sound different 
(i.e., accent, language) or have different cultural values (i.e., religion) are more likely to be 
from a different region and hence might have been exposed to novel diseases. Therefore, 
foreigners are likely to have increased immunity to some diseases that local people can become 
infected by and local people can also infect foreigners with diseases they themselves are 
immune to. 
PST is often used to explain why differences in overarching value systems (i.e., 
collectivism vs. individualism) develop and generally refers to environmental differences (e.g., 
rates of diseases) to explain cultural variations in beliefs (Thornhill & Fincher, 2014). Several 
theories have been proposed to explain differing value orientations across societies (e.g., 
market integration or religion; for a review see Hruschka & Henrich, 2013), but often these 
theories do not explain the origins of value orientation differences in the first place. Likewise, 
25 
 
why do some people develop conservative belief systems while others develop values that are 
more liberal? Researchers have shown that differences in personality, moral foundations, 
genetic factors, family upbringing and motivated cognition, such as a need for certainty, can 
lead to different ideological beliefs. Unfortunately, none of these research themes point towards 
why individual differences exist in the first place (e.g., origins of genetic or personality 
differences associated with ideological differences; Brown, Walasek, & Mullett, 2016). 
Describing the ultimate causal factors explaining why overarching belief systems develop in 
the first place is a core goal of PST.  
PST hypothesises that people are more likely to develop collectivistic and socially 
conservative value systems when rates of parasites and infectious diseases are high. In contrast, 
when parasites and infectious diseases are low, people are more likely to adopt individualistic 
and socially liberal value systems. The reason for this difference is that there is both a cost and 
benefit to interacting with out-group members. Engaging with out-group members (openness) 
results in access to new ideas, mates and resources (benefits). However, these interactions 
could result in contraction of debilitating diseases (costs) and ultimately lead to death (Brown, 
Fincher, et al., 2016). Table 2.1 shows the major differences between collectivism and 
individualism that are relevant to PST.  
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Table 2.1: Differences between Collectivistic and Individualistic countries taken from 
Thornhill & Fincher, 2014. 
 
 
Collectivistic Individualistic 
Developing countries 
More conservative                                                                              
Developed countries 
More liberal 
More infectious disease  Less infectious disease 
More homicide Less homicide 
In-group goals paramount Personal autonomy and self-fulfilment paramount 
Low cognitive ability (IQ) High cognitive ability (IQ) 
More religious Less religious 
Autocratic governance Democratic governance 
Stronger family ties  Weaker family ties 
Low rate of innovation High rate of innovation 
High conformity to tradition and norms Low conformity to tradition and norms 
Low socioeconomic status High socioeconomic status 
Restricted/conservative female sexuality Unrestricted/liberated female sexuality 
Greater distinctions between in and out-groups Fewer distinctions between in- and out-groups 
More out-group avoidance and racism (xenophobia) Less out-group avoidance and racism 
High disgust sensitivity Low disgust sensitivity 
Low openness to new experiences High openness to new experiences 
Closed-minded and unimaginative Creative and curious 
Perceptions of a threatening and dangerous world Perceptions of a more secure world 
Intolerance of ambiguity Tolerance of ambiguity 
High contagion concern Low contagion concern 
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Using epidemiological data and worldwide cross-national surveys of 
individualism/collectivism, Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, and Schaller (2008) were the first to 
find support for PST. They found that greater regional prevalence of pathogens strongly 
correlated with cultural indicators of collectivism and negatively correlated with individualism. 
Further evidence has shown that increased pathogen prevalence predicts regional variation 
(both internationally and across U.S. states) of indicators of collectivism such as stronger 
family ties, increased ethnocentrism as well as greater religious belief (Fincher & Thornhill, 
2012). A potential reason for religious beliefs increasing under high pathogen stress is that they 
ensure strict adherence to behavioural norms that would reduce disease transmissions (e.g., no 
premarital sex and not eating certain types of food). Premature death of loved ones, especially 
children, is more likely in high parasite stress areas and religion has the potential to reduce 
some of the torment this situation will induce. 
Correlational evidence also shows that, across countries as well as U.S states, regions 
with higher disease prevalence are associated with lower intelligence (Eppig, Fincher, & 
Thornhill, 2010; Eppig et al., 2011). The potential cause of this correlation is that during 
development the body has to distribute energy in the most effective way to ensure survival; 
under high parasite stress, people are more likely to get exposed to an infection and 
consequently energy would have to be devoted to driving the immune system response, which 
would in turn reduce the energy available for other areas of development (i.e., cognitive 
development).  
Individualism has often been linked to increased economic growth and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), and Thornhill and Fincher (2014) have shown that a decline in parasites is also 
strongly linked to these outcomes. Indeed, Murray (2014) has shown that a reduction in 
parasites predicted scientific and technological innovation, which greatly influences a 
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country’s GDP and economic growth. Importantly, mediation analysis revealed that the link 
between low disease rates and innovation was mediated by reductions in conforming 
behaviours. In collectivistic cultures (high parasite), deviating from the norm is greatly 
disapproved of and this conformity is believed to reduce creativity and innovation. Because 
social norms (e.g., hygiene and food preparation techniques; Murray & Schaller, 2016) help to 
reduce the transmission of infections, conforming to social norm likely had evolutionary 
advantages (Murray & Schaller, 2012). 
Both correlational and experimental methods have shown that increased exposure to 
diseases leads to increases in conformity (e.g., Murray & Schaller, 2012). Furthermore, greater 
parasite prevalence leads to autocratic governance (Murray, Schaller, & Suedfeld, 2013) and 
increases (social) conservatism (for a review see Terrizzi, Clay, & Shook, 2014). Higher 
disease rates have also been shown to be associated with higher number of languages as well 
as the amount of distinct religions in regions (Fincher & Thornhill, 2008a, 2008b) which is 
believed to be due to groups’ unwillingness to engage with outsiders. Finally, parasites are 
believed to have an influence on personality and sexuality, resulting in more inhibitory 
behaviours (e.g., introversion, reduced openness and casual sex), as these decrease the potential 
for becoming infected with diseases (Schaller & Murray, 2008). Importantly, the correlational 
results reported above remain significant when controlling for potential confounding variables 
(e.g., human freedom, economic development, educational attainment, etc.). 
Present study 
We tested the major predictions of PST using US state-level data (Study 1), country-
level data (Study 2) and data from a priming study (Study 3).  Study 1 used secondary data 
from Project Implicit to determine whether people show a greater anti-out-group/pro-in-group 
bias in regions where disease rates are higher. The dataset included measures of individuals’ 
explicit (conscious) and implicit (automatic associations) attitudes towards both in-groups and 
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out-groups. An advantage of examining implicit as well as explicit attitudes is that participants 
may behave in a socially desirable manner when reporting attitudes explicitly, which is 
especially problematic when socially sensitive topics are concerned (Greenwald et al., 2009). 
This study aimed to understand why being exposed to more black people increases white 
respondents’ anti-black/pro-white biases (Putnam, 2007; Rae et al., 2015; Taylor, 1998). We 
first created an exposure-to-whites index for each state. This index was the log of the ratio of 
number of white people to number of black people in the state, multiplied by an integration 
index.  
In Study 2, we examined whether higher disease rates are associated with higher 
implicit and explicit anti-out-group/pro-in-group biases across 76 countries. We analysed only 
data from white participants because data were available from few black respondents. 
Estimates of average skin colour were used as a proxy for exposure to black people. In Study 
3, we used an experimental design to test the hypothesised causal link between diseases and 
prejudice.  
Study 1 (US) and Study 2 (World) 
On the basis of PST (Thornhill & Fincher, 2014), we hypothesised that people living in 
regions with higher disease rates will express greater anti-out-group/pro-in-group biases even 
after exposure to out-groups is controlled for. In addition, we tested the prediction of the contact 
hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) that white individuals exposed to people in countries 
with darker skin tone will show decreased implicit and explicit prejudice towards black people 
when holding disease rates constant. 
Method 
Participants: The sample consisted of volunteers who completed the Race IAT on the 
Project Implicit website (https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/) (Nosek, et al., 2007). Analysis 
across the US was restricted to black and white participants within the 50 US states. The cross-
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country analysis was limited to white participants (N > 787,000) with a further restriction that 
at least 30 usable IAT scores and explicit responses were available within each country. These 
restrictions resulted in 76 countries included in the final analysis. The sample used data 
collected between 2006 and 2013. 
We used standard IAT analytic procedures to remove inappropriate IAT scores 
(Greenwald et al., 2003). The algorithm removed participants who made errors on > 30% of 
trials and had reaction times of <300ms and/or >10,000ms on >10% of trials (approximately 
2%). To facilitate reporting, we performed separate analysis on white (N > 702,000) and black 
respondents (N > 149,000) within the US (see Appendix 2 for a full description of 
demographics). The dataset we used is available for public use (https://osf.io/y9hiq/; Xu, 
Nosek, & Greenwald, 2014)  
Materials 
   
Implicit bias: All participants completed the Race IAT with “African American” and 
“European American” as the category labels and “Good” and “Bad” as the valence labels. 
These labels appeared at the top of the screen. The stimuli used included greyscale pictures of 
black and white individuals as well as positive (Glorious, Wonderful, Joy, Love, Peace, 
Pleasure, Laughter, Happy) and negative (Terrible, Evil, Horrible, Agony, Nasty, Awful, 
Failure, Hurt) words. These stimuli were presented successively to participants at the centre of 
their screen and on each trial participants were required to sort the stimulus into the appropriate 
category using the correct key press.  If a correct response was given, the stimulus disappeared 
and a new stimulus appeared after 400ms. If an incorrect response was given, a red “X” 
appeared directly below the stimulus and both remained until the correct response was given.   
In one of the two critical blocks, participants had to press the E key on a computer 
keyboard if a “good” word or a picture of a white person appeared and press the I key if a “bad” 
word or a picture of a black person appeared. In the other critical block, participants pressed E 
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if a “good” word or a picture of a black person was shown and pressed I key for a “bad” word 
or a picture of a white person. The order of the sorting task (i.e. black-good and white-bad first 
vs. black-bad and white-good first) was randomised across participants. The basic idea 
underlying the IAT is that participants will make faster and more accurate responses when 
those responses are congruent with their current beliefs than when they are not.  Participants’ 
implicit biases were measured using IAT D scores(Greenwald et al., 2003). Positive D scores 
indicate an anti-black/pro-white attitude and negative D scores indicate an anti-white/pro-black 
attitude. 
Bipolar Explicit bias: Participants used a 7 point Likert scale to respond to the question 
“Which statement best describes you?”: (1) I strongly prefer African Americans to European 
Americans – (4) I like European Americans and African Americans Equally – (7) I strongly 
prefer European Americans to African Americans. 
Disease rates across US states and the world: Fincher & Thornhill, (2012) developed 
a measure of disease rates across the 50 US states. This measure aggregates all infectious 
diseases reported by the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC; available at www.cdc.gov) for 
the years 1993 to 2007 for each state, divides the number of diseases by state population, and 
transforms the result into a z-score. For the cross-country measure of disease rates, the World 
Health Organization’s (WHO), Infectious Disease DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Years) and 
non-zoonotic parasite prevalence (human-specific and multi-host disease transmission) within 
each country were standardised and then summed, producing a combined disease rates measure 
– see Fincher & Thornhill, (2012) for details and validation. 
Control variables: For both the US state and cross-country analysis, five individual-
level control variables were used. These included political ideology (1 = strongly liberal to 7 = 
strongly conservative), religious belief (1 = not at all religious to 4 = strongly religious), gender 
(dummy coded: 0 = female & 1 = male), age and education level (dummy coded: 0 = as far as 
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completion of high school, 1 = any educational accreditation after high school). For the US 
analysis, the state level controls included median income (logged), state inequality (Gini: 
higher scores = greater inequality), land population density per square mile, race exposure (high 
scores indicate greater white exposure, lower scores indicate greater black exposure) and 
whether a state was previously part of the Confederacy. Median income, inequality, population 
density and race exposure used the American Community Survey 5 year estimates (2008-
2012). Based on previous methods of analysis (Alba, Rumbaut, & Marotz, 2005; Rae et al., 
2015),  we used the logged ratio of white people living in a state relative to black people. This 
ratio was then multiplied by 1-(state segregation/100) to create the race exposure estimate. 
State segregation scores ranged from 0 (complete integration) to 100 (complete segregation) 
where the value indicates the percentage of black people that would need to move for them to 
be distributed exactly like white people (Frey & Myers, 2005). 
         The cross-country control variables included the same individual-level controls. The 
country level controls included gross national income (GNI) per capita, based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) and logged, national level inequality (Gini), land population density per 
square kilometre, ethnic diversity, and skin colour. GNI, Gini and population density used the 
World Bank’s most recent estimates up to the year 2012. Ethnic diversity measures the 
probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a country are not from the same ethnic 
group (see Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003, for methodology). 
Skin colour within a country was estimated using Chaplin's (2004, updated 2007) skin colour 
map. The first author and an independent researcher assigned a score based on the maps scale 
of 1 (darker skin) to 7 (lighter skin) to each of the 86 countries that had 30 usable IAT and 
explicit scores. The interclass correlation coefficient between the two scores was .96. 
Discrepancies were resolved and agreed by the two raters. Of note, the full analysis included 
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only 76 countries because the control variables did not have a value for every country in the 
analysis.      
Analysis: Multilevel analysis was used due to the large sample size available and the 
many benefits it has over multiple regression (Pollet, Tybur, Frankenhuis, & Rickard, 2014). 
Multilevel analysis groups individual responses, which provides a much finer analysis because 
individuals’ variability in responding within a region is considered. Furthermore, demographic 
variables can act as individual level controls rather than having to use only state or country 
level controls. Participants were grouped by US state or country of residence depending on the 
analysis being conducted. The SPSS linear mixed model function was used and the model 
included a random intercept term at the US state level or the country level.  
Results 
Study 1 – Disease rates across US states 
 
Consistent with PST, multi-level analysis (Table 2.2) revealed that white participants 
residing in states with higher disease rates showed a greater anti-black/pro-white bias for both 
implicit (t = 3.54, p < .01) and explicit attitudes (t = 4.51, p < .001). This finding survived 
controls for individual-level variables (age, gender, education, political ideology, religious 
belief) and state-level variables (median income, inequality, race exposure, population density, 
Confederate state). Also, again consistent with the PST hypothesis, black participants living in 
states with higher disease rates showed a greater anti-white/pro-black bias (Table 2.3).  
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Table 2.2: Summary of Multilevel Analysis for Variables Predicting US State Level Implicit/Explicit 
Scores. 
  White Implicit Attitudes 
 (N=735,119) 
White Explicit Attitudes 
(N=702,815) 
Predictor  
B(est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
 
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
Disease Rates 0.014 0.004 3.54** 0.054 0.012 4.51*** 
Political Ideology 0.023 0.000 74.90*** 0.104 0.001 143.30*** 
Religious Belief -0.012 0.000 -22.57*** -0.056 0.001 -43.85*** 
Gender 0.023 0.000 23.55*** 0.177 0.002 77.67*** 
Age 0.000 0.000 4.55*** 0.001 0.000 12.63*** 
Education -0.005 0.001 -4.61*** 0.076 0.003 30.46*** 
Median Income -0.075 0.050 -1.51 -0.148 0.154 -0.96 
State Inequality 0.004 0.190 0.02 0.039 0.591 0.07 
Population Density 0.000 0.000 3.48*** 0.000 0.000 0.95 
Confederate State -0.005 0.009 -0.51 -0.024 0.029 -0.82 
Race Exposure -0.020 0.013 -1.59 -0.094 0.039 -2.39* 
Note: Scores were coded such that higher numbers indicate a greater anti-black/pro-white bias. 
†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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 Table 2.3: Summary of Multilevel Analysis for Variables Predicting US State Level 
Implicit/Explicit Scores. 
 
Note: Scores were coded such that higher numbers indicate a greater anti-black/pro-white bias. 
†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 Black Implicit Attitudes 
 (N=155,038) 
Black Explicit Attitudes 
(N=149,551) 
Predictor  
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
 
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
Disease Rates -0.017 0.004 -3.93*** -0.050 0.012 -4.27*** 
Political Ideology -0.002 0.000 -2.43* 0.048 0.002 20.30*** 
Religious Belief -0.012 0.001  -9.34***  -0.050 0.004  -12.73*** 
Gender 0.015 0.002 6.15*** 0.173 0.007 23.81*** 
Age -0.002 0.000 -20.57*** -0.012 0.000 -40.11*** 
Education 0.017 0.002 6.77*** -0.081 0.007 -10.98*** 
Median Income 0.112 0.058 1.92† -0.047 0.159 -0.30 
State Inequality -0.178 0.206 -0.87 -0.439 0.561 -0.78 
Population Density -0.000 0.000 -0.04 0.000 0.000 1.00 
Confederate State -0.008 0.009 -0.96 -0.028 0.023 -1.21 
Race Exposure 0.010 0.015 0.65 0.107 0.040 2.66* 
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This held for both implicit (t = -3.93, p < .001) and explicit attitudes (t = -4.27, p < 
.001). In contrast to what would be predicted by the contact hypothesis, white participants 
living in states where exposure to blacks is higher showed higher explicit anti-black/pro-white 
biases (t = -2.39, p = .022). Yet consistent with the contact hypothesis, black participants living 
in states where exposure to whites is higher showed weaker anti-white/pro-black biases (t = 
2.66, p = .015). In Appendix 2, we present alternative analyses using different methods to 
estimate out-group exposure which largely support parasite-stress theory. In Appendix 2, we 
also discuss effects of the individual-level controls.  
Study 2 – Disease rates across 76 countries 
 
Further, consistent with PST, multi-level analysis (Table 2.4) revealed that white 
participants residing in countries with higher disease rates showed a greater anti-black/pro-
white bias on both implicit (t = 2.12, p = .041) and explicit attitude measures (t = 3.33, p < 
.001). This finding survived controls for individual-level variables (age, gender, education, 
political ideology, religious belief) and country-level variables (Gross National Income, 
inequality, population density, ethnic diversity, skin colour). Consistent with the contact 
hypothesis, people living in countries in which the average skin tone was darker showed 
reduced anti-black/pro-white explicit biases (t = 3.48, p = .001). For implicit attitudes this effect 
was marginally significant (t = 1.82, p = .077). Effects of the individual level controls are 
discussed in Appendix 2.  
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Table 2.4: Summary of Multilevel Analysis for Variables Predicting Country Level 
Implicit/Explicit Scores. 
   White Implicit Attitudes 
(N=787,996) 
White Explicit Attitudes 
(N=826,644) 
Predictor  
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
 
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
Disease Rates 0.011 0.005 2.12* 0.056 0.017 3.33** 
Political Ideology 0.023 0.000 82.00*** 0.106 0.000 156.20*** 
Religious Belief -0.013 0.000 -25.18*** -0.054 0.001 -45.38*** 
Gender 0.256 0.000 28.03*** 0.180 0.002 83.76*** 
Age 0.000 0.000 4.46*** 0.001 0.000 14.44*** 
Education -0.002 0.001 -2.25* 0.078 0.002 33.18*** 
GNI 0.043 0.022 1.93† -0.006 0.070 -0.09 
GINI 0.001 0.000 1.06 0.003 0.003 0.86 
Population Density 0.000 0.000 0.15 0.000 0.000 0.07 
Ethnic Diversity 0.006 0.030 -0.20 0.023 0.098 .024 
Skin Colour 0.013 0.007 1.83† 0.079 0.023 3.48** 
Note: Scores were coded such that higher numbers indicated a greater anti-black/pro-white bias 
†p<.10, *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.  
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Study 3 
We hypothesised that white participants primed with disease images would show 
increased anti-black/pro-white bias compared to controls (participants primed with furniture 
and buildings). A terror threat priming condition was also included because previous research 
has shown that such priming can increase prejudice and conservative worldviews (Van de 
Vyver, Houston, Abrams, & Vasiljevic, 2016). This extra condition acted as a comparison to 
the disease condition and allowed us to test whether any threat to a person’s life increased 
prejudice or if the effect (if present) is specific to disease threats. Rather than using a full 15 
item scale to measure participants’ perceived vulnerability to disease (PVD scale; Duncan, 
Schaller, & Park, 2009) we instead used a 5 item Private Body Conscious (PBC) scale.  The 
(PBC) scale has previously been shown to moderate the effects of disgust (e.g., Petrescu & 
Parkinson, 2014; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). 
Method 
Participants were recruited through a social media platform dedicated to performing 
online surveys or experiments (see https://www.reddit.com/r/SampleSize/). All participation 
was voluntary, but each participant could view their implicit bias score at the end of the 
experiment which acted as an incentive. Data were gathered for slightly over a month (between 
3rd March and 6th April, 2016). Overall, 525 participants completed the experiment. However, 
74 were removed from the final analysis because “White” was not selected as their race. A 
further 57 were removed because either they did not respond correctly to the memory question 
(N=7), they had already previously completed the experiment (N=34), they selected “other” as 
their gender (N=12), their accuracy on the IAT was below 70% (N=2), or they responded faster 
than 300ms and/or slower than 10,000ms on >10% of the IAT trials (N=2). 
The final sample included 394 participants (224 were male) and each one was randomly 
allocated to either the control (130 participants), disease threat (138 participants) or the terror 
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threat condition (126 participants). 231 participants from the US completed the experiment; the 
remaining participants were mainly from large Western countries such as Canada, Australia 
and the UK. The mean age of the sample was 24.3 years (SD = 6.29), and 338 participants had 
at least a college diploma. The sample was mainly non-religious/slightly religious (M = 1.39, 
SD = .81) and liberal (M = 2.54, SD = 1.48). 
Materials 
Demographic information: Participants’ gender, age, race, country of residence, state 
of residence if in the US, educational level, political ideology (1= Strongly Liberal to 7= 
Strongly Conservative) and religious belief (1= not at all religious to 4= strongly religious) 
were collected via an online questionnaire. 
Private Body Conscious (PBC) scale (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981) is a 5-item 
measure addressing participants’ awareness of internal physical sensations. Items included “I'm 
very aware of changes in my body temperature” and “I know immediately when my mouth or 
throat gets dry”. Each item was rated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The internal reliability of this scale was .62. 
Implicit & Explicit biases: The IAT and the bipolar explicit question used by Project 
Implicit and described above were matched as closely as possible. Two additional feeling 
thermometer items were included in the explicit attitude questionnaire. For these questions, 
participants had to rate how warm or cold they felt towards African Americans and European 
Americans (0 = coldest feelings, 5 = neutral, 10 = warmest feelings). A relative score was 
calculated by taking the black feeling thermometer score from the white feeling thermometer 
score. This measure produced similar findings to the bipolar explicit question and therefore, 
will not be discussed further. D-scores (Greenwald et al., 2003) were calculated from the raw 
data of the IAT by applying the D-algorithm. High scores on both the IAT and explicit 
measures indicate an anti-black bias/pro-white bias. 
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Disease, terror and control images: The disease images consisted of 30 images of 
mould, faeces and people with infections. 20 of the images were sourced from previous 
research that used pathogen primes (Schaller, Miller, Gervais, Yager, & Chen, 2010; Wu & 
Chang, 2012). 10 of these images had white individuals with chicken pox, cuts or who were 
coughing or sneezing etc. 10 images of black individuals with infections/diseases were added 
and closely matched the 10 images of white people5. For the control condition, 15 images of 
buildings and 15 images of single furniture items against a white background were used. For 
the terror threat condition, 30 images of terrorist attacks (e.g., 9/11, Madrid’s ETA bombings) 
were used and were matched for the proportion of black and white individuals across the set. 
For the three conditions, the order of the images was the same for each participant, and this 
order was maintained for the two-time points when images were shown. 
A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on scores of how unpleasant or disturbing 
participants found the images revealed a significant difference across the 3 prime conditions 
(control: M = 1.11, SD = .47, terror: M = 4.99, SD = 1.21, disease: M = 5.04, SD = 1.05), F(2, 
389) = 705.69, p < .001, ηp2= .78. LSD tests showed that both disease and terrorism images 
were reported as being significantly more disturbing/unpleasant then the control images, ts > 
32.02, ps < .001, d > 35.45. No significant difference was found between the disease and 
terrorism conditions, t(262) = .43, p = .71. Therefore, both threat conditions induced similar 
aversive reactions, albeit, likely different emotional reactions (e.g., fear vs. disgust).  
 Procedure: The design included a between-subject variable called prime type which 
had three levels: control, disease threat and the terror threat. To begin the online experiment, 
                                                 
5 A pilot study was carried out that did not include the extra 10 images of black people. Due 
to this shortcoming, no significant disease priming effect was found at the implicit level. 
However, this set of disease primes did significantly increase prejudice at the explicit level. 
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participants had to click a box which confirmed they were 18 years of age or older and were 
happy to participate in the experiment based on the information that they had been provided. 
Next, they completed demographic information and were randomly allocated to one of the three 
priming conditions. Participants scrolled through their respective images for as long as they 
wanted but a minimum of 30 seconds elapsed before participants could continue to the explicit 
questions. 
Following these questions, participants viewed the same images previously shown for 
at least another 30 seconds and were asked if “The images were disturbing and unpleasant?” 
below all the images. The Race-IAT was then completed. Next, participants responded to a 
memory question to ensure they viewed the images, as well as a question asking if they had 
previously completed the experiment. An item asking how recently they have had a cold or flu 
was included, and they then completed the PBC scale. Finally, they were thanked and 
debriefed. The full experiment can be viewed at 
https://brianpsychexperiments.warwick.ac.uk/tdc.html 
Results 
There was a significant effect of prime type (control, terrorism, disease) on IAT D-
score, F(2, 391) = 5.43, p < .01, ηp2 = .03). Consistent with PST, Fisher’s LSD test showed 
significantly higher anti-black/pro-white bias with the disease prime (M = .42, SD = .35), 
compared to the control (M = .29, SD = .41, t(266) = 2.90, p < .01, d = .34). Similarly, the 
disease prime showed significantly higher anti-black/pro-white bias compared to the terrorism 
prime (M = .29, SD = .35, t(254) = 2.76, p < .01, d = .37). There was no significant difference 
between the control and terrorism prime conditions, t(262) = .12, p > .25 (see Figure 2.1). 
There was also a significant difference between priming conditions for the explicit 
measure, F(2, 379) = 3.57, p = .029, ηp2 = .02. LSD tests showed that there was a significantly 
stronger anti-black/pro-white bias with the disease (M = 4.62, SD = .88) than with the control 
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prime (M = 4.37, SD = .64, t(245.83) = 2.62, p = .009, d = .34 ). Significantly higher anti-
black/pro-white biases were also shown with the terror prime (M = 4.52, SD = .81) compared 
to the control prime, t(255.81) = 2.17, p = .031, d = .29). The disease and terror threat conditions 
did not differ, t(259) = .19, p > .25 (see Figure 2.1). For correlational analysis of the variables 
used in Study 3 and analysis addressing gender differences, please see Appendix 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Mean implicit and explicit anti-black/pro-white bias across the three conditions. 
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. In the disease threat condition, implicit bias 
(prejudice) is higher than in the terror threat and the control conditions. Explicit bias is higher 
in both the disease and terror threat conditions compared to the control.   
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Discussion 
Across three studies, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that living in 
regions with higher disease rates and being primed with diseases increases anti-out-group/pro-
in-group biases. Across the US states, we observed that residents in states with higher disease 
rates displayed stronger anti-out-group/pro-in-group biases at the implicit and explicit level for 
both white and black respondents. In many respects, these findings were replicated in our cross-
country analysis. Importantly, all the effects reported across the US and the world were robust 
when controlling for several important individual and state level factors often used to explain 
prejudice. For example, conflict over limited resources (Baumeister & Bushman, 2010) and 
greater diversity (Putnam, 2007) have previously been used to explain racial prejudice in the 
US. However, when we considered median income, inequality (proxy for limited resources) 
and race exposure (proxy for diversity), disease rates were the best predictor of prejudice. 
At the cross-country level when disease rates were held constant, we found that white 
respondents living in countries that had an average darker skin tone exhibited a reduction in 
explicit anti-black/pro-white biases. This result also survived the inclusion of numerous control 
factors. At the implicit level, comparable results (albeit marginally significant results) were 
observed across the world after the control factors were added to the model. These findings are 
consistent with our prediction, based on the contact hypothesis, that contact with out-groups is 
a crucial factor in reducing prejudice particularly at the explicit level.  
Across the US states, race exposure was not associated with increased prejudice among 
black and white respondents at the implicit level. However, on measures of explicit attitudes, 
even when disease rates were controlled, white respondents with higher exposure to black 
people were associated with greater anti-black/pro-white biases. In contrast, black respondents 
exposed to more white people were associated with explicitly weaker pro-black/anti-white 
biases. These inconsistent findings at the explicit level for both groups, as well as the cross-
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country analysis, challenge the notion that exposure to more black people increases prejudice 
in white individuals. Therefore, if it is the case that exposure to black people increases 
prejudice, the effect appears to be unique to white residents of the US.  
The central aim of this research was to test the novel hypothesis that exposure to disease 
increases racial prejudice. As hypothesised, we found experimentally that being reminded of 
diseases/infections increases anti-black/pro-white biases among white individuals. This 
selective effect was clearly observed at the implicit level because the terror threat prime did 
not increase prejudice towards black people. From an evolutionary perspective, this outcome 
is exactly what we would expect given that, unlike with disease cues, there will have been little 
opportunity to develop detection and defence mechanisms to terrorist threats (if it is even 
possible to do so). 
 Regarding the secondary and experimental data, we observed small to moderate effect 
sizes. However, it has been reported that even small increases in implicit prejudice can have 
substantial societal effects on groups experiencing persecution (Greenwald et al., 2015). A 
limitation of the data gathered through Project Implicit is that a high proportion of participants 
completed the Race IAT for course credits or assessments for school. Therefore, the sample is 
biased towards students that are liberal and younger than the general population (Nosek et al., 
2007). Crucially however, this limitation is unlikely to affect the substantive findings that 
disease rates increase prejudice at the US state and country level. Furthermore, the randomised 
experiment in Study 3 overcame this shortcoming. Another limitation is that the relative nature 
of the implicit and explicit measures used means that we cannot determine if diseases are 
associated with a strong preference for in-groups or a greater disdain towards out-groups or 
some combination of these two biases (Greenwald et al., 2003, see Chapter 6 for the description 
and test of a new potential measure of absolute implicit associations - Simple Implicit 
Procedure; SIP - that overcomes the relative nature weakness of the IAT.)  
45 
 
Our study underlines the importance of parasite-stress theory and BIS research by 
demonstrating that the prevalence of infectious diseases is an influential factor in explaining 
intergroup tensions across the US and the world. Indeed, none of the other US state level factors 
were consistently associated with racial prejudice. Likewise, across the world, only the country 
-level factors of disease rates and reduced exposure to people with dark skin tone were 
consistently related to increased prejudice for white respondents. Therefore, only when disease 
rates (or the perception of disease rates) are low will increased contact with out-groups be likely 
to result in a reduction in prejudice. Our research also offers the possibility that disease 
outbreaks (e.g., recent Ebola and SARS outbreaks) might be an important contributor to 
heightened prejudice towards ethnic out-groups. Similarly, refugees and illegal immigrants 
often originate from regions with high disease rates which could be a key factor in explaining 
the race-motivated attacks or social segregation that these groups sometimes experience. In 
conclusion, efforts to ameliorate diseases worldwide have the potential to reduce interaction 
anxiety with out-groups, which could encourage more meaningful engagement between 
groups. 
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Chapter 3: Measuring implicit attitudes: 
A positive framing bias flaw in the 
Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure (IRAP) 
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Abstract 
How can implicit attitudes best be measured? The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
(IRAP), unlike the Implicit Association Test (IAT), claims to measure absolute, not just 
relative, implicit attitudes. In the IRAP, participants make congruent (Fat Person-Active: False; 
Fat Person-Unhealthy: True) or incongruent (Fat Person-Active: True; Fat Person-Unhealthy: 
False) responses in different blocks of trials. IRAP experiments have reported positive or 
neutral implicit attitudes (e.g., neutral attitudes towards fat people) in cases where negative 
attitudes are normally found on explicit or other implicit measures. It was hypothesised that 
these results might reflect a Positive Framing Bias (PFB) that occurs when participants 
complete the IRAP. Implicit attitudes towards categories with varying prior associations (non-
words, social systems, flowers and insects, thin and fat people) were measured. Three 
conditions (standard, positive framing, and negative framing) were used to measure whether 
framing influenced estimates of implicit attitudes. It was found that IRAP scores were 
influenced by how the task was framed to the participants, that the framing effect was 
modulated by the strength of prior stimulus associations and that a default PFB led to an 
overestimation of positive implicit attitudes when measured by the IRAP. Overall, the findings 
question the validity of the IRAP as a tool for the measurement of absolute implicit attitudes. 
A new tool (Simple Implicit Procedure: SIP) for measuring absolute, not just relative, implicit 
attitudes is proposed.  
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Introduction 
Implicit attitudes are automatic evaluations that occur outside conscious awareness and 
are measured without requiring respondents to introspect on their feelings. Explicit attitudes in 
contrast are the result of deliberate introspection and controlled evaluative judgement 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). One reason for measuring implicit attitudes is that participants 
may use self-presentation tactics or respond in a socially desirable manner on explicit self-
reports to avoid being perceived as prejudiced. Implicit measures can also be useful in areas 
where participants might be unwilling to reveal personal psychological attributes or are 
unaware of these psychological attributes (for a review of implicit attitudes and the tools used 
to measure them see Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014).  
The current gold standard method for assessing implicit attitudes is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and this tool has been 
increasingly used in clinically relevant areas (see https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/pimh/). 
The IAT has shown promise in predicting self-harm (Randall, Rowe, Dong, Nock, & Colman, 
2013), social anxiety disorders (Teachman & Allen, 2007) and suicidal ideation (Harrison, 
Stritzke, Fay, Ellison, & Hudaib, 2014). The current study questions the validity of a recently 
developed implicit measure, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-
Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010), which has also been used with vulnerable 
populations. 
Absolute vs. relative measures of implicit cognition 
 In a typical IAT (e.g., the Fat-Thin IAT) participants are successively presented with 
various pictures of thin and fat individuals and positive and negative words. In one of the two 
critical blocks, participants have to press the E key on a computer keyboard if a positive word 
or a picture of a thin person appears and press the I key if a negative word or a picture of a fat 
person appears (congruent task). In the other critical block, participants have to press E if a 
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positive word or a picture of a fat person is shown and they must press the I key for a negative 
word or a picture of a thin person (incongruent task). The basic idea underlying the IAT is that 
participants will make faster and more accurate responses when those responses are congruent 
with their current beliefs than when they are not.  
 Researchers using the IAT typically find a pro-thin/anti-fat bias (e.g., O’Brien, Hunter, 
& Banks, 2007). Importantly, the IAT can only measure relative attitudes (e.g., attitudes to fat 
people relative to attitudes to thin people). It is therefore impossible to determine using the IAT 
whether this bias is the result of a strong/weak pro-thin bias, a strong/weak anti-fat bias or some 
combination of the two (see Blanton & Jaccard, 2006; Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2011; 2012). Likewise, the IAT cannot be used to determine how interventions that aim to 
increase or reduce implicit biases have their effect (e.g., a difference in implicit attitudes could 
be reduced by acting on the ‘Thin Person’ category, the ‘Fat Person’ category, or both; see Lai 
et al., in press).  
The IRAP is a recently developed alternative to the IAT that claims to measure attitudes 
in both absolute and relative terms. Like the IAT, the IRAP is based on latencies of participants’ 
accurate and speeded responses to stimuli. However, rather than categorizing items with the 
appropriate key press (as in the IAT), participants instead have to press keys that correspond 
with True or False displayed on the computer screen. “Correct” responses are based on 
instructions given to participants before each block of trials begins. For example, participants 
might be presented with the picture of a ‘Fat Person’ and the adjective ‘Active’. In one 
condition participants are instructed to respond with a True key press (an incongruent response) 
and in another condition they are instructed to respond with a False key press (a congruent 
response).  
The mean latency difference between pressing True and pressing False across the 
congruent and incongruent response conditions is claimed to reflect a participant’s absolute 
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positive implicit attitude towards ‘Fat Person’. Similarly, an evaluation of absolute negative 
implicit attitudes can be obtained by measuring the latency difference to respond True to the 
association of ‘Fat Person’ with negative words (e.g., ‘Fat Person’-‘Unhealthy’), except that 
the True key is now a ‘congruent response’ and the False key an ‘incongruent response’ (see 
Figure 3.1)6. When the results from responding True or False to ‘Fat Person’ with positive 
words and ‘Fat Person’ with negative words are combined/averaged, the result reveals if the 
absolute attitude towards ‘Fat Person’ is positive, negative or neutral7. 
 This kind of absolute attitude measurement cannot be achieved using the standard IAT, 
because the latency with which a person responds to positive words (e.g., ‘Active’) and pictures 
of fat people in the ‘Fat Person-Positive’ condition is uninterpretable in isolation. The latency 
only becomes useful if it can be compared with the latency from the condition in which negative 
words (e.g., ‘Unhealthy’) and pictures of thin people require the same response (i.e., the ‘Thin 
Person-Negtive’ condition).  
                                                 
6 Separately measuring both a positive and a negative attitude towards a category can provide 
a more nuanced understanding of the attitude under investigation. For example, a person can 
have both a strong positive attitude towards giving blood (i.e., like helping people) but also 
have a strong negative attitude towards giving blood (i.e., fear of needles). Traditional bipolar 
attitude measures (e.g., like-dislike) treat positive and negative evaluative processes as 
reciprocally activated, equivalent and interchangeable which is not always the case (see 
Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997).    
7 The IRAP normally includes a comparison group to allow researchers to carry out relative 
comparisons between groups in order to compare results with those obtained from the IAT. 
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Figure 3.1: Screen shot examples of the four IRAP trial types. The picture categories (‘Thin 
Person’ or ‘Fat Person’), target word (Active, Ugly, and Healthy etc.) and response options 
(True and False) appeared simultaneously on each trial. Asterisks indicate the correct response 
option to press on either pro-Thin or pro-Fat blocks of trials.    
 
The IRAP has been used in at least 20 empirical studies to date (Golijani-Moghaddam, 
Hart, & Dawson, 2013). These studies have examined a number of forensic/clinically relevant 
samples (for a review see Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). Because the IRAP is 
being used with such vulnerable populations, it is important that the validity of this tool is 
tested thoroughly to ensure that the method is accurately measuring what it purports to. This is 
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of particular importance because a number of IRAP publications have reported unexpected or 
contradictory results that cannot be accounted for easily. 
For example, Roddy et al. (2011, 2012; see also Nolan, Murphy, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2013) reported that what was driving the pro-thin/anti-fat bias in the IAT was an extremely 
strong pro-thin bias with participants having a neutral implicit attitude towards fat people. The 
concept of culture-based socialization that glorifies a slender figure was used to account for 
these results. However, Bessenoff & Sherman (2000) using a non-relative/absolute lexical 
decision making task, obtained completely opposite results to those of Roddy et al. (2011, 
2012; i.e., they found an anti-fat bias and a neutral/unbiased attitude towards thin people).  
In another example, Barnes-Holmes et al., (2010) found that participants associated 
pictures of a black person with a gun and pictures of a white person with a gun as ‘Safe’ (i.e., 
they were faster to press True rather than False to the joint presentation of a picture of a person 
with a gun and ‘Safe’). This was not what the authors had predicted based on prior evidence 
that a civilian holding a gun in a neutral context would normally be considered as dangerous 
rather than safe (i.e., participants should press False quicker than True)8. Other counterintuitive 
results include findings that a normative sample of participants had an unexpected pro-death 
implicit bias (Hussey, Daly, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015), and one where religious participants 
and atheists had unpredicted positive attitudes towards both their in-group and out-group 
                                                 
8 It could be argued that people are generally exposed to guns in a safe environment (i.e., 
guns being carried by law enforcers), resulting in the pro-safe attitude. However, we think 
this is unlikely because the experiment used pictures of civilians wearing a white t-shirt and 
this is likely to evoke a fight or flight response especially for the black individuals (e.g., 
Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). 
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(O’Shea, 2017a)9. Importantly, when the data were compared relatively (like in the IAT) the 
typical pro-in-group/anti-out-group biases were obtained. In the current study we show that 
these results can be accounted for on the assumption that participants are adopting a simple 
default heuristic (a Positive Framing Bias; PFB) when performing the IRAP.   
Framing effects and language biases  
The power of positive and negative framing has been well documented, particularly in 
the area of risky decision making (for reviews, see Kühberger, 1998). One of the best-known 
examples of the framing effect is Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) “Asian disease problem”. 
When presented with choices, if logically equivalent outcomes are phrased in terms of the 
number of lives saved, people will generally select the certain/safe option. In contrast, if 
outcomes are phrased in terms of the number of lives lost, people preferentially select the risky 
option. Building on this evidence McKenzie and Nelson (2003) found that participants had a 
bias towards describing a new treatment in terms of the percentage that survived rather than 
died (i.e., a positively biased outcome description). Furthermore, participants were also biased 
towards describing a glass as half full rather than half empty (i.e., an optimism bias; e.g., 
Peterson, 2000). Importantly, it was possible to manipulate these positivity biases by describing 
the reference points of the treatment outcomes differently or stating where the liquid in the 
glass had been previously. For example, people were more likely to say the glass was half 
empty if it had previously been full.  
Language both reflects and shapes our representations of the world (Boroditsky, 2011) 
and language can therefore provide important insights into thought processes and biases. 
English speakers appear to have a general tendency to describe changes in events or objects as 
                                                 
9 Atheists are generally distrusted in societies with a religious majority (e.g., Gervais, Shariff, 
& Norenzayan, 2011). 
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increasing rather than decreasing. To clarify, if a person’s weight has decreased, we might 
describe this as ‘the person is thinner’ (thinness has increased), not ‘the person is less fat’. In 
contrast, a person who has gained weight might be referred to as ‘fatter’, but not as ‘less thin’. 
Additionally, there is no morpheme in English that is equivalent to the suffix ‘er’ to indicate 
that a dimension has decreased (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003). This implies that describing 
objects in positive (increasing) rather than negative (decreasing) ways is a bias inherent in the 
English language and therefore our thought processes.  
Another strand of psycholinguistic research that emphasizes the importance of 
positivity is based on markedness (see Haspelmath, 2006, for a critical review) where 
‘unmarked’ is the classification for words used most frequently and which also have the most 
neutral meaning (Leech, 2006). ‘Positive adjectives like good and long are stored in memory 
in less complex forms than…their opposites’ (Clark, 1969, p.398) and therefore, are described 
as ‘unmarked’. A speaker asking in a restaurant ‘How good is the food?’ is simply asking for 
an evaluation of the food and will be satisfied with a positive or negative appraisal. However, 
when asking ‘How bad is the food?’ essentially he/she is inquiring about the extent of the 
food’s badness. In this context, “since good can be neutralized and bad cannot, good is said to 
be ‘unmarked’ and bad ‘marked’” (Clark, 1969, p.398). Likewise describing a board as six 
meters long is acceptable to English speakers but describing it as six meters short is not. 
Therefore, short would be described as ‘marked’. Finally, a morphologically negative word is 
‘marked’ as opposed to a positive one (e.g., honest vs. dishonest; happy vs. unhappy) and 
therefore, humans are less efficient (in terms of processing speed) at handling negative 
statements (e.g. Sherman, 1973).  
Related studies (e.g., Matthews & Dylman, 2014) have shown that English speakers 
have a preference to use ‘larger’ (e.g., more, taller, higher) comparisons to describe the 
relationship between two magnitudes (e.g., one flag is _____ than the other). Other evidence 
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shows that people make a concerted effort to dampen down, mute, and even erase negative 
experiences and that positive illusions promote psychological wellbeing (Taylor & Brown, 
1994). Peoples’ strong positivity biases have been described as the Pollyanna Principle (for 
review see Matlin, 2016). Overall, the evidence points towards humans having a bias towards 
positivity and larger or increasing descriptions (i.e., a Positive Framing Bias; PFB) and 
suggests that this bias can be manipulated by framing effects.   
Present study 
The present study tests the hypothesis that the absolute estimates of implicit attitudes 
obtained from the IRAP are influenced by a PFB. Specifically, people might find it easier to 
response True to positive descriptions of stimuli than to press False. This effect is predicted to 
occur over and above any effect of congruence between the stimulus and the description that 
is presented with it, and is expected to lead to an overestimation of the positivity of absolute 
implicit attitudes. For example, participants may be faster to respond True (rather than False) 
when responding whether a stimulus category (e.g., Thin Person/Flowers) is positive (e.g., 
“Good”) than when it is negative (e.g., “Bad”). If a PFB does influence IRAP responding, the 
IRAP may not be able to measure absolute implicit attitudes in the way intended. 
Three main hypotheses were therefore tested:    
H1: By default, participants will be more likely to focus on positive rather than 
negatively framed associations and therefore they will be faster to respond True than False for 
categories presented with positive words in the standard IRAP condition.  
H2: The way the task is framed will influence estimates of a person’s absolute implicit 
attitudes. If absolute attitudes as measured by the IRAP are susceptible to PFB effects, directly 
manipulating how the task is framed to participants should influence the results in predictable 
directions. Specifically, encouraging participants to focus on whether positive associations are 
true or false should increase estimated ‘implicit positive attitudes’ towards any category. 
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Conversely, encouraging participants to focus on whether negative associations are true or false 
should increase estimates of ‘implicit negative attitudes’. The effect of framing is predicted to 
be modulated by the strength of pre-existing negative or positive associations. That is, robust 
positive or negative associations will be less likely to be influenced by framing effects. Tasks 
that involve weak or absent prior associations will be more strongly influenced by the framing 
manipulation than those with strong prior associations. To test this we ran four different IRAP 
tasks, using stimuli which had differing strengths of prior positive and negative associations. 
H3: When the IRAP data are analysed in such a way as to obtain relative attitudes (as 
is done for the IAT), the framing effect will have no influence. This is because any systematic 
biases will be cancelled out when the relevant conditions are combined. Tasks that use stimuli 
with weak or absent prior associations will show neutral attitudes; those with strong prior 
associations will in contrast show the expected pro/anti-bias (e.g., pro-thin/anti-fat). 
To test these hypotheses, we manipulated the way in which tasks were framed (no 
frame-standard, positive frame, and negative framing conditions) for each of four IRAP tasks, 
which contained stimuli that varied in their strength of prior associations. If a PFB does exist 
(i.e., if the first two hypotheses were confirmed), the use of the IRAP as a measure of absolute, 
rather than just relative attitudes would be severely limited.  
Method 
Participants: The final sample consisted of 60 students from the University of Warwick 
(mean age = 21.9, SD = 2.79), 20 in each condition (standard, positive frame and negative 
frame). Fourteen participants were replaced (four from the standard, six from the positive frame 
and four from the negative frame conditions)10 from the original 60 because the required 
                                                 
10 Including the original participants did not cause any significant changes to the results 
reported.   
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performance criteria were not met. The final sample contained 32 females and comprised 36 
Asians, 19 Whites, 3 Mixed Race and 2 Blacks. Participants were recruited via an electronic 
recruitment system and were paid £4. Participants were tested individually in a small room and 
the experiment took approximately 40 minutes to complete.  
Apparatus and materials 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure: (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). Each 
participant completed four separate IRAPs. These were a Non-word IRAP, a Social System 
IRAP, a Nature IRAP, and a Weight IRAP. These four different IRAPs were chosen because 
the category stimuli in each were expected to have varying degrees of prior associations. Both 
the Nature and Weight IRAP stimuli were predicted to have strong prior associations (see 
Greenwald et al., 1998 and O'Brien, et al., 2006). The Social System IRAP stimuli were 
expected to have weak associations11 and the Non-word IRAP stimuli should have no prior 
associations. All IRAP tests were administered using an Intel Windows 7 laptop with a 15” 
LCD screen (IRAP software available from http://irapresearch.org/wp/downloads-and-
training/).  
For the Weight IRAP, on each trial one of two category labels was presented at the top 
of the screen (‘Thin Person’ or ‘Fat Person’) and a single positive or negative target stimulus 
was presented in the center of the screen (e.g., ‘Healthy’ or ‘Ugly’). The Weight IRAP used 
pictures, and the other three IRAPs used words as the category labels. Two response options 
(‘True’ and ‘False’) also appeared at the bottom left and right (respectively) of the screen (see 
                                                 
11 O’Shea, (2017b) found that 17 UK and 10 Chinese undergraduates had no relative 
comparison bias in favor or against Capitalism vs. Communism or Socialism. However, see 
O’Shea (2015) where bankers had extremely strong biases in favor of Capitalism.       
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Figure 3.1).  The remaining IRAP tasks followed the same format but with the condition-
specific stimuli presented (see Tables S3.1 and S3.2 in Appendix 3 for the full stimulus sets).  
All category labels and target stimuli were matched on word length, phoneme length 
and word frequency using Brysbaert and New (2009) film subtitle database. The positive and 
negative target stimuli for the Social System IRAP were determined by asking 50 participants 
(via Amazon Mechanical Turk) to generate positive and negative words that they associated 
strongly with Capitalism and Socialism. The most frequently reported words were selected for 
use in the current study. Stimuli for the nature IRAP were chosen from past implicit research 
(e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998). The 12 images for the weight IRAP were taken from Nolan et 
al. (2013) and consisted of three pictures of women and three pictures of men, before and after 
they had lost a significant amount of weight. These images were controlled on a number of 
dimensions (e.g., picture angle, cropping, clothing and background). The most appropriate 
positive and negative target words were chosen from studies of implicit weight biases (Roddy 
et al., 2010, 2011). 
Design and procedure 
The study used a mixed 4 (trial type: category 1-positive words, category 1-negative 
words, category 2-positive words, and category 2-negative words) × 4 (IRAP task: Non-word, 
Social System, Nature and Weight) × 3 (framing condition: standard, positive, negative) 
design, with IRAP task and IRAP trial type as within-subjects factors and framing condition as 
a between-subjects factor.  
We illustrate the procedure using the Weight IRAP task. Participants were required to 
respond in a predefined way as specified before each block of trials. For example, participants 
might be instructed ‘On this block please respond as if Thin Person is Positive and Fat Person 
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is Negative’. This would be described as a pro-Thin block of trials (congruent responding12) 
and participants were required to respond True to the stimulus combination ‘Thin Person – 
Positive Word’ and ‘Fat Person – Negative Word’, and to respond False to ‘Thin Person – 
Negative Word’ and ‘Fat Person – Positive Word’. After participants completed this pro-Thin 
block they were required to respond in the opposite manner on the next block and were thus 
instructed: ‘On this block please respond as if Thin Person is Negative and Fat Person is 
Positive’ (incongruent responding). On these pro-Fat trials participants had to respond False to 
‘Thin Person – Positive Word’ and ‘Fat Person – Negative Word’ and to respond True to ‘Thin 
Person – Negative Word’ and ‘Fat Person – Positive Word’.  
This procedure enabled the experimenter to measure attitudes based on four separate 
trial types (Thin Person – Positive Word, Thin Person – Negative Word, Fat Person – Positive 
Word and Fat Person – Negative Word) by measuring the mean latency difference in 
responding True vs. False in pro-Thin and pro-Fat blocks. To respond, participants pressed 
either ‘D’ or ‘K’ on the keyboard. The D and K keys corresponded to the left – right positions 
of the response options on the screen respectively. The locations of the two response options 
interchanged quasi-randomly from left to right among trials, with the constraint that they could 
not remain in the same position three times in succession.  
 To complete the IRAP sequence, participants completed six test blocks which 
alternated between requiring pro-Thin or pro-Fat responses across blocks. Initial block ( pro-
Thin or pro-Fat) was counterbalanced across participants. Each block consisted of 24 trials, 
                                                 
12 For the Non-Word IRAP and the Social System IRAP the blocks that are referred to as 
congruent or incongruent responding were arbitrarily selected. However, for the Nature and 
Weight IRAP congruent responding was defined in terms of the blocks people were expected 
to find easier due to prior associations in memory.    
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made up of the 6 positive and 6 negative target words presented twice in the presence of the 
two category stimuli (i.e., ‘Thin Person’ or ‘Fat Person’). Trials were presented quasi-
randomly, such that the same trial type could not be repeated across two successive trials. If 
participants pressed the correct response on a trial the screen cleared for 400ms before the next 
trial was presented. If an incorrect response was given a red letter (X) appeared on screen and 
remained until the participant pressed the correct response key. After participants completed a 
block of trials their mean accuracy and median response latency scores were displayed on the 
screen. The first participant was assigned to the standard condition, the second to the positive 
framing condition and the third to the negative framing condition. This order was then repeated 
and maintained for the remaining participants. 
Standard framing condition: For the standard condition visual instructions before 
each block were alternated across participants. For example, one participant would be shown, 
‘On this block please respond as if Thin Person is Positive and Fat Person is Negative’ and 
‘On this block please respond as if Thin Person is Negative and Fat Person is Positive’ and 
the next participant would always begin with Fat Person as the first category described in each 
sentence.  
Positive framing condition: In the positive framing condition visual explanations of 
how to perform the task were always framed in a positive way prior to beginning each block 
of trials (e.g., ‘On this block please respond as if Thin Person is Positive and Fat Person is 
Negative’ or ‘On this block please respond as if Fat Person is Positive and Thin Person is 
Negative’)13. These instructions were dependent on participants completing a pro-Thin or pro-
                                                 
13 Since English speakers process sentences from left to right the leftmost instructions were 
likely be processed first. 
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Fat block. Unlike in the standard framing condition, each participant in this condition was also 
presented with a standardized verbal explanation from the experimenter. 
 The script was as follows:  
“A method or strategy that will help you complete this task is to keep ‘Thin Person’ and 
‘Positive word’ in your mind and base all other responses off that14. For example, when a 
‘Thin Person’ and a Positive word appears, press True and if this does not occur press False 
(such as ‘Thin Person’ and Negative word). Then use this strategy to gauge how to respond 
to the other category by responding in the opposite manner (such as ‘Fat Person’ Positive 
words False; ‘Fat Person’ Negative word True) To emphasize ‘Thin Person’ is Positive, 
‘Thin Person’ is Positive” 
After participants completed the first practice block they were told the following: 
“Now on this block put ‘Fat Person’ is Positive into your mind ‘Fat Person’ is Positive, 
‘Fat Person’ is Positive” 
Participants were told the following on each successive IRAP: 
“For this task use the same strategy as the last time by keeping ‘XXX’ and Positive word in 
your mind.” 
Negative framing condition: The negative framing condition was identical to the 
positive except that the underlined words in the verbal script above were replaced with their 
antonyms and the visual description before each block always described the negative 
instructions first (e.g., ‘On this block please respond as if Fat Person is Negative and Thin 
                                                 
14 Category words in bold were replaced depending on which pro-block was presented first 
and which of the four versions of the IRAPs was being conducted. Sentences in brackets were 
only explained to participants who were confused and required more detailed instructions. 
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Person is Positive’ or ‘On this block please respond as if Thin Person is Negative and Fat 
Person is Positive’).  
The remaining three IRAP tasks (Non-word, Social System and Nature) followed the 
same procedure but with the condition-relevant stimuli substituted. The order of the four IRAPs 
was randomized within the standard framing condition with the same set of random orders used 
for the positive and negative framing conditions. For the first IRAP participants were required 
to complete a minimum of two practice blocks. This was to ensure that participants were 
accustomed to the IRAP’s procedure.  If a participant received first pro-Fat then pro-Thin 
conditions on the practice blocks this sequence was maintained for the 1st and 2nd test block, 
the 3rd and 4th, and the 5th and 6th test block.  
  To proceed to the test blocks participants had to achieve an accuracy of 79% or above 
and a median response latency of less than 2,200ms on two consecutive practice blocks.  All 
participants met the practice block criteria but if these criteria were not maintained throughout 
each test block on the four IRAP tasks, participants’ data were removed and replaced with data 
from new participants. This resulted in 14 participants being replaced. When the four IRAPs 
were completed, participants provided demographic information, received their payment and 
were thanked and debriefed.  
Results 
The primary data obtained from the IRAP tasks are raw latency scores defined as the 
time in milliseconds that elapsed between the onset of the stimulus and the correct response 
being made by the participant. The DV was participants’ mean False minus True reaction time 
difference for each of the four trial types (i.e. Thin Person-Positive Words, Thin Person-
Negative Words, Fat Person-Positive Words, Fat Person-Negative Words) across the congruent 
(e.g., pro-thin) vs. incongruent (e.g., pro-fat) blocks. Analysing the trial types/categories 
separately provided the absolute results while averaging all the trial types provided the relative 
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results. Following standard procedures to control for individual variation, (Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2010a) each participant’s response latencies were transformed using an adaption of the 
Greenwald et al., (2003) D-algorithm. The steps involved in calculating both the absolute and 
relative D-IRAP scores can be found in Appendix 3. Initially a stimulus Category × Word 
Valence × IRAP task within-subjects ANOVA was performed on the False minus True 
absolute D-IRAP scores for each of the four trial types in the standard condition. This analysis 
allowed us to test the first hypothesis: H1: participants will have a faster True (vs. False) 
response for categories presented with positive words. Inclusion of the factors stimulus 
Category and IRAP task also allowed us to consider the generality of the effect of Word 
Valence. 
Following this, a 4 (trial type: category 1-positive words, category 1-negative words, 
category 2-positive words, category 2-negative words) × 4 (IRAP task: Non-word, Social 
System, Nature, Weight) × 3 (framing: standard, positive, negative) mixed ANOVA was 
performed on the of absolute D-IRAP (estimate) scores15. This analysis was carried out to test 
H2 (how the task is framed will influence the estimates of a person’s implicit attitudes). A 
further analysis combined both the positive word and negative word D-IRAP (estimate) scores 
for each of the eight categories (i.e., Fat Person, Thin Person, Flower, Insect etc.) in the 
standard condition. This method provides the average absolute D-IRAP (estimate) scores for 
each category and matches the standard way of calculating the IRAP’s results. This analysis 
                                                 
15 The absolute D-IRAP (estimate) scores were found by reversing the False minus True D-
IRAP scores for categories presented with negative words. Categories presented with positive 
words were not reversed. This was carried out so that scores above zero represent a positive 
attitude and those that are below the zero mark represent a negative attitude. The absolute D-
IRAP (estimate) scores were used to test H2.  
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was used to test further the argument that the PFB has an influence on peoples’ responses and 
to examine the extent to which this can lead to potentially inflated estimates of implicit 
attitudes16. Finally, tests were carried out to determine whether framing influenced participants’ 
relative implicit attitudes (H3).  In all analyses, whenever Mauchly’s sphericity assumption 
was violated the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied.17  
Test of H1: The influence of the PFB on prior associations in the standard condition  
False minus True D-IRAP scores for the standard framing condition were analysed 
using a 2 (Category) × 2 (Word Valence) × 4 (IRAP task) within-subjects ANOVA. This 
revealed a significant main effect of Valence: F(1,19) = 67.05, p <. 001, ηρ² = .78, as predicted 
by H1. There was also a significant Category × Valence two-way interaction: F(1,19) = 12.26, 
p <. 005, ηρ² = .392, and a significant IRAP × Category × Valence three-way interaction: 
F(3,57) = 5.77, p <. 005, ηρ² = .233. No other main effects or their interactions were significant 
(all Fs < 1.57, ps > .21). As shown in Figure 3.2, True responses were faster than False 
responses on positive word trials while for negative word trials there were no differences 
between pressing True/False supporting H1. The significant three-way interaction arises 
because True responses were faster than False responses for Category 1 stimuli across all four 
IRAPs. In contrast, for Category 2 stimuli True responses were only faster than false responses 
                                                 
16 Separate analysis of each of the four IRAPs (Non-word, Social System, Nature, and 
Weight) can be found in Appendix 3.   
17 Preliminary analyses revealed the sentence sequence instructions (e.g., Thin Person 
described first or Fat Person described first) in the standard condition and the order of the 
IRAP blocks presented (e.g. beginning with either a pro-Thin or a pro-Fat block) did not 
influence the critical IRAP effect in subsequent analyses. 
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for the Non-word and Social System IRAPs (i.e., those in which the stimuli had relatively weak 
prior associations).  
This pattern of results is assumed to reflect differences in the strength of prior 
associations across the four IRAP types. For the two IRAPs with the weakest prior associations 
(Non-word and Social System) there was little influence of whether the description was 
congruent or incongruent with the stimulus being presented. Thus, for those IRAPs there was 
little difference between scores for Category 1 versus Category 2 stimuli but there was an 
overall effect of Word Valence. That is, True vs. False responses were faster on positive word 
trials. In contrast, for the IRAPs with stronger prior associations (Nature and Weight), there 
was an effect of stimulus congruence. That is, congruent responses (e.g., positive word – 
flower, negative word - insect) were faster than incongruent responses (positive word – insect, 
negative word – flower). As for the Non-word and Social System IRAPs, the effect of the PFB 
was to increase the speed of True responses on positive word trials. This resulted in an 
increased difference between positive word and negative word trials for positive stimuli (e.g., 
Flowers/Thin) and a corresponding smaller difference for negative stimuli (Insects/Fat). 
Test of H2: The influence of the PFB on estimates of absolute implicit attitudes 
The absolute D-IRAP (estimate) scores were analysed with a 4 (trial type: category 1-
positive words, category 1-negative words, category 2-positive words, category 2-negative 
words) × 4 (IRAP task: Non-word, Social System, Nature, Weight) × 3 (framing: standard, 
positive, negative) mixed ANOVA, with trial type and IRAP task as the within-subjects factors 
and framing condition as the between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of trial type, F(3, 171) = 64.52, p < .001, ηρ² = .53, but not of IRAP task, F(2.62, 149.34) 
= .40, p = .76, ηρ² = .01. Importantly, the trial type × IRAP task interaction was significant, 
F(7.02, 399.99) = 10.26, p < .001, ηρ² = .15. As shown in Figure 3.3 (top left), for stimuli with 
absent or weak priori associations (i.e., the Non-word IRAP and the Social System IRAP), 
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elevated implicit attitudes were found (see Cat1-Positive and Cat2-Positive). For stimuli with 
stronger prior associations (i.e., the Nature & the Weight IRAPs) this pattern was weaker. 
 
Figure 3.2: Mean False Minus True D-IRAP scores as a function of Category, Word Valence 
and IRAP task. Values above zero indicate that responses for pressing True were faster than 
responses for pressing False while values below zero indicate a faster False vs. True 
response bias. Error bars with 95% confidence intervals have been included.  
 
A significant main effect was found for framing, F(2, 57) = 42.40, p < .001, ηρ² = .60. 
As shown in Figure 3.3 (top right) the positive framing condition produced elevated estimates 
of implicit attitudes (M = .31) whilst negative framing resulted in reduced estimates of implicit 
attitudes (M = -.09). The standard framing condition showed estimates of implicit attitudes that 
were in between the estimates obtained in the positive and negative framing conditions (M = 
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.16). Across the four trial types the framing manipulation had a similar effect — a framing × 
trial type interaction was not found, F(6,171) = 1.02, p = .41, ηρ² = .04. Crucially, the framing 
× IRAP task interaction was significant F(6,171) = 9.50, p < .001, ηρ² = .25. Figure 3.3 (bottom 
left) shows that framing influenced the estimates of participants’ implicit attitudes and that this 
influence was weaker for strong prior associations. Lastly the three way interaction was not 
significant F(18, 504) = .62, p = .89, ηρ² = .02. The overall pattern of results suggest that: i) 
participants had positive implicit attitudes (estimates) across all the IRAP tasks, ii) framing had 
a strong effect on the estimates of implicit attitudes, and iii) the effect of framing was stronger 
for associations with weaker rather than stronger prior associations. 
Test of H2: Combining the positive and negative trials for each category in the standard 
condition 
In order to match the standard way the IRAP results are reported in the literature we 
combined/averaged the absolute D-IRAP (estimate) scores for the positive and negative word 
associations in each category (see Figure 3.3; bottom right). For example, ‘implicit attitudes’ 
for ‘Thin Person’ were calculated by averaging the D-IRAP (estimate) scores from the ‘Thin 
Person-Positive Words’ and ‘Thin Person-Negative Words’ trials. One-sample t-tests were 
conducted on the resulting values which revealed that the scores for the Non-word and Social 
System trials (absent/ weak prior associations) were significantly greater than (ts > 2.95, ps < 
.01) or marginally greater (for Capitalism; t = 1.90, p = .07) than zero. In the Nature IRAP there 
was an expected pro-flower bias (t = 7.24, p < .001). The apparent neutral attitude towards 
insects (t = -1.07, p = .30) is likely due to the tendency for participants to frame the IRAP task 
in a positive way, with this PFB then offsetting the negative bias people usually possess for 
insects. This is similar to the Weight IRAP in which a strong positive attitude was observed for 
thin people (t = 4.43, p = <.001) but a neutral attitude was found for fat people (t = -1.03, p = 
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.32). These findings further underline the problem of using the IRAP’s absolute results because 
they are likely to overestimate the positivity of a person’s implicit attitudes.   
        
Figure 3.3: (Top Left): The mean absolute D-IRAP (estimate) trial type × IRAP task 
interaction. Points above the zero line indicate a positive attitude towards the category under 
investigation. This occurs when True responses are faster than False responses for categories 
presented with positive words and also when False response are faster than True response for 
categories presented with negative words. Points below the zero line indicate a negative 
attitude. This occurs when False responses are faster than True response for positive word 
associations and also when True response are faster than False response for negative word 
associations. Error bars that cross the zero mark indicate a statistically neutral attitude; those 
that do not cross zero indicate a significant positive or negative attitude. (Top Right) The 
mean absolute D-IRAP (estimate) trial type × framing condition interaction. (Bottom Left) 
The mean absolute D-IRAP (estimate) IRAP task × framing condition interaction. The IRAP 
tasks are ordered from no prior associations (Non-word IRAP; leftmost) to strong prior 
associations (Weight IRAP; rightmost). (Bottom Right) The mean combined/averaged 
absolute D-IRAP (estimate) results for each category. Error bars with 95% confidence 
intervals have been included.  
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`Test of H3: The influence of the PFB on the relative IRAP results 
The relative overall D-IRAP scores were analysed using a similar method to that used 
to analyse IAT data to assess if there were differences across the standard, positive and negative 
framing conditions for each of the four IRAP tasks. For all the IRAP tasks there were no 
significant differences across the three framing conditions (Non-word = F(2, 57) = .35, p = .70, 
ηρ² = .01; Social System =  F(2, 57) = .19, p = .83, ηρ² = .01; Nature = F(2, 57) = .30, p = .74, 
ηρ² = .01; Weight = F(2, 57) = .28, p =.78, ηρ² = .01; see Figure 3.4).   
 
Figure 3.4: The mean relative D-IRAP score for the four IRAP tasks. Error bars with 95% 
confidence intervals have been included.  
  
 
In each of the framing conditions for the Non-word and Social System IRAP tasks 
(absent/ weak prior associations), the D-IRAP scores did not differ significantly from zero (all 
ts < 1.51, ps > .15), indicating neutral attitudes to the Non-words as well as Capitalism relative 
to Socialism. In each of the framing conditions for the Nature and the Weight IRAP tasks 
(strong prior associations), the D-IRAP scores were a significant distance away from zero (all 
70 
 
ts > 3.30, ps <.01), indicating the predicted pro-flower/anti-insect bias and the pro-thin/anti-fat 
bias. 
Discussion 
The main aim of the present study was to determine if default (positive) framing biases 
might compromise the validity of the IRAP (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). According to 
previous research (Matlin, 2016; McKenzie & Nelson, 2003) people have a general and default 
bias to frame events and objects in a positive way (a Positive Framing Bias; PFB) and it is 
possible to manipulate this bias though framing. Based on the procedure and structure of the 
IRAP we reasoned that such a PFB might have the effect of biasing estimates of absolute 
attitudes. Indeed, such a bias might account for previous results which seem either 
counterintuitive (e.g., Hussey et al., 2015), or inconsistent with prior research (e.g., Roddy et 
al., 2011; 2012). We suggest that the effect of a positivity bias in this situation would lead to 
more rapid True responses to categories presented with positive words than False responses 
for the same stimuli. This in turn would lead to inflated estimates of positive attitudes towards 
the stimulus set being examined. If this is indeed the case, the validity of the IRAP as a measure 
of absolute implicit attitudes would be severely limited. 
We set out to test three hypotheses: (H1) participants hold a default (as measured in the 
standard condition) Positive Framing Bias (PFB) which results in a decrease in the time 
required for them to press True to categories presented with positive words than to press False. 
(H2) framing the response task in different ways should influence the estimates of absolute 
implicit attitudes obtained by the IRAP, with weak prior associations being more malleable, 
and (H3) framing biases or direct manipulations would have no influence when a relative 
category analysis of the data is carried out. 
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The effect of a default Positive Framing Bias (H1) 
 In the standard condition the absolute IRAP scores were positively biased across all 
four IRAPs. In these IRAPs participants were generally faster at pressing True rather than False 
when associating any category with positive words. The implication of this finding is that 
researchers using the IRAP might incorrectly interpret their results as showing that participants 
have a positive (absolute) attitude towards abstract categories (e.g., social systems or atheism: 
(O’Shea, 2017a). In contrast, the ‘true’ attitudes could be either neutral or even negative and 
so this finding calls into question the validity of the IRAP procedure. Of note, even the IRAP 
tasks that used stimuli with strong prior associations (Nature and Weight) were influenced by 
this PFB and, as predicted, a reduction in positivity was seen for categories that usually show 
a negative bias when assessed by other measures (e.g., insects and fat people), resulting in 
neutral absolute attitudes as measured by the IRAP.  
These findings could account for at least some of the unusual results that have been 
previously published using the IRAP. For example, as detailed earlier, Roddy et al. (2011, 
2012) reported a neutral bias towards fat people whereas we might expect a negative attitude. 
Similarly, Barnes-Holmes et al. (2010) reported that participants evaluated black and white 
non-security related civilians with a gun as ‘Safe’ whereas we might expect that they would be 
viewed as dangerous. Both these results could be explained as an artefact caused by a PFB.  
That is, participants are likely to be simplifying the task by picking just one of the two possible 
associations they have to perform on a block (usually the positive) and basing all responses on 
that association18. This bias in turn leads to an overestimation of the absolute positive attitude 
                                                 
18 After participants completed the current experiment those in the standard framing condition 
were asked to write down any strategies they used to complete the task. This question was not 
needed for the participants in the positive and negative framing condition because they were 
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towards a stimulus set because, as we have shown, True responses to positive associations are 
faster than False responses. 
The influence of framing on estimates of absolute attitudes (H2) 
 We also determined the effect of directly manipulating the framing of the task on 
estimates of absolute implicit attitudes. If the IRAP results are influenced by framing, then 
directly manipulating the frame should have a related influence on the ‘implicit attitude’ 
(estimate) scores obtained when an absolute analysis of the data is calculated. As argued 
previously, we would expect that weak or absent prior associations would be more likely to be 
influenced by the framing effect than those with strong prior associations. This prediction was 
also confirmed. For the Non-word and Social System IRAP there was a strong effect of 
framing.  That is, in the positive framing condition scores were elevated across all trial types 
whereas in the negative framing condition scores were reduced.  In contrast, for the Nature and 
Weight IRAP the framing effects were smaller, particularly in the negative framing condition.  
These outcomes suggest that the reason that using the absolute results from IRAP trial 
types are problematic is that responses are influenced strongly by how a person frames each 
block of trials. It is noteworthy that the way in which the associations are phrased before 
beginning an IRAP block (especially the sequence) are practically non-existent in published 
                                                 
specifically given a strategy to follow. Of the 10 participants in the standard framing 
condition who made any references to focusing on mainly the associations, all mentioned the 
positive associations and none made reference to a focus on the negative associations. The 
remaining 10 could not describe any strategies they used other than remembering the two 
possible associations they had to perform on each block of trials. This suggests that when 
participants did spontaneously choose an explicit strategy they chose one based on positive 
associations.      
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IRAP reports. Yet we have shown that they can have an influence on the results obtained, 
particularly if a researcher primes a participant in some way to focus on either the negative or 
positive associations. In summary, the IRAP claims to determine absolute implicit attitudes. 
However, as we have shown, framing effects can influence the absolute value of the scores 
obtained, making them unreliable at best. Such framing biases can arise naturally and by default 
(as in the standard condition) to frame objects positively (the PFB). In addition, differences in 
the way the IRAP task is explained to the participants can have large influences (as in the 
positive and negative framing conditions). 
The influence of framing on the relative results (H3) 
The third hypothesis was that the framing effect would not have an influence on relative 
attitudes (when the data were analysed using the standard IAT methodology). Use of stimuli 
with weak or no prior associations was expected to lead to neutral attitudes, while stimuli with 
strong prior associations were predicted to lead to findings showing the expected pro/anti-bias 
(e.g., pro-thin/anti-fat). Again, all these predictions were confirmed across the four IRAPs. 
When analysed in a relative manner we found the Non-word IRAP and the Social System IRAP 
indicated neutral attitudes towards the various category labels. For the Nature and Weight 
IRAPs, the results were consistent with previous IAT studies (i.e., pro-flower/anti-insect; pro-
thin/anti-fat). This suggests that that the IRAP can still be used when a relative analysis of the 
data is to be carried out.  
One possible benefit of using the IRAP as a relative measure is that it appears to be 
difficult for participants to fake their responses (McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Stewart, 2007) but see Hughes et al., (2016) for more critical findings. The major 
disadvantages of the IRAP as a relative measure are that it is more complicated, takes longer 
to complete and has a higher attrition rate than the IAT (Golijani-Moghaddam et al., 2013).  
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Developing a new absolute measure of implicit attitudes 
In addition to the framing biases revealed here for the IRAP, other proposed absolute 
methods also suffer from problems. As discussed earlier, there are problems with both the 
Go/No-Go task and the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task for measuring absolute implicit 
attitudes (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014; De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007). Initial results obtained 
using the single concept IAT variations (e.g., Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) have shown 
promise in measuring absolute implicit attitudes. However, the IAT and its derivatives are not 
without their limitations. For example, the sequence or order (Klauer & Mierke, 2005) in which 
participants carry out the critical blocks has been shown to influence the IAT results. For 
example beginning with the Fat Person-Positive and Thin Person-Negative block results in a 
weaker pro-thin/anti-fat IAT effect than when the presentation order is the other way around. 
However, it is possible that including more practice trials after the first critical block reduces 
this problem (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). Nonetheless, it remains to be determined 
whether the PFB influences the results of the single concept IATs in a similar way to those of 
the IRAP.  
 Diversifying the tools used to measure implicit attitudes is likely to enhance our 
understanding of them. Consequently, the authors are currently developing a new implicit tool 
called the Simple Implicit Procedure (SIP) which was inspired by the present work. In brief, 
this tool has parallels to the IRAP but, as the name suggests, rather than participants having to 
respond to two opposing associations during blocks, the SIP will only involve one association 
per block. For example, before each block in the IRAP participants could be told ‘On this block 
please respond as if Thin Person is Negative and Fat Person is Positive’, but during the SIP 
they could be told ‘On this block please respond as if Thin Person is Negative’ which is much 
simpler as it only requires one association to be kept in memory. 
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 We anticipate that this change will reduce participants’ PFB because they will be 
exposed to equal frequencies of instructions that are framed positively and negatively19. 
Keeping just one association in memory will reduce participants’ cognitive load and hence 
their need to use a simplifying strategy/method to make the task easier.  To ensure that 
participants do not focus solely on the positive and negative words and ignore the category 
stimuli, an inhibition/alternative response key will be used in some of the trials. For example, 
participants will have to press the Space Bar when ‘Fat Person’ and any valenced word appears 
on a ‘Thin Person’ block.  
The SIP will also bring the ability to measure a single concept (e.g. self-esteem) without 
the need for a comparison group. Additionally, this tool could act as both an absolute and 
relative measure by simply adding in a comparison group/category. This feature would enable 
researchers to obtain a general overview of participants’ attitudes through the relative 
comparisons but a more complete understanding of implicit attitudes could be observed with 
the absolute results. The order or sequence effect apparent in the IAT (Klauer & Mierke, 2005) 
is not expected to have as much of an influence when using the SIP. For example, in a Fat-Thin 
SIP participants will respond in one of four possible blocks of trials at any point (i.e. Thin 
                                                 
19 In the IRAP participants have to press “True” or “False” to positively valenced word and 
“True” or “False” to negative valenced words depending on which “Pro” block they are 
carrying out. The SIP, however, will require participants to press “True” to the positive 
valenced words in the positive association blocks and “True” to the negatively valenced 
words in the negative association blocks. The mean latency difference between pressing 
“True” on different block will be measured. Likewise, “False” is pressed to negative words in 
the positive association blocks and to positive words in negative association blocks. Using 
this procedural set up should remove the PFB people have. 
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Person-Positive, Thin Person-Negative, Fat Person-Positive, Fat Person-Negative). Each 
participant will experience a random sequence of these four blocks in the SIP (24 possible 
sequences) which represents an improvement over the two possible sequences available for the 
IATs. Pilot studies are currently being carried out to test the validity of the SIP. 
Consideration of special populations 
Although the current research implies that people in general have a PFB, it is possible 
that the results would not generalize to specific groups, namely those with depression or other 
emotional disorders. There is a wealth of evidence showing that these groups are in fact biased 
towards negative thought processes (e.g., Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010).  It would be 
illuminating to see if those with depression are more likely to focus on negative associations, 
resulting in a Negative Framing Bias (NFB) when conducting the IRAP.  Indeed, (Kosnes, 
Whelan, O’Donovan, and McHugh (2013) provided evidence for this suggestion using the 
IRAP with a sub-clinically depressed sample and a normative one. The authors claimed they 
were measuring participants’ responses to future thinking (i.e., measuring the difference 
between pressing True and False to ‘I expect’ or ‘I don’t expect’ which were presented with 
positive and negative words). 
 While the experimenters interpreted their results as the normative sample having 
positive future thinking and the subclinical having negative future thinking, the current findings 
suggest an alternative interpretation. That is, the statements ‘I expect’ and ‘I don’t expect’ are 
unlikely to evoke strong prior associations, similar to the Non-word IRAP and Social System 
IRAP above. Therefore, the cognitive heuristics or framing strategies a participant engages in 
(e.g., a normative sample having a PFB and a depressed sample having a NFB) may be the 
driving factor behind Kosnes et al.’s (2013) results.    
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Conclusion 
The current study has provided the first empirical evidence that people have a tendency 
to spontaneously frame opposing associations in a positive way (Positive Framing Bias; PFB) 
when put under time pressure. This bias can be accentuated when participants are encouraged 
to focus on the positive associations and reversed when they are prompted to focus on the 
negative associations. These findings seriously question the validity of the IRAP as a tool for 
determining absolute implicit attitudes.  
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Chapter 4: The Simple Implicit 
Procedure (SIP): A new method for 
measuring implicit cognition 
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Abstract 
Diversifying the tools used to measure implicit attitudes will enhance our understanding of the 
response biases that such tools measure and will enable us to control for method-specific 
variations (i.e., use of sorting tasks vs. affirming and negating tasks). Here the Simple Implicit 
Procedure (SIP) is introduced as a tool for capturing individual’s implicit attitudes and 
stereotypes. In the SIP, participants must respond correctly to statements using affirming 
(“Yes”) and negating (“No”) responses. If participants are asked to “respond as if Flowers are 
Positive”, “Yes” is the correct response when a flower and a positive word appear together, 
while “No” is the correct response for a flower and a negative word pair. Likewise, participants 
must respond in the opposite manner to the statement “respond as if Flowers are Negative”. 
This procedure allows separate biases towards flowers and positive words, and flowers and 
negative words, to be measured. A contrasting category (i.e., insects) can also be included, 
allowing for the measurement of relative attitudes. Using the SIP across two attitude domains 
with near universal evaluative differences (i.e., flowers vs. insects and carers vs. criminals), 
attitudes towards the self, and a socially sensitive stereotype domain, we find that measures of 
implicit attitudes obtained using the SIP correlate with explicit measures, have acceptable 
internal reliability and show added predictive validity over the explicit measure in the socially 
sensitive domain. Furthermore, unlike the Implicit Association Test, the SIP is not subject to 
problematic order and practice effects. The SIP may therefore be useful in clinical settings 
where use of control groups is not ethical. These results show the unique benefits that the SIP 
can offer to attitude researchers.  
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It has been almost 20 years since the introduction of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and it is still the most widely used (Nosek et al., 2011) 
and reliable measure for estimating an individual’s implicit social cognitions (Bar-Anan & 
Nosek, 2014; Greenwald et al., 2009). The appeal of the IAT is due in part to its simple 
procedural set up and the ease with which participants can understand and complete the task. 
In a typical IAT (e.g., the Flower–Insect20 IAT) participants are successively presented with 
various pictures of flowers and insects, and positively and negatively valenced words. In one 
of the two critical blocks, participants must press the “E” key on a computer keyboard if a 
positive word or a picture of a flower appears and press the “I” key if a negative word or a 
picture of an insect appears (congruent block). In the other critical block, participants must 
press “E” if a positive word or a picture of an insect is shown and press the “I” key for a 
negative word or a picture of a flower (incongruent block).  
This task set up aims to measure biases participants have in associating concepts 
(flowers and insects) with valenced words. The stronger the association, the faster and more 
natural the sorting task will feel (congruent block), while weaker associations will result in a 
slowing down of processing times due to the unaccustomed pairings in memory (incongruent 
block). These response biases are often referred to as implicit attitudes which are 
“introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate 
favourable or unfavourable feelings, thought or actions towards social objects” (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995, p. 8). Explicit attitudes, however, are the result of controlled evaluative 
judgement and thoughtful introspection.  
In all areas of psychological research, particularly the area of implicit cognition, 
investigations into psychological phenomena depend on the tools of measurement (Gawronski, 
De Houwer, Reis, & Judd, 2014). The present research develops a new tool called the Simple 
                                                 
20 The flower-insect example will be used through the introduction. 
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Implicit Procedure (SIP) which aims to offer an alternative to associative measures of implicit 
attitudes like the IAT.   
Associative versus propositional measures of implicit cognition 
 The IAT is limited in the sense that it can only measure attitudes towards one 
category relative to another category (e.g., flower vs. insect; see Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). To 
overcome this limitation, the IAT has been adapted in various ways to create new measures of 
implicit attitudes such as the Single Category (SC)-IAT (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), the 
Sorting Paired Features Task (SPFT; Bar-Anan et al., 2009) and Go/No-Go Association Task 
(GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001). These absolute/unipolar measures can estimate implicit 
attitudes towards separate categories (separate bias towards flowers and insects). However, 
these measures cannot determine whether a bias is driven by a stronger positive or negative 
evaluation towards a category because to do so the response latencies for associating a category 
both with positive words and with negative words are required.  
All of these tasks have their advantages and disadvantages (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014; 
Greenwald & Sriram, 2010) but all measure associations between concepts, with the 
consequence that they ignore how the concepts are related. For example, “I am good” and “I 
want to be good” both involve an association between “I” and “good” but differ with respect 
to the type of relation/proposition involved. These two beliefs are of course different and will 
likely predict different behavioural outcomes, something that associative measures may not 
detect (De Houwer, Heider, Spruyt, Roets, & Hughes, 2015). 
New lines of research on implicit attitudes have questioned the idea that implicit 
cognition is confined to associations and suggests that implicit cognition may also involve 
rudimentary propositional/relational abilities (De Houwer, 2014; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Vahey, 2012; for empirical evidence supporting this suggestion see Remue, De Houwer, 
Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt, & De Raedt, 2013, and Remue, Hughes, Houwer, & Raedt, 
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2014). This novel way of thinking about implicit cognition led to the development of a task 
that aims to measure propositions between concepts and not just associations.  
This task is called the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; (Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010). In the IRAP participants must respond 
correctly on the basis of opposite statements about two categories (i.e., “respond as if flowers 
are positive and insects are negative”) using affirming (“Yes”) and negating (“No”) relational 
response options, rather than participants having to sort items into the correct categories as in 
the IAT. For example, based on the “as if” statement above, when a picture/word of a flower 
and a positive word appears, “Yes” is the correct response, but if a negative word appears with 
a flower, “No” is the correct response. Similarly, participants must respond according to the 
rule “insects are negative”. When these two stimuli appear together, “Yes” is the correct 
response, and when an insect appears with a positive word, “No” is the correct response. This 
pro-flower/anti-insect block is expected to be congruent with participants’ prior experiences of 
positive associations with flowers and negative associations with insects.  
On a subsequent incongruent pro-insect/anti-flower block, participants must respond 
using the correct affirming and negating responses on the basis of the relational statement 
“respond as if flowers are negative and insects are positive”. Therefore, a “Yes” response will 
be made when an insect and a positive word, or a flower and a negative word, appear on the 
screen. A “No” response should be used when an insect and a negative word, and a flower and 
a positive word appear on the screen. Due to the alternating responding across pro-flower/anti-
insect blocks and the pro-insect/anti-flower blocks, the IRAP allows for the assessment of four 
separate (absolute/unipolar) response biases (Flower–Positive, Flower-Negative, Insect-
Positive, Insect–Negative). These four response biases/trial types are found by measuring the 
mean latency difference in pressing “Yes” vs. “No” across the pro-flower/anti-insect blocks 
and the pro-insect/anti-flower blocks (see Figure 4.1 for a graphical representation). 
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Figure 4.1: Screen shot examples of the four Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure trial 
types. The category exemplars (a flower or an insect), target word (Enjoy, Cheer, Poison, etc.) 
and response options (Yes and No) appear simultaneously on each trial. Asterisks indicate the 
correct response option to press on either block. For each trial type, latency differences are 
compared between the correct “Yes” and “No” responses across the pro-flower/anti-insect 
blocks and the pro-insect/anti-flower blocks. 
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The advantage of the IRAP over other associative implicit measure can be exemplified 
with the gender-career IAT.  In this task, which aims to measure stereotypes, the four categories 
are: (1) male names, (2) female names, (3) career words and (4) family words. Participants are 
faster to sort males with careers and females with family than they are to sort females with 
careers and males with families, which shows a relative male-career/female-family bias on the 
IAT (Nosek, et al., 2007). With the GNAT, SPFT or the ST-IAT, researchers can test if 
participants have a bias in associating males with a career or a family, and a separate bias in 
associating females with a career or a family. Going a step further, the IRAP can measure 
separately the bias participants have in relating males with a career, males with a family, 
females with a career and females with a family. This enhanced ability is due to the 
propositional nature of the IRAP which compares “Yes” versus “No” response latencies in 
each of the 4 separate trial types21. 
Limitations of the IRAP 
The added specificity that the IRAP has in determining the source of an implicit bias 
unfortunately comes with some costs. When participants undertake the IRAP, it is immediately 
apparent that they find the task substantially harder than the IAT and the IRAP has been 
reported to have high attrition rates (Golijani-Moghaddam, Hart, & Dawson, 2013; Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2013). This limitation is likely to be due to the complicated nature of the IRAP 
which requires participants to keep two opposing relations in memory and to the strictness of 
the performance criteria (≥ 80% median accuracy & ≤ 2,000ms median response latency) that 
                                                 
21 A similar measure based on the IRAP’s propositional response options is the Relational 
Responding Task (RRT; (De Houwer, Heider, Spruyt, Roets, & Hughes, 2015). Although the 
RRT could technically measure separate (absolute) implicit attitudes, the initial publication 
did not report these details.    
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must be maintained throughout the task (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al., 2010). The 
experimenter also needs to impart detailed instructions to the participants to ensure they can 
complete the task correctly which constrains its utility for gathering data online (De Houwer et 
al., 2015).  
However, more problematically, research by O’Shea, Watson, and Brown (2016)22 
demonstrated that great caution should be used when interpreting the zero/neutral point of the 
four absolute IRAP trial types due to a “default” positive framing bias (PFB) that participants 
have when completing the IRAP. The PFB occurs precisely because participants are asked to 
store two relational statements in memory (e.g., “respond as if flowers are negative and insects 
are positive”). To make the task easier, participants appear to use a cognitive heuristic by 
storing just one of the relations in memory (i.e., normally the positive relation, e.g., insects are 
positive) and base all their responses on this relation, regardless of whether it is congruent or 
incongruent with their prior history of relating these items together.  
 This bias is illustrated by the findings from O’Shea et al., (2016) that across four 
different IRAP tasks participants were generally faster to press ‘Yes’ rather than ‘No’ when 
relating any category with positive words (the four domains were: non-words, 
capitalism/socialism, flower/insects and thin/fat individuals). This results in an over-inflation 
of estimates of positive biases towards any category, even those that have negative prior 
associations such as insects. In addition, using other relational response options (e.g., “True” 
and “False”; “Confirm” and “Deny”) did not remove or reduce the PFB. Positivity biases that 
are inherent to the English language (e.g., Dodds et al., 2015; Matlin, 2016; Matthews & 
Dylman, 2014) and a human propensity toward optimism (e.g. Peterson, 2000) were used to 
explain this PFB. 
                                                 
22 Reported in Chapter 3 
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O’Shea et al., (2016) also successfully manipulated the PFB by getting participants to 
frame the IRAP task either positively or negatively. In these conditions, participants were 
instructed to focus on only the positive or negative relation in the statement before each block 
of trials. In the positive framing condition, the positivity of participants’ estimates of implicit 
attitudes across the four domains increased compared to the control. In contrast, for the 
negative framing condition, estimates of implicit attitudes were reversed compared to those in 
the positive framing condition, resulting in more negative attitudes across the four domains. 
The authors recommended that the IRAP’s relative comparison results should also be reported 
(i.e., flowers vs. insects biases) because these yielded the predicted results in line with previous 
IAT findings. This finding occurs because the PFB gets cancelled out when calculating the 
relative results.  
It has been argued that it is advantageous for the IRAP to be sensitive to positivity 
biases inherent to languages (Hussey et al., 2015) because the IRAP was designed to capture 
such patterns in verbal or relational responding. If this assertion is correct, then describing the 
absolute results in the IRAP as positive, negative or neutral is meaningless, because the 
estimates of implicit attitudes are automatically shifted towards the positive pole. Therefore, 
results on the IRAP that apparently show neutral implicit attitudes towards a concept (e.g., 
O’Shea, 2015; Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010) might, in fact, be reflecting extremely 
negative attitudes.  
The IRAP remains a novel way of estimating implicit attitudes through its propositional 
methodology, as well as its enhanced abilities to determine where biases lie through the 
measurement of four separate absolute trial types. However, it is imperative that the IRAP task 
is simplified to make it easier for participants to complete and to reduce the number of 
instructions required. More simplicity would help with developing an online version, enabling 
easier access to participants that are not just WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, 
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Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). This greater range of people would 
increase the generalisability of findings. Furthermore, the PFB in the IRAP contaminates the 
accurate measurement of absolute implicit attitudes. Therefore, a simplified version of the 
IRAP that retains the propositional aspect but is not subject to the PFB would be a substantial 
advance. This possibility motivated the development of the Simple Implicit procedure (SIP).   
The Simple Implicit Procedure: SIP 
The SIP was designed to remove the PFB apparent in the IRAP and, as the name 
suggests, simplicity in the procedural set up was a priority. The SIP aims to achieve these two 
goals by requiring participants to store only one statement in memory before each block, 
instead of requiring participants to remember two relational statements as in the IRAP. To 
clarify, before each block in the IRAP participants are told one of two response rules (e.g., (1) 
“On this block respond as if Flowers are Negative and Insects are Positive” and (2) “On this 
block respond as if Flowers are Positive and Insects are Negative”). In the SIP, participants are 
instead told one of four response rules (i.e., (1) “On this block respond as if Flowers are 
Positive”, (2) “On this block respond as if Flowers are Negative”, (3) “On this block respond 
as if Insects are Positive”, (4) “On this block respond as if Insects are Negative”.  
Having four separate response rules requires participants to keep only one statement in 
memory on any given block of trials. Keeping just one statement in memory on all blocks of 
trials reduces participants’ cognitive load and hence their need to use a simplifying 
strategy/method to make the task easier. This procedure will remove the PFB because equal 
numbers of positive and negative statements will be stored in memory when participants 
complete the SIP.   
 The SIP is visually and structurally like the IRAP (see Figure 4.2). If participants are 
asked to “respond as if Flowers are Positive”, “Yes” is the correct response when a flower and 
a positive word appear together, while “No” is the correct response for a flower and a negative 
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word pair. Likewise, participants must respond in the opposite manner to the statement 
“respond as if Flowers are Negative”.  
The SIP also has an additional “space bar” response option which acts as an 
inhibition/alternative response to accommodate the contrasting category on each block of trials 
(e.g., insects on the pro/anti-flower blocks). This “space bar” response is necessary in the SIP 
to ensure participants relate the category stimuli with the positive and negative target stimuli. 
If there were no “space bar” responses, participants could focus solely on the positive and 
negative target words/stimuli and ignore the category stimuli. Hence, the SIP would not be 
measuring the speed at which participants relate flowers with positive and negative words but 
rather the speed at which they respond to positive and negative words. To summarise, 
participants must press “space bar” when “Insect” and any target word (i.e., both positive and 
negative) appears when they are using response rule 1 (“On this block respond as if Flowers 
are Positive”) and 2 (“On this block respond as if Flowers are Negative”). Likewise, 
participants must press the “space bar” when “Flower” and any target word appears when they 
are completing response rule 3 (“On this block respond as if Insect are Positive”) and 4 (“On 
this block respond as if Insect are Negative”).  
Throughout the following studies, an appropriate contrast category (e.g., Carer vs. 
Criminal, I am vs. Others are, Male Names vs. Females Names) was always used to allow 
relative results to be calculated as in the IAT. It is important to note that a contrasting category 
is not necessarily needed as the “space bar” response could be pressed for any item (e.g., cars, 
professions, celebrities etc.) that is not a flower if participants are responding to rule 1 or 2 
above. See Figure 4.3 for the correct responses on each trial when completing one of the four 
response rule blocks. 
The order or sequence effect that occurs in the IAT (i.e., completing the pro-flower/anti-
insect block first rather than second can influence the magnitude of the IAT effect; Nosek, 
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Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007) is not expected to be a problem when using the SIP. This problem 
will be greatly ameliorated or eradicated in the SIP for the group level analysis because each 
participant will complete a random sequence of the four response rules (i.e., 24 different 
sequences possible). Nevertheless, order effects in the SIP could still occur at the individual 
level but extremely large samples will be required to determine the influence order has. If only 
one category is used (no contrast category) then it is likely that a similar order effect to the IAT 
will still occur in the SIP because only one of two random sequences are possible. 
 
Figure 4.2: Screen shot examples of the four Simple Implicit Procedure trial types. The 
category exemplars (a flower or an insect), target word (Enjoy, Cheer, Evil, etc.) and response 
options (Yes, Space and No) appear simultaneously on each trial. Asterisks indicate the correct 
response option to press on each block. For each trial type, latency differences are compared 
between the correct “Yes” and “No” responses across the pro-flower and the anti-flower 
blocks, and the pro-insect and anti-insect blocks. 
90 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Diagram showing the correct response option to press on each trial in the four response rule blocks.   
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Overview of studies 
In the three studies that follow, the reliability and the validity of the SIP as well as its 
susceptibility to practice or experience effects was examined. These studies addressed attitudes 
across four domains (1) flowers vs insects, (2) non-words (i.e., cug vs vek), (3) carer vs. 
criminals and (4) the self  (i.e., “I am” vs. “others are”). One stereotype domain (gender–career 
vs family) was also examined. For each SIP, the mean “No” minus “Yes” RT differences for 
each of the four separate trial types (e.g., Flower–Positive, Flower–Negative, Insect–Positive, 
Insect–Negative) are reported. These allow for an improved understanding of where implicit 
biases lie (i.e., is a bias driven by the category stimuli being related to either positive words, 
negative words, or both). In addition, the scores from what we term “compacted” trial types 
(e.g., the average of the Flower–Positive and Flower-Negative trial types) are reported. It is 
hypothesised that the compacted trial type results will be less affected by noise in participants’ 
RTs. This improvement is due to the compacted RT scores being averaged across twice as 
many trials as the separate trial types. The relative results are also reported (i.e., biases towards 
flowers relative to biases towards insects). Throughout, internal reliability is reported for each 
SIP and the correlations between implicit beliefs and criterion variables are also reported (i.e., 
explicit measures; see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009, for how to 
validate implicit measures). 
Study 1 
Study 1 reports the findings from four separate SIPs assessing implicit and explicit 
biases towards: (1) flowers and insects (Nature) SIP, (2) carers and criminals (Character) SIP, 
(3) self-other (Self) SIP, and the (4) gender-career/family (Gender) SIP. It is hypothesised that 
the SIP’s 4 separate response rules, each with only one statement on a block of trials, will 
remove the PFB that occurs in implicit measures that use response rules with two statements 
on a block of trials (i.e. the IRAP and potentially the RRT). This elimination of the PFB in the 
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SIP would be observed if estimates of implicit biases are in line with the following 
expectations: for the absolute/unipolar/separate23 implicit scores, positive biases are observed 
for flowers, carers and the self on both the positive target word trials (i.e., faster to press “Yes” 
than “No”) and the negative target word trials (i.e., faster to press “No” than “Yes”). Negative 
biases are observed for insects and criminals on both the positive target word trials (i.e., people 
will be faster to press “No” than “Yes”) and negative target word trials (i.e., people will be 
faster to press “Yes” than “No”). Similarly, on the compacted absolute trial types, pro-flower, 
pro-carer, pro-self, anti-insect, and anti-criminal bias are expected. These expectations were 
based on research by Greenwald et al., (1998), Karpinski and Steinman, (2006), Nosek and 
Banaji, (2001) and public opinion (Gallup, 2017). No predictions were made for the implicit 
bias scores for the “Other” category in the Self SIP.  
Regarding the Gender SIP, the target stimuli are career and family words instead of 
positive and negative target words. It was expected that participants will be faster at relating 
both male and female names with career words as well as family words (i.e., faster to press 
“Yes” than “No”) on the separate trial types (i.e., Male-Career, Male-Family, Female-Career, 
Female-Family). The compacted (absolute) male trial type scores were predicted to show faster 
“Yes” responses when relating males with career than family but for females, faster “Yes” 
responses would be shown when relating females with family than career. 
 For the relative implicit scores, pro-flower/anti-insect biases, pro-carer/anti-criminal 
biases, pro-self/anti-other biases and male-career/female-family biases were predicted (Nosek, 
Smyth, et al., 2007). Internal reliability was expected to be in line with most implicit measures 
but would likely not be as good as the IAT (Nosek, et al., 2007) due to each participant having 
to complete a number of different SIPs in one sitting. The scores of the relative implicit and 
explicit measures in the Nature and Character tasks were expected to show a positive 
                                                 
23 These three terms will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
93 
 
correlation. Due to the near universal evaluative differences of people expressing positivity 
towards flowers and carers and negativity towards insects and criminals, and the greater 
variability in implicit attitudes between individuals, the absolute implicit and explicit measures 
were not predicted to show strong correlations. For the Self SIP, positive correlations between 
implicit and explicit attitudes were expected, and explicit attitudes were expected to predict 
scores on a validated self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1967) better than implicit attitudes. 
However, for the gender-career SIP, it was expected that participants will explicitly express 
egalitarian gender roles, while implicit biases will be more in line with traditional views of 
males being the breadwinner and females being the housewife (e.g., Rudman & Phelan, 2010). 
Therefore, the explicit measure will not correlate with the implicit measures. Because of this 
divergence, implicit attitudes are expected to predict scores on a scale addressing traditional 
gender justification (Jost & Kay, 2005) better than explicit attitudes.  
It is hypothesised that: (1) no differences in implicit scores will be seen if images or 
words are used as the category stimuli, but (2) using more stimuli in each category will lead to 
stronger apparent implicit biases. It is also hypothesised that (3) a “space bar” response is 
necessary to accurately estimate implicit biases because it forces participants to view the 
category stimuli and associate them with the positive and negative words. Hence, without a 
“space bar” response in the SIP, the task is not measuring implicit biases but instead response 
biases towards positive and negative words. Therefore, an overall neutral bias would be 
expected when no “space bar” responses are used. To test this hypothesis, scores from a SIP 
tasks with no “space bar” responses will be compared with scores from the same SIP task that 
uses “space bar” response options. Lastly, it is hypothesised that (4) having the “Yes” and “No” 
response options switch location on the screen throughout a SIP task (i.e., randomising) leads 
to more variability in participants responding (i.e., lower internal reliability) compared to a SIP 
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task with stationary “Yes” and “No” response options. Each of the four SIPs used tests one of 
these four hypotheses.   
Method 
Participants: The sample consisted of 64 first year psychology students (55 females) 
from the University of Warwick (UK) who received course credit for completing the current 
experiment. The mean age of the sample was 19.1 (SD = .97) and the majority (42 participants) 
were white British.    
Materials 
 
Demographic Information: Participants’ age, gender, nationality and ethnicity were 
gathered using an online questionnaire.  
Simple Implicit Procedure (SIP): The SIP was programmed using Blitzmax 
(www.blitzbasic.com/Products/blitzmax.php) and ran on an Intel Windows 7 desktop attached 
to a 22” LCD screen at a resolution of 1440 × 900 pixels.  A single trial consisted of three 
elements: (1) On the top of the screen a category stimulus appeared, (2) in the centre of the 
screen a positive or negative target word/stimulus appeared (see Table 4.1 for all the stimuli 
used in the four SIPs) and (3) “Yes”, “Space” and “No” response options appeared at the 
bottom of the screen. “Space” always remained at the bottom centre of the screen, while “Yes” 
was at the bottom left and “No” was at the bottom right of the screen for half of the participants. 
The other half had “Yes” on the right and “No” on the left of the screen throughout the task 
(counterbalanced across participants) (see Figure 4.2). An “E” keypress corresponded to the 
option on the bottom left of the screen and an “O” keypress corresponded to the response option 
on the bottom right of the screen and “Space” corresponded to the “space bar” key.  
Explicit Semantic Differential Scale (SDS): For the Character and Nature SDS items, a 
Likert scale was used that ranged from -3 (Strongly Disagree) to +3 (Strongly Agree), where 
each of the category stimuli were used to form a sentence/question with both the word 
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“Positive” and “Negative” (e.g., “Doctors are Negative”, “Bluebells are Positive”). For the Self 
SIP, a similar Likert scale was used for questions that connected “I am” with all the target 
words in that task (e.g., “I am hated”, “I am smart”). No explicit questions were collected for 
the “Other” category because of the abstract nature of who the other would constitute 
(Karpinski, 2004). Similarly, the gender SDS questionnaire used a Likert scale where “Males” 
and “Females” formed coherent sentences that included each of the career and family stimuli 
(e.g., “Males want to marry when the time is right”, “Females are effective in corporations”).  
 
Table 4.1: The stimuli used in the four SIPs in Study 1.  
Nature SIP Character SIP Self SIP Gender SIP 
Category Labels 
Flower Insect Carer Criminal I am Others 
are 
Male 
Names 
Female 
Names 
Category Stimuli 
Bluebell Mosquito Doctor Murderer Me They Jack Chloe 
Daffodil Spider Nurse Rapist My Them Thomas Emily 
Tulip Wasp Volunteer Pedophile Mine Their James Megan 
Lavender Cockroach Therapist Terrorist Self People Joshua Charlotte 
    Myself Him/Her Daniel Jessica 
      Harry Lauren 
Target Labels 
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Career Family 
Target Stimuli 
Enjoy Unpleasant Helpful Evil Smart Stupid Executive Home 
Cheer Poison Nice Bad Beautiful Ugly Management Parents 
Happy Evil Kind Nasty Good Bad Professional Children 
Lovely Damage Friendly Wrong Nice Awful Corporation Cousin 
Friend Ugly Generous Terrible Competent Useless Salary Marriage 
Pleasing Hurt Gentle Dangerous Loved Hated Office Wedding 
      Business Relatives 
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All negative items were reverse coded such that higher scores indicate a more positive 
bias. For the Character and Nature SIP, the categories connected with positive and negative 
scores were averaged to create a compacted absolute explicit SDS score. A relative/bipolar 
SDS score was obtained by subtracting the negative category compacted score (criminal/insect) 
from the positive category compacted score (carer/flower) for each participant. For the self-
esteem questionnaire, the self-positive and self-negative items were averaged to create a 
compacted absolute self SDS score. Because explicit attitudes were not gathered towards the 
“Other” contrast category, a relative explicit SDS score could not be calculated. However, the 
self-esteem questionnaire used an additional feeling thermometer item where participants 
responded to the question: “How warmly do you feel towards yourself (0 = very cold, 100 = 
very warm)”. For the Gender SIP SDS, a positive score on both the career and family items 
indicate a pro-career or pro-family bias, while negative scores indicate an anti-career or anti-
family bias. To calculate the compacted SDS for male names, the male-family items were 
subtracted from the male-career items for each participant. Similarly, to calculate the 
compacted SDS for female names, the female-family items were subtracted from the female-
career items for each participant. The relative SDS was calculated by subtracting the compacted 
absolute female SDS from the compacted absolute male SDS. 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) is a ten-item scale measuring an 
individual’s global self-worth. Participants used a four-point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) to respond to the questions. 
Gender System Justification Scale (Jost, & Kay, 2005) is an eight-item scale measuring 
individual’s tendency to legitimise gender inequality. A 9 point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree 
to 9 = strongly disagree) was used for the item responses (see 
https://warwickpsych.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_agEITuIdboAbPeJ for the items used in the 
explicit questionnaires).   
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Design and procedure 
 
Each participant completed four separate SIPs. For the Nature SIP, a 4 (SIP trial type: 
Flower-Positive, Flower-Negative, Insect-Positive, Insect-Negative) × 2 (stimulus: pictures, 
words) mixed design was used. For the four SIPs, trial type was always a within-subject factor, 
and on the Nature SIP, stimulus was a between-subject factor. For the Character SIP a 4 (SIP 
trial type) × 2 (stimulus: 1 stimulus, 4 stimuli) mixed design was again used, with stimulus as 
the between-subject factor. This was also the case for the Self SIP, with the between subject 
factor having two levels (response; “space bar” response, no “space bar” response). Lastly, the 
Gender SIP used a 4 (SIP trial type) × 2 (response: stationary, randomising) mixed design with 
the response as a between subject factor. 
 Each participant completed a randomised order of the four SIPs. Within each of the 
four SIPs, participants were assigned to one of the two conditions. Assignment to a condition 
was counterbalanced across participants. In the Nature SIP, one of the conditions used names 
of different kinds of flowers and insects and the other condition used images of the same 
flowers and insects. For the Character SIP, one condition had only one stimulus in the carer 
and criminal category. Within this condition, the first participant completed the Character SIP 
with “Doctor” and “Murderer” as the category stimuli, the second participant with “Nurse” and 
“Rapist”, the third with “Volunteer” and “Paedophile”, and the fourth participant with 
“Therapist” and “Terrorist”. This order was then repeated for the remaining participants in this 
condition. For the other condition in the Character SIP, the participants completed the task with 
four stimuli in both the carer and criminal categories.   
For the Self SIP, the “space bar” response was removed in one of the conditions to test 
whether the results in the no “space bar” condition differed from the results in the condition 
that used the “space bar” response. Without a “space bar” response, participants did not need 
to look at the category label because the stimuli from the contrasting category were never used.  
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Only the “Yes” & “No” response options were used and therefore, participants only had to look 
at the valence word to determine the correct response. The Gender SIP had a condition where 
the “Yes” and “NO” response options remained stationary, and in the other condition, the 
response options alternated location with each other. This switching occurred in a quasi-
random fashion with a requirement that a switch must take place after three trials but a switch 
could also happen from one trial to the next or after two trials.  
Participants completed the experiment individually in a well-lit room. After giving 
informed consent, each participant was then directed towards the computer to complete their 
first SIP. Participants read the following on-screen instructions; “In this task, you will have to 
respond to statements in the appropriate fashion as fast and as accurately as possible” and the 
experimenter explained how the task was to be performed. For each block, participants had to 
respond in accordance with one of four rules across a block of trials. For brevity, only the 
Character SIP’s rules will be explained here; the other three SIPs followed a similar procedure 
but with their domain specific stimuli.    
For the Character SIP, the response rules were: (1) “On this block respond as if the 
CARER is POSITIVE” (pro-carer), (2) “On this block respond as if the CARER is 
NEGATIVE” (anti-carer), (3) “On this block respond as if the CRIMINAL is POSITIVE” (pro-
criminal) and (4) “On this block respond as if the CRIMINAL is NEGATIVE” (anti-criminal). 
One of these four response rules was presented to the participants before they started a block 
of trials. For example, if a participant was completing the block “respond as if the CARER is 
NEGATIVE”, when a negative word and a word referring to a carer appeared on screen, the 
correct response was ‘YES’. If a positive word and a word referring to a carer appeared, the 
correct response was ‘NO’. If a word referring to a criminal was shown, regardless of the target 
word (i.e., positive or negative) that also appeared on the screen, the correct response was 
“Space”. Likewise, if a participant was completing the block “respond as if the CRIMINAL is 
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POSITIVE”, when a positive word and a word referring to a criminal appeared, the correct 
response was ‘YES’. If a negative word appeared with the word of a criminal, the correct 
response was “NO”. If words referring to a carer was shown, the correct response was “Space”. 
Each participant was exposed to a random sequence of the four response rule blocks. 
Each participant had to successfully complete the practice blocks which were composed 
of a minimum of four blocks of trials.  Each practice block had 10 trials, which included 4 
“Space”, 3 “Yes” and 3 “No” response trials. Trials were presented quasi-randomly, such that 
the same trial was not repeated across two successive trials. If a correct response was made, 
the screen was cleared for 400ms before the next trial’s stimuli appeared. If an incorrect 
response was made a red “X” appeared below the target word and all the stimuli remained until 
the correct response was selected. Following each block, participants’ median accuracy and 
response latency were presented and if these scores across the 4 practice blocks averaged to 
≥ 80% accuracy and ≤ 1,800ms response latency, they continued to the test blocks. These 
criteria were used to ensure that participants understood and complied with the block’s 
response rules.  
If participants did not meet the above criteria, the 4 practice blocks were repeated. If 
they failed to meet the accuracy and response latency criteria on the second attempt the study 
ended, but this never occurred for any of the participants. This procedure likely led participants 
to believe that they would eventually have to repeat blocks of trials if they did not maintain the 
speed and accuracy criteria throughout the SIP. However, this penalty only occurred for the 
practice blocks but it nevertheless potentially contributed to the high accuracy and quick 
responses from all the participants throughout the SIPs.   
After completing the practice blocks successfully, participants were informed on the 
screen to “press space bar to begin the test blocks”.  For the test blocks, participants completed 
16 blocks which were comprised of a random sequence of the 4 response rule blocks for each 
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participant. This unique sequence was repeated until a participant had completed all 16 blocks. 
Each test block contained 18 trials consisting of 6 “Spacebar,” 6 “Yes” and 6 “No” response 
trials. When all the 16 blocks were completed, participants were informed on screen the task 
was over and instructed to call the experimenter. The experimenter then set up the next SIP for 
the participant to complete, followed by the third and then the fourth SIP. Each of these SIPs 
had the same response criteria, number of blocks and trials etc. as the Character SIP apart from 
the stimuli used. 
After participants completed the four SIPS, they were directed towards the online 
questionnaire to complete the explicit questions. The order in which participants completed the 
Nature, Character, Self and Gender explicit SDS was randomised and the order of the items 
within each of the questionnaires were also randomised. Next, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale was completed followed by the Gender System Justification Scale. Following these 
scales, a number of other questionnaires that were unrelated to the current experiment were 
completed. Lastly, participants were thanked and debriefed. To complete all these sections, it 
took participants between 75 – 90 minutes. 
Results 
The primary data obtained from the SIP are raw latency scores defined as the time in 
milliseconds that elapsed between the onset of the stimulus and the correct response being 
made by the participant. The dependent variable was participants’ mean “No” minus “Yes” 
reaction time (RT) latency for each of the four trial types (i.e., Category 1-Positive, Category 
1-Negative, Category 2-Positive, Category 2-Negative) across the pro-Category 1 and anti-
Category 1 blocks as well as the pro-Category 2 and anti-Category 2 blocks. For the Category 
1-Positive and Category 2-Positive trial types, values above zero indicate a positive bias and 
negative values indicate a negative bias. For both the Category 1-Negative and Category 2-
Negative trial types, scores were multiplied by -1. The purpose of this was to match the valence 
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output of the Category 1-Positive and Category 2-Positive trial types such that scores above 
zero indicate a positive bias and scores below zero indicate a negative bias. For example, if 
participants were faster to press “No” than to press “Yes” to Category 1–Negative words across 
the pro-Category 1 and anti-Category 1 blocks, that would indicate participants have a positive 
bias towards Category 1-Negative words. 
To minimise the impact that individual differences such as age, cognitive ability and 
motor skills can have, an individual’s response latencies were transformed using an adaption 
of the Greenwald et al., (2003) D-algorithm. This D-algorithm is normally applied to IAT 
response latency scores and similar transformations to response latency scores in the IRAP are 
also applied (see Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010). The steps involved in calculating both the 
absolute and relative D–SIP scores are as follows: 
(1) Only response latency data from the 16 test blocks were used; (2) latencies above 
10,000ms were discarded; (3) if latencies from more than 10% of a participant’s trials 
throughout the 16 test blocks were less than 30ms, that participant was removed from the 
analysis; (4) for each SIP task, 16 individual standard deviations were calculated for each trial 
type across the 16 test blocks (Category 1-Positive, Category 1-Negative, Category 2-Positive, 
Category 2-Negative × 4 = repeating blocks); (5) 16 mean latencies were calculated for both 
the “Yes” and “No” responses for each trial type across the 16 test blocks; (6) difference scores 
were calculated for each trial type by subtracting mean latencies of  “Yes” responses from 
mean latencies of “No” responses in each test block pair (i.e., pro- Category 1 block and anti–
Category 1 block; pro-Category 2 block and anti-Category 2 block); (7) each difference score 
was then divided by its corresponding standard deviation from step 4, yielding 16 D-SIP scores, 
one score for each trial type across the 16 test blocks; (8) four overall trial type D-SIP scores 
were calculated by averaging the four scores for each of the four trial types across the blocks 
(these calculations revealed the absolute/non-relative separate trial type results); (9) averaging 
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the positive and negative trial type for each category showed the absolute/non-relative 
compacted trial type results); (10) To compute the relative comparison, equivalent to that of 
the IAT, an overall relative D-SIP score was calculated by subtracting the compacted 
Category 2 score from the compacted Category 1 score.  
The Nature, Character and Self SIP used the above analytic procedures. For the Gender 
SIP, the task did not measure general attitudes using positive and negative words but instead 
measured stereotypes with words referring to careers and family. Because the categories were 
not connected with negative words, none of the trial types were reverse coded. The four overall 
trial type D-SIP scores (steps 1-8) were calculated using the same methods as above. For step 
9, the male compacted absolute scores were calculated by subtracting the Male-Family trial 
type from the Male-Career trial type. Similarly, the female compacted absolute scores were 
calculated by subtracting the Female-Family trial type from the Female–Career trial type. Step 
10 was the same as above where the relative overall D-SIP score was calculated by subtracting 
the compacted female score from the male compacted score.  
The results from the Nature SIP are reported first, followed by the Character SIP, then 
the Self SIP and finally the Gender SIP. For each SIP, the findings from the 4 (trial type) × 2 
mixed ANOVA are presented. One-sample t-tests are carried out on the four trial scores, the 
two compacted trial types scores as well as the relative results to tests which are a significant 
distance above or below zero. These results indicate whether implicit bias scores towards an 
object are positive, neutral or negative. Next, the SIP’s internal reliability is reported by using 
odd even split–half reliability analysis. To obtain the odd and even SIP scores, two separate 
scores were calculated in the same way as for the overall relative D-SIP, except that the 
algorithm described previously was applied separately to odd trials and to even trials. Several 
correlational analyses were also used to test whether the scores on implicit and explicit 
measures were associated. If the scores show a positive correlation, these findings indicate the 
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measures are assessing similar constructs. However, if the scores are negatively correlated, 
these findings indicate the measures are assessing distinct constructs. Lastly, for the Self and 
Gender SIP, hierarchical logistical regression analyses will be used to determine if the SIP has 
increased predictive validity over the explicit SDS.  
Nature SIP: A 4 (trial type: Flower–Positive, Flower–Negative, Insect–Positive, 
Insect–Negative) × 2 (stimulus: words, images) mixed ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of trial type, F(3, 186) = 104.54, p < .001, ηρ² = .63, a non-significant main effect of 
stimulus, F(1, 62) = .15, p = .70, ηρ² = .00 and no significant interaction between trial type and 
stimulus, F(3, 186) = 1.98, p = .119, ηρ² =  .03. Because no significant difference between the 
stimulus types was found, these two conditions were combined and are reported together. 
Figure 4.4 shows the scores for four trial types, including the scores for compacted flower and 
insect trial types and the overall D-SIP score.  
Follow-up one-sample t-tests were used to determine what was causing the main effect 
of trial type. The scores on the Flower–Positive trials, t(63) = 14.67, p < .001, the Insect–
Positive trials, t(63) = 7.58, p < .001, and the compacted Flower trials, t(63) = 10.38, p < .001, 
were significantly above zero, while the compacted Insect trials scores did not differ from zero, 
t(63) = .045, p = .965, indicating a neutral attitude.  The scores on the Insect-Negative trials, 
t(63) = -7.80, p < .001 was significantly below zero, while the scores on the Flower-Negative 
trials did not differ from zero, t(63) = -.920, p = .361. As expected, the relative score (overall 
D-SIP) was significantly above zero, t(63) = 7.06, p < .001 consistent with a pro-flower/anti-
insect bias. To test for internal reliability, the correlation between the odd and even trials was 
significant, r = .298, n = 64, p = .017.  
Correlations between the relative implicit and relative/bipolar explicit scores are 
reported here and in subsequent SIPs. To make use of the absolute/unipolar scores for both the 
implicit and explicit measures an individual’s Category 1 (Flower) and Category 2 (Insect) 
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implicit and explicit attitude scores are included in the same correlation  (e.g., each participant 
has two correlation points for both their implicit and explicit scores in the analysis). The term 
“unipolar relative” is used to describe this setup. Based on this unipolar relative setup, two 
additional correlation scores are also reported. Each of these correlations report scores that 
alternate from using Category 1 (Flower) implicit and explicit scores to Category 2 (Insect) 
implicit and explicit scores across each participant. For example, analysis 1 (cut 1) will include, 
participant 1 = Category 1, participant 2 = Category 2, participant 3 = Category 1, etc. While 
analysis 2 (cut 2) will include, participant 1 = Category 2, participant 2 = Category 1, 
participant 3 = Category 2, etc.  
The unipolar relative correlations are expected to create more variation across responses 
and hence stronger correlations between the implicit and explicit variables are expected to be 
shown. This expectation is especially likely for attitudes that have a near-universal evaluative 
difference (i.e., almost everyone prefers flowers to insects and carers to criminals). Correlations 
between the compacted Category 1 and Category 2 absolute trial types and the corresponding 
absolute/unipolar explicit measure will also be reported.  
The correlation between the relative bipolar implicit and explicit measures was not 
significant, r = .056, n = 64, p = .660. The compacted absolute Flower, r = .149, n = 64, p = 
.240, and Insect, r = .110, n = 64, p = .386, implicit and explicit scores correlated in the expected 
direction but they did not reach conventional significance levels. There was a significant 
positive correlation between the unipolar relative implicit and explicit scores, r = .528, n = 128, 
p < .001, as were the correlations for cut 1, r = .465, n = 64, p < .001 and cut 2, r = .554, n = 
64, p < .001.  
To summarise, these findings suggest that using words or images in the SIP produce 
similar results. The initial results also suggest that perhaps an affirming/positivity bias (not 
PFB) is still occurring in the SIP because participants were faster to press a “Yes” rather than 
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a “No” response when relating insects with positive words. This affirming/positivity bias 
appears to artificially increase scores on the compacted trial types leading to estimates of 
neutral biases towards insects, even though a negative bias was expected. The internal 
reliability was found to be reasonable for an implicit measure and although the bipolar and 
absolute compacted implicit and explicit correlations were not significant, the correlations were 
in the expected direction. Importantly, the unipolar relative correlations (i.e., each participant 
with two data point, cut 1 and cut 2) between the implicit and explicit measures were 
moderately-strongly related.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: The four individual trial types, the two compacted trial types and the relative D-SIP 
score for the Nature SIP. 95% confidence internal error bars are included. Error bars that cross 
the zero mark indicate a statistically neutral attitude; those that do not cross zero indicate a 
significant positive or negative attitude.   
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Character SIP: The 4 (trial type: Carer–Positive, Carer–Negative, Criminal–Positive, 
Criminal–Negative) × 2 (stimulus: one, four) mixed design showed a significant main effect of 
trial type, F(3, 186) = 87.97, p < .001, ηρ² = .59. A non-significant main effect of stimulus, 
F(1, 62) = 3.53, p = .065, ηρ² = .05 and a significant interaction between trial type and stimulus 
was shown, F(3, 186) = 3.18, p = .032, ηρ² = .05. As shown in Figure 4.5, the interaction 
occurred because there was no difference between the 1 stimulus and the 4 stimulus conditions 
for Carer–Positive and Carer-Negative, but more negative biases were observed in both the 
Criminal–Positive and Criminal-Negative trial types in the 4 stimulus condition compared to 
the 1 stimulus condition.  
 
Figure 4.5: The four individual, the two compacted and the overall D-SIP for the two 
conditions in the Character SIP.  Error bars with 95% confidence intervals have been 
included.  
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For brevity, we will report the results for the seven one-sample t-tests for only the 4-
stimulus condition. These one-sample t-tests will also indicate why the main effect of trial type 
occurred. Carer-Positive, t(31) = 9.40, p < .001, Criminal-Positive, t(31) = 2.41, p = .022, and 
compacted Carers trial type, t(31) = 7.30, p < .001 means were significantly above zero. 
Criminal-Negative, t(31) = -6.93, p < .001, and compacted Criminal scores, t(31) = 3.37, p = 
.002, were significantly below zero, while Carer-Negative scores did not differ from zero, t(31) 
= .95, p = .35. The overall D-SIP was significantly above zero, t(31) = 7.01, p < .001, consistent 
with a strong pro-carer/anti-criminal bias.  
The correlation between the odd and even trials to test for internal reliability in the 1 
stimulus condition was not significant, r = .262, n = 32, p = .148. However, for the 4 stimulus 
condition a significant effect between the odd and even trials was shown, r = .428, n = 32, p = 
.014. The correlations between implicit and explicit scores for the 1 stimulus condition were 
as follows: the correlation between relative bipolar implicit and explicit scores was significant, 
but in the opposite direction to expectations, r = -.370, n = 64, p = .037. For both the compacted 
Carer, r = -.084, n = 64, p = .646, and Criminal, r = -.181, n = 64, p = .322, implicit and explicit 
scores, non-significant negative correlations were found.  The correlation between the unipolar 
relative implicit and explicit score was significant, r = .404, n = 64, p = .001, as was the 
correlation for cut 1, r = .504, n = 32, p = .003, but not cut 2, r = .284, n = 32, p = .115.  
The correlation between implicit and explicit scores for the 4 stimulus condition were 
as follows: the correlation between the relative bipolar implicit and explicit scores was not 
significant, but it was in the predicted direction, r = .088, n = 32, p = .632. For both the 
compacted absolute Carer, r = .009, n = 32, p = .959, and Criminal, r = .111, n = 32, p = .544, 
implicit and explicit scores, non-significant effects were found but the effects were in the 
predicted direction. The correlations between the unipolar relative implicit and explicit scores 
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was significant, r = .669, n = 64, p < .001, as was the correlation for cut 1, r = .606, n = 32, p 
< .001 and cut 2, r = .729, n = 32, p < .001.  
In summary, the results confirm that there is still an apparent affirming bias in the SIP 
as can be seen in the criminal positive trial type, where participants were unexpectedly faster 
to respond with an affirming response (“Yes”) rather than a negating response (“No”), when 
relating/associating criminals with positive words. Using four stimuli rather than just one for 
the categories appears to improve the accuracy of the results, especially for the negative 
category (criminal) as can be seen in the compacted Criminal trial type. The 4-stimulus 
condition also improved the internal reliability and stronger correlations between the implicit 
and explicit measures were shown compared to the 1 stimulus condition.   
Self-SIP: A 4 (trial type: Self–Positive, Self–Negative, Other–Positive, Other–
Negative) × 2 (response: “space bar”, no “space bar”) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of trial type, F(3, 186) = 47.708, p < .001, ηρ² = .45 and a non-significant main 
effect of response, F(1, 62) = 1.20, p = .278, ηρ² = .02. The interaction between trial type and 
response was significant, F(3, 186) = 4.94, p = .003, ηρ² =  .07, and it occurred because all the 
trials in the no “space bar” response condition were closer to zero/neutral than the trials in the 
standard SIP with a the “space bar” response (see Figure 4.6).  The neutral overall D-SIP score 
in the no “space bar” condition as shown in Figure 4.6 was in line with expectations.       
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Figure 4.6: The four individual, the two compacted and the overall D-SIP for the two 
conditions in the Self SIP.  Error bars with 95% confidence intervals have been included.  
 
The subsequent Self SIP results will be reported using only the “space bar” version 
because it is measuring implicit bias while the no “space bar” condition is simple measuring 
response bias towards words. For the seven one-sample t-tests, scores were significantly above 
zero for the Self–Positive trial type, t(31) = 10.25, p < .001, the Self–Negative trial type (faster 
to press “No” than “Yes” when relating the self with negative words), t(31) = 2.11, p = .043, 
the Other–Positive trial type, t(31) = 5.87, p < .001, and the compacted Self trial type, t(31) = 
7.87, p < .001. The Other–Negative trial type score was significantly below zero, t(31) = -3.93, 
p < .001,  and the compacted Other trial type score did not differ significantly from zero, t(31) 
= 0.59, p = .559. The overall D-SIP score showed a pro-self/anti-other bias because it was 
significantly above zero, t(31) = 6.16, p < .001.      
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The internal reliability across the odd and even trials was not significant, r = .104, n = 
32, p = .570. However, when split half reliability analyses were carried out on the Self and 
Other trials separately, we found a significant correlation between the odd and even scores in 
the more meaningful Self trial types, r = .582, n = 32, p < .001 and a non-significant correlations 
in the less meaningful Other trial types, r = .073, n = 32, p = .690.  The correlation between the 
compacted Self SIP trial type and the explicit Self SDS was significant, r = .395, n = 32, p = 
.025. The compacted Self SIP and the feeling thermometer correlation approached significance, 
r = .334, n = 32, p = .062, and the correlation between the compacted Self SIP and the 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale was non-significant but it was in the predicted direction, r = .187, 
n = 32, p = .306.  
Based on research by Karpinski and Steinman (2006), a composite score was created 
by averaging together each participant’s explicit Self SDS item score, their self feeling 
thermometer (logged) score and their score on the Rosenberg scale. This composite score 
significantly correlated, albeit marginally, with participants’ compacted Self SIP score, r = 
.349, n = 32, p = .051. We tested whether the SIP had increased predictive validity over the 
explicit SDS by running a hierarchical logistical regression analysis. We first entered the Self 
explicit SDS into the model, and it was a significant predictor of scores on Rosenberg scale, B 
= .366, p < .001, accounting for 76% of the variance. When the compacted Self trial type was 
added into the model, it did not improve it, B = -.192, p = .306. 
These results indicate the SIP could be useful as a tool for assessing implicit self-
esteem. The internal reliability of the compacted Self SIP trial type performed better than most 
other implicit measures used in previous research (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). 
The improved performance of the SIP compared to other implicit measures used to examine 
the self is also apparent from the compacted Self SIP trial types scores which correlated with 
the explicit Self SDS scores. This significant correlation is likely due the implicit and explicit 
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items matching closely (Hofmann, Gawronski, et al., 2005). In addition, finding strong internal 
reliability for the Self trials and weak reliability for the Other trials might indicate that the 
Other category used in relative implicit measures like the IAT could be the reason for their low 
predictive validity (see also Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). These findings also emphasise the 
importance of the “space bar” response in the SIP to measure implicit attitudes accurately. 
Gender SIP: A 4 (trial type: Males–Career, Male–Family, Female–Career, Female– 
Family) × 2 (response: stationary, randomising) mixed ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of trial type, F(3, 186) = 87.97, p < .001, ηρ² = .59, a non-significant main effect of 
response, F(1, 62) = 1.43, p = .237, ηρ² = .02, and the interaction between trial type and 
response was also non-significant, F(3, 186) = 2.46, p = .064, ηρ² = .04. The interaction 
approached significance because all the trial types were comparable to each other, apart from 
the Male–Career trial type which showed a stronger pro-career bias in the stationary condition 
than in the condition where the location of “Yes” and “No” response option was randomised 
in each trial. 
Since no significant difference was shown between the two conditions, they were 
combined and reported together. A one-way ANOVA conducted on the 4 separate trial types, 
the two compacted trial types and the overall D-SIP showed that all these scores were  
significantly above zero (Males-Career: t(63) = 11.29, p < .001, Males-Family: t(63) = 5.03, p 
< .001, Females-Career: t(63) = 10.00, p < .001, Female-Family: t(63) = 10.60, p < .001, 
compacted Males: t(63) = 4.47, p < .001), except for the compacted Female trial type score 
which did not differ significantly from zero, t(63) = -1.56, p = .123. The overall D-SIP score, 
t(63) = 17.34, p < .001, suggests that participants had a strong bias in relating males with careers 
and females with families (i.e., males-career/female-family bias; see Figure 4.7).        
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Figure 4.7: The four individual, the two compacted and the overall D-SIP for the Gender SIP.  
Error bars with 95% confidence intervals have been included.  
 
Testing the internal reliability, the odd and even trials were positively correlated, but a 
significant result was not obtained, r = .201, n = 64, p = .110. Because the response option 
randomisation could have reduced the internal reliability in the SIP, separate split-half 
correlational analyses were carried out on the data that used the randomising and stationary 
response options. For the SIP that used stationary responses, the internal reliability approached 
significance, r = .337, n = 32, p = .059, while the internal reliability of the randomising response 
condition was substantially worse, r = .049, n = 32, p = .792. However, these two-correlation 
coefficients did not significantly differ from one another, (p = .13, one tailed). No significant 
correlation was found between the overall D-SIP implicit and explicit SDS scores, r = -.122, n 
= 63, p = .341, the compacted male scores, r = -.094, n = 63, p = .296, and compacted female 
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scores, r = -.169, n = 63, p = .186. The correlation between the unipolar relative implicit and 
explicit scores was also non-significant, r = -.094, n = 126, p = .129. Of note, the direction of 
all these effects were numerically negative, indicating a miss match between implicit and 
explicit stereotyping.    
When we correlated the scores from Gender System Justification Scale with the 
compacted SIP trial types scores, the overall D-SIP score, the unipolar explicit SDS and the 
relative explicit SDS scores, we found that Gender Justification was significantly correlated 
with the relative explicit questionnaire, r = .296, n = 63, p = .018, and the compacted female 
trial type, r = -254, n = 63, p = .045. All other relationships were non-significant, rs < .191, n 
= 63, ps > .133.  This finding indicates that as gender system justification increases, participants 
more strongly implicitly associate females with family rather than careers and show a stronger 
male-career/female family relative explicit bias. Using a hierarchical logistical regression 
analysis with the relative explicit measure entered first into the model, we found that it proved 
to be a significant predictor of gender system justification, B = .524, p = .018 and accounted 
for 30% of the variance. When the compacted female trial type was added into the model, it 
significantly improved the model, B = -.556, p = .020, resulting in an R2 change of 7.9% and 
the new model accounted for 41% of the variance. 
These results suggest that using stationary “Yes” and “No” response options are likely 
more appropriate because this condition showed better internal reliability (albeit non-
significantly) compared to the randomising response option condition. Most of the participants 
(N > 25) in the randomising condition also reported verbally to the experimenter that they 
found the constant switching much more challenging compared to the other SIPs that used 
stationary response options. Although no significant correlations between the implicit and 
explicit SDS scores were found in the current SIP, this was predicted based on the divergence 
between participants expressing egalitarian gender roles while implicitly supporting traditional 
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views. The compacted female trial types showed added predictive validity over the relative 
explicit SDS when predicting gender system justification which emphasises the importance of 
the added specificity that the SIP can offer.     
Discussion 
Using four SIPs we showed that the procedure has strong potential for 
capturing/measuring implicit beliefs. This can be seen through the appropriate internal 
reliability, even though participants completed four SIPs across different domains in one 
sitting. In addition, all the correlations were in the expected directions and the SIP correlated 
strongly with the unipolar relative explicit SDS for three out of the four domains. For the 
socially sensitive domain, the SIP correlated with a measure examining justification of gender 
inequality and the SIP had improved predictive validity over the explicit SDS.   
 No differences in implicit bias scores were found when the participants were shown 
either images or pictures as the category stimuli. We can infer from this finding that researchers 
could mix the use of visual and verbal category stimuli within the SIP’s block of trials. Previous 
research using the IAT has shown that using words rather than images results in a stronger pro-
flower/anti-insect bias (e.g., Carnevale, Fujita, Han, & Amit, 2015; Nosek, Banaji, & 
Greenwald, 2002) but this effect is modulated by using an image instead of a word as the 
category labels (e.g., similar or stronger pro-flower/anti-insect biases are shown in the IAT 
when people sort images into the correct image on the top of the screen than if they sort words 
into the correct word on the top of the screen; Meissner & Rothermund, 2015). This finding 
implies that mixing visual and verbal stimuli in the IAT is not ideal. The likely reason that 
using images or words in the SIP does not influence the findings is because participants must 
store only one of the four response rules in memory and cannot use stimuli on the screen to 
assist with the task.  
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          Using one stimulus rather than four stimuli in each category did not show results in line 
with expectations (i.e., negative implicit biases towards criminals were weaker). However, the 
results showed more pronounced biases in the 4 stimulus condition. This finding is likely due 
to participants being reminded of more people that fit into the criminal category and hence, an 
additive effect might occur for implicit biases scores when more category stimuli are included 
in the SIP. A study systematically increasing the number of stimuli in each category would be 
useful to test if a linear relationship occurs between stronger implicit biases and more stimuli 
included in the SIP. A linear relationship would be problematic for the SIP because researchers 
could simple influence individuals’ scores by increasing or decreasing the number of category 
exemplars.     
A “space bar” response should always be used in the SIP to ensure participants 
relate/associate the category stimuli with the positive and negative words. However, we still 
have not determined the optimal number of “space bar” responses required to ensure 
participants do not ignore the category stimuli. Because “space bar” responses are never used 
in the analysis, determining the least amount necessary would be useful to shorten the overall 
time it takes to complete the SIP.  
Finally, stationary response options should be used in the SIP because it makes it easier 
for participants to complete the task and improves the internal reliability. Overall, the Gender 
SIP showed the worst internal reliability compared with the other three SIPs. This reduced 
reliability could be due to the higher number of category and target stimuli used in the Gender 
SIP (i.e., 26 stimuli in the Gender SIP vs 20 stimuli in the Nature and Character SIP). The SIP 
has removed the PFB by using four separate response rules which use equal numbers of single 
positive and negative statements that must be stored in memory before each block of trials. 
Regardless of this enhanced procedure, it appears there is still another positivity/affirming bias 
in the SIP that overestimate the positivity of implicit biases scores towards objects (i.e., 
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participants showed positive biases towards criminals and insects in the positive word trial 
types).  
New research by O’Shea, Brown, and Watson (2017)  has shown that participants are 
faster to sort affirming (e.g., “Yes”) than negating (e.g., “No”) stimuli (see Chapter 5). 
Furthermore, they showed that participants were more likely to associate affirming words with 
positive words and negating words with negative words as well as being overall faster when 
sorting affirming and positive words than negating and negative words. These findings would 
account for why participants are faster to press “Yes” than “No” when relating insects/criminals 
with positive words. The next study develops a method to overcome these response biases.  
Study 2 
Study 2 assessed implicit and explicit biases towards: (1) novel/non-words (Non-Word 
SIP), (2) flowers and insects (Nature SIP), and (3) carers and criminals (Character SIP). The 
findings from Study 1 indicate there is an affirming/positivity bias in SIP which appears to lead 
to overestimates of the positivity of implicit biases towards objects. One potential method of 
overcoming the SIP’s affirming/positivity bias is as follows. One would expect participants to 
have neutral attitudes to novel/non-words. If neutral implicit attitudes are not detected to such 
stimuli, then it could be assumed that the detection of any apparently non-neutral attitude is 
most likely reflecting a (affirming/positivity) response bias. Therefore, this information from 
the Non-Word SIP can be used to correct for the response biases in other SIP tasks (i.e., Nature 
and Character SIP) by correcting for an individual’s data which accounts for biases towards 
novel/non-words. Therefore, for the Non-Word SIP each of the four separate trial types are 
corrected/normalised until they show neutral attitudes and these correction metrics are then 
used to correct/normalised the results in each of the four trial types in the Nature and Character 
SIP.   
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After this correction, we expect the absolute/unipolar implicit scores to show positive 
biases towards flowers and carers on both the positive and negative target trials, while negative 
biases will be observed for insects and criminals on both the positive and negative target trials. 
Similarly, on the compacted trials, pro-flower, pro-carer, anti-insect and anti-criminal biases 
are expected. For the relative/bipolar implicit and explicit scores, pro-flower/anti-insect biases 
and pro-carer/anti-criminal biases are predicted. Internal reliability is expected to be in line 
with the Nature and Character SIP from Study 1 due to participants completing three SIPs in 
one session. Correlations are also expected to be similar to the Nature and Character SIP in 
study 1 (i.e., they will positively correlate). However, significant correlations are not expected 
between the Non-Words SIP and the explicit self-report due to participants mainly rating the 
non-words as neutral.  
A final aim of this study is to provide a preliminary test of whether there are 
practice/experience effects after participants complete two SIPs (weaker biases are shown in 
the IAT after participants complete it once or twice; Greenwald et al., 2003). Study 1 could not 
test practice/experience effects because each participant completed the four SIPs in a random 
order. In the current experiment, in contrast, half the participants completed the Nature SIP 
first and the other half completed the Nature SIP last (3rd SIP). This design allows preliminary 
tests of whether weaker implicit scores are shown on the last SIP completed compared to the 
first SIP.          
Method 
Participants: 28 participants completed the current study (15 females). The mean age 
of the sample was 22.3 (SD = .51) with mostly Chinese participants (N = 16) and the remaining 
being white British/European. Participants were sourced using an online recruitment platform 
available through the University of Warwick. Due to this method of recruitment, all participants 
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were students from various levels and educational degrees at the University. Each participant 
was paid £5 for approximately 40 minutes of their time.       
Materials 
 
Demographic Information: Each participant’s age, gender, nationality and ethnicity 
was gathered using a paper and pen questionnaire (see Appendix 4).  
SIP: The SIPs used here were designed in the same way as those reported in Study 1. 
For example, the same number of practice (4) and test blocks (16) had to be completed and 
each block was composed of the same “Space”, “Yes” and “No” response options.  The same 
criteria as the SIP in Study 1 were also used; average of ≥ 80% accuracy and ≤ 1,800ms 
response latency must be met across the practice blocks to continue to the test blocks. Study 2 
used all the same Nature stimuli as in study 1 but for the Character SIP, the category stimuli 
only included doctor, nurse, murderer and rapist. In the Non-Words SIP, Cug and Vek were 
used as the Non-Words for half of the participants (time point 1), while the other half used non-
words with “E/e” (Fykes, Beith, Chegn, Glure, Elths, Yimed) and “O/o (Ointh, Tholc, Dofth, 
Shrox, Volph, Squov) (time point 2). The positive and negative words used in both non-word 
conditions were: Good, Happy, Positive, Freedom, Care, Lucky, Problems, Died, Negative, 
Hated, Bad and Sick. 
Explicit Questionnaire: Using a paper questionnaire (see Appendix 4), participants 
completed a feeling thermometer which ranged from 0 (very cold or unfavourable feeling) to 
100 (very warm or favourable feeling) for how they felt towards carers, criminals, insects, 
flowers, Cug and Vek (time 1), words with “E/e” and words with “O/o” (time 2). Scores on all 
these feeling thermometers were recoded into a -4 to +4 format with higher scores indicating 
more positive attitudes. Each thermometer was used as an absolute/unipolar result. In addition, 
three relative scores were created for each individual: (1) scores from the criminal thermometer 
were subtracted from the carer thermometer scores, (2) scores from the insect thermometer 
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were subtracted from the flower thermometer scores, (3) scores from the Vek/“O” thermometer 
were subtracted from the Cug/“E” thermometer scores.   
Design and Procedure 
 
Three separate 4 (SIP trial type: Category 1 - Positive, Category 1 - Negative, Category 
2 - Positive, Category 2 - Negative) × 2 (time: point 1, point 2) mixed designs were used to 
analyse data from (1) the Non-Word SIP, (2) the Nature SIP (3) and the Character SIP. The 
SIP trial type was always a within-subject factor and time was a between-subject factor.  For 
time point 1 the Character SIP was the first task that each participant completed followed by 
the Non-Word SIP that used Cug and Vek. Lastly, each participant completed the Nature SIP. 
For time point 2, the position of the Character SIP and Nature SIP was reversed so that the 
Character SIP was always the last task participants completed and the Nature SIP was always 
the first. The Non-Word SIP was again completed between the Nature and Character SIP, 
however, this time, participants had to respond to the “E/e” and “O/o” non-words instead of 
Cug and Vek.     
Participants completed time point 1, individually in a small, well-lit room. Time point 
2 was carried out a month later using the same room. Each SIP took approximately 11-12 
minutes to complete24. When all three SIPs were completed, participants completed the 
demographic information and the explicit questionnaire. Following all these tasks, participants 
were thanked, debriefed and compensated for their time.   
 
 
                                                 
24 The amount of time to complete a SIP task could be greatly reduced by having 8 or perhaps 
even 4 test blocks rather than 16. However, the number of trials should be increased if only 4 
or 8 test blocks are used.    
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Results 
Similar analytic procedures to Study 1 were used. Initially, the results from the Non-
Words SIP are presented using the SIP standard analytic methods. Following this presentation, 
the four separate trial types in the Non-Words SIP are transformed to neutral to control for any 
response biases. These correction metrics from the Non-Word SIP are then used to correct for 
each individual’s response biases on each of the four trial types on the Nature and Character 
SIP. The Non-Word SIP and the corrected Nature and Character SIP’s results will be reported 
using the same format as Study 1.  
Non-Word SIP: The 4 (trial type: Non-Word 1–Positive, Non-Word 1–Negative, Non-
Word 2–Positive, Non-Word 2 – Negative)25 × 2 (time: Cug & Vek, words with “E/e” and 
“O/o”) mixed design showed a significant main effect of trial type, F(3, 78) = 47,26, p < .001, 
ηρ² = .65, a non-significant main effect of time, F(1, 26) = .86, p = .36, ηρ² = .03 and no 
significant interaction between trial type and time, F(3, 78) = .44, p = .73, ηρ² =  .02. One-
sample t-tests showed that the score from the Non-Words 1–Positive trials, t(27) = 8.60, p < 
.001, Non-Words 2–Positive trials, t(27) = 11.09, p < .001 were a significantly above zero (i.e., 
participants were faster to press “Yes” than to press “No” to any non-word related with positive 
words). Non-Word 1–Negative scores, t(27) = -2.24, p = .033, and the Non-Words 2– Negative 
scores, t(27) = -4.08, p < .001, were both significantly below zero (i.e., participants were faster 
to press “Yes” than to press “No” to any non-word related with negative words).  
The compacted Non-Words 1, t(27) = 4.32, p < .001, and compacted Non-Words 2 trial 
type scores, t(27) = 3.84, p = .001, were both significantly above zero. This finding indicates 
that overall participants were the fastest at pressing “Yes” to positive words. The relative score 
was neither significantly above or below zero, t(27) = 0.86, p = .40. This suggests that 
participants had a neutral relative implicit attitude towards the non-word stimuli but the 
                                                 
25 Non-Words 1 = Cug/“E/e” and Non-Word 2 = Vek/”O/o”.  
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apparent positive and negative biases on the separate trial types are likely due to an affirming 
bias (see Figure 4.8). The positive biases on the two compacted trial types indicate that there 
is also an overall positivity bias when using the SIP.  
The split-half internal reliability between odd and even trials was significant, r = .378, 
n = 28, p = .048. The correlation between the relative implicit and explicit scores was not 
significant, r = .209, n = 28, p = .286. Both the compacted absolute Non-Words 1, r = .330, n 
= 28, p = .087, and Non-Words 2, r = .093, n = 28, p = .639, implicit and explicit measure 
scores were not significantly correlated but again they were in the expected direction. The 
correlation between the unipolar relative implicit and explicit scores was also non-significant, 
r = .202, n = 56, p = .136, as was the correlation in cut 1, r = .076, n = 28, p = .700, but their 
directionality was in the expected direction. For cut 2, a significant correlation was shown, r = 
.422, n = 28, p = .025.   
There was an overall response bias with participants being faster at pressing “Yes” 
rather than “No” to both positive and negative words in the Non-Words SIP, even though 
neutral biases would have been expected towards non-words (i.e., no difference in pressing 
“Yes” or “No” to non-words). This finding indicates a clear affirming bias when the SIP is 
used. To remove this affirming bias, we averaged the Non-Word 1-Positive and Non-Word 2-
Positive scores and subtracted this number from the scores in the Non-Word 1-Positive and 
Non-Word 2-Positive trial types. Likewise, we averaged the Non-Word 1-Negative and Non-
Word 2-Negative scores and subtracted this number from the scores in the Non-Word 1-
Negative and Non-Word 2-Negative trial types. These two averaged scores from (1) the two 
positive and (2) the two negative Non-Word trial types were used to transform/normalise the 
Nature and Character SIP biases. Importantly, rather than this correction being done at a group 
level, each individual’s non-word response bias scores were used to correct for their response 
biases in the Nature and Character SIP. As seen in Figure 4.9 the response bias corrections 
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resulted in neutral biases towards non-words on all the trial types, including the compacted trial 
types and the overall D-SIP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: The uncorrected Non-Words SIP. Error bars with 95% confidence intervals have 
been included.  
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Figure 4.9: The corrected Non-Words SIP. Error bars with 95% confidence intervals have 
been included.  
 
 
Nature SIP: Initially, the data from each individual from the four absolute trial types 
were corrected using the same scores that were used to correct the data in the Non-Words SIP.  
A 4 (trial type: Flower–Positive, Flower–Negative, Insect–Positive, Insect–Negative) × 2 
(time: point 1 = Nature SIP competed last,  point 2 = Nature SIP completed first) mixed design 
revealed a significant main effect of trial type, F(3, 78) = 7.66, p < .001, ηρ² = .23, a non-
significant main effect of time, F(1, 26) = .33, p = .571, ηρ² = .01 and no significant interaction 
between trial type and time, F(3, 78) = 1.86, p = .170, ηρ² = .07. Similar results were also found 
on the uncorrected data and therefore will not be reported. Importantly, the uncorrected scores 
from the four separate trial types and compacted trial types were similar to Study 1.    
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For the corrected results, one-sample t-tests showed that the scores on the Flower–
Negative, t(27) = 2.30, p = .029, and the compacted Flower trial type, t(27) = 2.27, p = .032, 
were significantly above zero. Both the Insect–Positive, t(27) = -2.85, p = .008,  and the Insect-
Negative, t(27) = -3.21, p = .003, including the compacted Insect trial type scores, t(27) = -
5.37, p < .001, were significantly below zero. The Flower-Positive trial type score did not differ 
significantly from zero, t(27) = .26, p = 800. The relative D-SIP score showed a strong pro-
flower/anti-insect bias, t(27) = 6.33, p < .001 (see Figure 4.10). 
The split-half internal reliability between odd and even trials, was in the predicted 
direction but was not significantly correlated, r = .240, n = 28, p = .218. It should be noted that 
when a Spearman-Brown correlation was used, a significant correlation was shown, r = .412, 
n = 28, p = .03026. The correlation between the relative implicit and explicit scores was in the 
predicted direction but it was not significant, r = .255, n = 28, p = .190. Both the compacted 
absolute Flower, r = .260, n = 28, p = .181, and compacted absolute Insect, r = .200, n = 28, p 
= .308, implicit and explicit scores did no significantly correlate but again they were in the 
expected direction. The correlation between the unipolar relative implicit and explicit scores 
was significant, r = .525, n = 56, p < .001, as were the correlations in cut 1, r = .589, n = 28, p 
= .001, and cut 2, r = .462, n = 28, p = .013.   
In summary, the correction to remove the affirming biases in the SIP seem to be 
effective. This effectiveness is especially apparent because strong negative attitudes were seen 
towards insects on the two separate trial types, including the compacted Insect trial type. A 
positive bias was observed on the compacted Flower and the Flower-Negative trial type but the 
neutral finding on the Flower-Positive trial type might suggest that the response bias correction 
                                                 
26 Throughout, Pearson’s correlation was used and generally this analysis showed comparable 
results to Spearman-Brown’s correlational analysis.  
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may be over compensating on this trial type. Promisingly, the relative unipolar implicit and 
explicit measures were moderately-to-strongly correlated and acceptable internal reliability 
was shown when Spearman-Brown’s correlation was used. Finally, previously completing two 
other versions of the SIP (Non-Words and Character SIP) did not influence or reduce 
participants’ biases towards flowers and insects compared with those who initially completed 
the Nature SIP.   
 
 
Figure 4.10: The corrected Nature SIP results. Error bars with 95% confidence intervals have 
been included.  
 
 
Character SIP: After the correction was applied to the Character SIP to remove the 
affirming bias in the SIP, a 4 (trial type: Carer–Positive, Carer–Negative, Criminal–Positive, 
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Criminal–Negative) × 2 (time: point 1 = Character SIP competed first,  point 2 = Character SIP 
completed last) mixed design revealed a significant main effect of trial type, F(3, 78) = 10.72, 
p < .001, ηρ² = .29, a non-significant main effect of time, F(1, 26) = .77, p = .390, ηρ² = .03 
and no significant interaction between trial type and time, F(3, 78) = .73, p = .501, ηρ² = .03. 
Similar findings were also shown on the uncorrected data but the scores on the four separate, 
including the compacted trial types were similar to those obtained in Study 1.  
One-sample t-tests showed that the scores on Carer–Negative, t(27) = 2.54, p = .017, 
and the compacted Carer trial type, t(27) = 2.71, p = .011, were significantly above zero. 
Criminal–Positive, t(27) = -5.42, p < .001, and the compacted Criminal trial type scores, t(27) 
= -5.11, p < .001, were significantly below zero. The Criminal–Negative trial type score was 
below zero but not significantly, t(27) = -1.82, p = .080. The Carer-Positive trial type did not 
significantly differ from zero, t(27) = .43, p = .674. Finally, the relative D-SIP score was a 
significantly above zero, t(27) = 6.935, p < .001, consistent with a strong pro-carer/anti-
criminal bias (see Figure 4.11).   
The split-half internal reliability between odd and even trials proved to be significant, 
r = .382, n = 28, p = .045. The correlation between the relative implicit and explicit scores was 
not significant but the correlation was in the predicted direction, r = .122, n = 28, p = .537. 
Both the compacted absolute Carer, r = .231, n = 28, p = .237, and compacted absolute 
Criminal, r = .027, n = 28, p = .893, implicit and explicit scores were not significantly correlated 
but again the correlation was in the expected direction. The correlation between the unipolar 
relative implicit and explicit scores was significant, r = .558, n = 56, p < .001, as were the 
correlations in cut 1, r = .479, n = 28, p = .010, and cut 2, r = .640, n = 28, p < .001.   
Again, the affirming biases in the SIP in Study 1 seem to be removed after an 
individual-level correction is done based on the non-word data. The expected negative biases 
are observed on the absolute Criminal trial types and a strong negative bias is shown on the 
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compacted Criminal trial type. Positive biases are also observed towards Carers as seen on the 
compacted Carer trial type. The neutral finding on the Carer-Positive trial type might again be 
suggesting that the response bias correction on this trial type may be too pronounced.  Strong 
correlations were observed between the relative unipolar implicit and explicit measures and 
acceptable internal reliability was shown. Similarly, to the Nature SIP above, these results also 
indicate that previously completing other versions of the SIP does not change implicit bias 
scores.   
 
 
Figure 4.11: The corrected Character SIP results. Error bars with 95% confidence intervals 
have been included.  
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Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to test the feasibility of measuring affirming response biases 
towards novel/non-words when using the SIP and controlling for these biases in SIPs that 
measure beliefs in different domains. It is clear when the response bias transformations are 
applied to the Nature and Character SIP, findings were in line with expectations (i.e., positive 
biases towards flowers and carers and negative biases towards insects and criminals were 
obtained). These findings were especially strong on the compacted trial types, with extremely 
strong negative biases being shown towards insects and criminals, while positive biases were 
observed for flowers and carers. The correction may be overcompensating on the Flower-
Positive and Carer-Positive separate trial types because neutral attitudes were shown. However, 
this finding could also be indicating that what drives implicit bias are strong negative biases 
instead of strong positive biases towards objects. 
A limitation of this study is that the Non-Words SIP was carried out after one SIP (either 
the Nature or Character SIP) had been completed and perhaps weaker or stronger affirming 
biases would have been shown if the task had been carried out first. A disadvantage of the 
current method to reduce the response biases is that it took a whole SIP task (10-12 minutes) 
to determine an individual’s affirming biases. An alternative method to overcome the affirming 
biases in the SIP that might take less time would be to initially measure the speed at which an 
individual presses “Yes” to both the positive and negative target words, as well as their speed 
in pressing “No” to the same positive and negative words. The latency difference of a “Yes” 
vs. “No” response to positive and negative words could then be determined and controlled in a 
subsequent SIP. Additionally, using this method would reduce the likelihood that participants 
have a positive or negative implicit bias towards the neutral/novel/non-word category stimuli. 
Finally, ascertaining the minimum number of trials needed to determine the response biases in 
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the SIP would be valuable to shorten the amount of time required for participants to complete 
the task.   
 Again, this study shows that the scores on the SIP’s absolute compacted trial types 
correlate (albeit non-significantly) with the explicit absolute SDS in the expected directions. 
These expected correlations were also observed for the relative SIP and explicit measures but 
the SIP’s unipolar relative results showed moderately strong correlations with the unipolar 
explicit relative results which suggests that the SIP is accurately measuring an individual’s 
implicit beliefs. The internal reliability was again appropriate for an implicit measure. This 
study also revealed preliminary evidence indicating that having more experience or practice 
with the SIP does not reduce the person’s overall score. For example, this study showed that 
the participants that completed the Nature SIP and Character SIP first (position 1) had similar 
implicit bias scores to participants that completed these tasks following two other SIPs 
(position 3). If the SIP was not limited by practice/experience effects it would give it a major 
advantage over the IAT, which has strong practice effects (Greenwald et al., 2003). Study 3 
addresses practice/experience in the SIP in more detail. 
Study 3 
 Nosek et al., (2002) speculated and provided preliminary evidence that including 
multiple IAT submissions from a single respondent in an analysis of data collected through 
Project Implicit over a four year period did not greatly influence IAT results apart from a 
reduction in extreme scores from respondents who had taken one or more IATs (see also 
Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). A more detailed analysis by  Greenwald et al., in 2003 examined 
whether prior experience with the IAT reduced IAT scores. When participants complete the 
IAT online through the Project Implicit website, they can optionally respond to the following 
question: “How many IATs have you previously performed?” There are five response options: 
0, 1, 2, 3–5 and 6 or more. Greenwald et al., (2003) reported that there was a significant 
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reduction in the of IAT scores after one previous use and little or no further reduction after two 
or more previous uses.  
Unpublished research by O’Shea, De Houwer, Ratliff, Brown and Watson (2017) 
directly challenges this finding, using a larger sample size, by showing that an individual’s IAT 
score consistently reduces with more prior experience as far as 6+ exposures. In addition, they 
confirmed experimentally that both the IAT and the SC-IAT have a strong practice effect 
limitation. The practical limitations of prior experience with the IAT and the SC-IAT mean 
that scores from novices cannot be compared directly with those of non-novices. Likewise, 
post-tests cannot be compared directly with pre-tests and therefore, a control condition is 
needed to compare change (see Lai et al., 2016, for a recent example). Requiring a control 
condition is clearly problematic in clinical settings because it would be ethically dubious to use 
one when dealing with vulnerable patients that need urgent treatment. 
The current study tests whether the SIP has similar practice effect limitations as the IAT 
and SC-IAT. Preliminary evidence from Study 2 indicates that D-SIP scores does not reduce 
after two exposures. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the SIP does not have a practice effect 
limitation due to its novel procedural set up.  To test this hypothesis, participants were required 
to complete three Flower-Insect (Nature) SIPs in one sitting. As shown in the Character SIP in 
Study 1, including more stimuli increases the overall D-SIP score. Therefore, it is also possible 
that changing the stimuli throughout each SIP exposure would prevent a reduction or even 
increase the overall D-SIP score.  
To address this possibility, we included one condition where participants completed the 
SIP with the same nature and target stimuli throughout, and another where all the stimuli 
changed on each SIP exposure. We remain agnostic regarding the outcome of the stimuli 
remaining the same or being different on each exposure. In this study, we did not measure any 
affirming biases when participants completed the SIP. Consequently, similar findings to the 
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Nature SIP in Study 1 were expected (i.e., positive attitudes towards flowers and neutral 
attitudes towards insects on the compacted trial types).       
Method 
Participants: 84 participants (53 females) took part in the study. The ethnicity of the 
sample was mainly Asian (N = 55) and White (N = 22). 32 participants were from Malaysia, 
22 were British and the remaining were from a diverse set of countries. The mean age of the 
sample was 21.50 (SD = 5.50). Each participant was paid £2.00 to complete the experiment 
which took approximately 20 minutes.   
       Materials 
 
Demographic Information: Each participant’s age, gender, nationality and ethnicity 
were gathered using the same paper and pen questionnaire as Study 2 (see Appendix 4).  
SIP: The SIPs used here were designed using the same procedure as in Study1 and 2. 
The only difference was that each Nature SIP (A-C) was composed of only 8 test blocks rather 
than 16. There were three versions of the Nature SIP and each had different words for flowers 
and insects, and positive and negative target words. See Table 4.2 for the stimuli used in each 
Nature SIP.     
Explicit Questionnaire: Using the same paper questionnaire as Study 2 (see Appendix 
4), participants completed the feeling thermometer for how they felt towards insects and 
flowers. These were the unipolar/ absolute items. A relative/bipolar score was also created from 
these thermometer scales by subtracting each participant’s insect score from their flower score. 
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Table 4.1: The stimuli used in the three Nature SIPs (A-C).  
Nature SIP A Nature SIP B Nature SIP C 
 Category Labels  
Flower Insect Flower Insect Flower Insect 
Category Stimuli 
Clover Fly Aster Caterpillar Jasmine Locust 
Gladiola Tarantula Bluebell Cricket Shamrock Tick 
Lily Bee Iris Dragonfly Rose Bedbug 
Carnation Mosquito Magnolia Earwig Buttercup Ant 
Daffodil Beetle Orchid Lice Marigold Cockroach 
Sunflower 
Dandelion 
Pansy 
Grasshopper 
Hornet 
Wasp 
Petunia Maggot Tulip Flea 
Poppy Bug Peony Housefly 
Violet Termite Lilac Moth 
Target Labels 
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Target Stimuli 
Joy Agony Splendid Nasty Adore Abandoned 
Wonderful Terrible Great Failure Delicious Bleak 
Pleasure Hurt Friend Evil Enjoy Crushed 
Happy Tragic Love Horrible Pleasing Rotten 
Superb Disgusting Peace Disaster Fabulous Miserable 
Brilliant Destroy Glorious Painful Healthy Injure 
Amazing 
Fantastic 
Awful 
Brutal 
Laughter Sad Kind Hostile 
Excellent Barbaric Joyful Suffer 
 
 
Design and procedure 
 
The experiment used a 2 (SIP compacted trial type: Compacted Flower, Compacted 
Insect) × 3 (repeat: time 1, time 2, time 3) × 2 (stimuli: same, different) mixed design. SIP 
compacted trial type and repeat were within-subject factors and stimuli was a between-subject 
factor. Each participant completed the experiment individually in a small, well-lit room. To 
ensure the correct counterbalancing was used among the participants who repeated the Nature 
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SIP with the same stimuli and those who repeated it with different stimuli the following steps 
were taken. Participant 1 completed SIP A (see Table 4.2) three times in succession. Participant 
2 completed SIP A, followed by SIP B and then SIP C. Participant 3 did SIP A three times, and 
Participant 4 completed SIP A, followed by SIP C and lastly, SIP B. Participants 5-8, completed 
a similar sequence except with SIP B as the initial SIP. Participants 9-12 begun with SIP C. 
This counterbalancing sequence (participants 1-12) was repeated 7 times for the remaining 72 
participants.  When participants had completed the Nature SIP three times, they were instructed 
on the screen to call the experimenter. Participants then completed demographic information 
followed by the explicit questionnaire. Finally, they were thanked, debriefed and compensated 
for their time.          
Results 
The same analytic procedures as those in Study 1 were used. For the sake of clarity, 
only the most relevant results are reported. Specifically, only the two compacted trial types 
rather than the 4 separate trial types are reported. The mixed design ANOVA is reported first. 
Null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) can only estimate if variables are statistically 
different from one another, while Bayes factors can estimate the likelihood that variables are 
statistically similar. Hence Bayes factors is useful to use in the current experiment, because it 
can test how much evidence there is that the SIP does not have a practice effect problem by 
estimating evidence in favour of the null hypothesis relative to the alternative hypothesis 
(Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). Bayes Factor 10 (BF10) will be used. See Table 4.3 for a description 
of how to interpret Bayes Factor 10.  
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Table 4.3 adapted from Wetzels et al., (2011).   
Bayes Factor 10 (BF10)  Interpretation  
> 100  Decisive evidence for HA  
30 - 100  Very strong evidence for HA  
10 - 30  Strong evidence for HA  
3 - 10  Substantial evidence for HA  
1 - 3  Anecdotal evidence for HA  
1  No evidence  
0.33 - 1  Anecdotal evidence for H0  
0.10 - 0.33  Substantial evidence for H0  
0.03- 0.10  Strong evidence for H0  
0.01 - 0.03  Very strong evidence for H0  
< 0.01  Decisive evidence for H0  
 
Next, a one-sample t-test is conducted on the averaged compacted Flower and Insect 
trial types as well as the overall D-SIP across the three time points. The split half (odd and 
even) reliabilities is reported for each of the three Nature SIPs (A-C), including test-retest 
reliability results. For the test re-test SIP results, the participants were split into one group that 
completed the Nature SIP three times with the same stimuli and another group that completed 
it with different stimuli. This splitting was done because of the expectation that presenting the 
same stimuli to participants would show higher test re-test reliability due to the consistency of 
the items, while those presented with different stimuli across SIPs would show lower test-retest 
reliability.  Finally, the correlations between the averaged compacted trial types, the overall D-
SIP and the absolute and relative explicit measures are reported. Matching the method used in 
Study 1, the unipolar relative implicit and explicit correlations are reported, including the 
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appropriate cutting of the data to ensure each participant had only one implicit and explicit data 
point.    
 A 2 (SIP compacted trial type) × 3 (repeat) × 2 (stimuli) mixed ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of SIP compacted trial type, F(1, 82) = 46.16, p < .001, ηρ² = .36, with 
the compacted Flower trial type showing more positive attitudes (M = .48, SD = .04) than the 
compacted Insect trial type  (M = .07, SD = .04). The main effect of repeat, F(2, 164) = .53, p 
= .593, ηρ² = .01, and stimuli F(1, 82) = .11, p = .745, ηρ² = .00, were not significant. All the 
interactions were non-significant, Fs <.84, ps > .365, ηρ² < .01.  The estimated Bayes factor of 
repeat (BF10 = .033) suggested that the data strongly supported the null hypothesis (i.e., there 
is no practice effect in the SIP). For stimuli, the estimated Bayes factor (BF10 = .130) suggested 
that the data substantially supports the null hypothesis (i.e., there is no difference between using 
similar or different stimuli throughout the three Nature SIP time points). See Figure 4.12.  
 
Figure 4.12: The compacted Flower and Insect trial types including the overall D-SIP across 
the three time points. Error bars with 95% confidence intervals have been included.  
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The one-sample t-test carried out on the averaged compacted Flower trial type scores 
was significantly above zero, t(83) = 11.76, p < .001, and the averaged compacted Insect trial 
type scores did not differ significantly from zero, t(83) = 1.53, p = .129. The averaged relative 
overall D-SIP score was significantly above zero, t(83) = 6.80, p < .001, consistent with a pro-
flower/anti-insect bias.  The split half odd and even reliabilities for the three-time points were 
as follows, Time 1: r = .358, n = 84, p = .001, Time 2: r = .147, n = 84, p = .183, and Time 3: 
r = .096, n = 84, p = .383. This finding suggests that the more time a participant spends carrying 
out the SIP, the weaker the internal reliability becomes. This reduction is likely due to fatigue 
and reduced concentration while completing the task over a relatively long period.  As shown 
in Table 4.4, higher test-retest reliability was found in the group that was presented with the 
same stimuli throughout.  Although Time 1 and Time 2 were not strongly related, the other 
time points were more in line with IAT test re-test findings (Nosek, et al., 2007), particularly 
for the group with consistent stimuli.   
Table 4.4: Test re-test reliability for participants in the same or different stimuli condition. 
Stimuli  Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Same Time 1 1 .088 .291† 
 Time 2  1 .495** 
 Time 3   1 
Different Time 1 1 .016 .152 
 Time 2  1 .235 
 Time 3   1 
† p < .065, ** p < .001 
 
The correlation between the relative/bipolar implicit and explicit scores was significant, 
r = .244, n = 84, p = .024. For both the (compacted) absolute flower, r = .206, n = 84, p = .060, 
and insect, r = .067, n = 84, p = .543, implicit and explicit measure scores did not significantly 
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correlate, but the correlations were in the predicted direction. The correlation between unipolar 
relative implicit and explicit scores was significant, r = .434, n = 168, p < .001, as were the 
correlations for cut 1, r = .446, n = 84, p < .001 and cut 2, r = .423, n = 84, p < .001. 
Discussion 
 The aim of the current study was to test whether the SIP has practice effect limitations 
like the IAT. On the basis of findings from Study 2 we hypothesised that the SIP would not 
have a practice/experience effect problem and this prediction was confirmed. Similar implicit 
biases were shown if participants saw the same stimuli throughout the three SIPs or if the 
stimuli changed on each new exposure. Bayes Factors were used to confirm that both these 
effects were statistically comparable to each other, something NHST cannot do. However, the 
internal reliability of the SIP does reduce over time and the test-retest reliability was higher 
when the same stimuli were used. This finding suggests that giving participants breaks after 
each SIP or perhaps getting them to complete the SIP the following day may improve the 
internal reliability over multiple SIP exposures. Lastly, the expected positive correlations were 
found in the relative implicit and explicit results for both the bipolar and unipolar measures. 
The absolute implicit and explicit measures were also in the expected direction. These findings 
indicate that the SIP is correctly measuring an individual’s relative bias towards flowers and 
insects.    
General discussion 
The SIP was developed to measure implicit beliefs, to be more user-friendly to 
complete and to overcome the positive framing bias (PFB) limitation in the IRAP. The SIP 
utilised the most beneficial aspects from the IRAP, such as the measurement of two separate 
biases (positive/negative) towards a single attitude object and the ability to measure 
propositional statements and not just associations. Other associative implicit measures, such as 
the SC-IAT and the GNAT can measure only one separate bias towards objects, while the most 
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popular associative implicit measure (IAT) can only compare one attitude object to another 
(i.e., Flowers vs. Insects). Therefore, absolute implicit measures, particularly the SIP, provide 
researchers with added specificity in determining the driving mechanism behind an implicit 
bias (i.e., whether participants have a neutral bias towards flowers and dislike insects, have a 
neutral bias towards insects and like flowers, or some combination of these).  
Response biases inherent to the English language result in participants having an 
affirming bias (faster to press “Yes” than “No” to both positive and negative words; see O’Shea 
et al., 2017a), while carrying out the SIP. However, this affirming bias can be remedied easily 
by measuring response biases towards neutral/non-words and then using these metrics to 
correct for response biases in subsequent SIPs. Importantly, an individual’s response biases 
rather than the group’s response bias must be measured and controlled for because some 
individuals may have more extreme affirming biases and perhaps others will have a negating 
bias.             
Across two different attitude domains with near universal bias, it was found (after the 
appropriate response biases transformations were made) that participants had strong negative 
implicit attitudes towards insects and criminals, and positive attitudes towards flowers and 
carers. Correlations were always in the expected direction and the unipolar implicit and explicit 
relative results showed moderately strong correlations. When measuring attitudes towards the 
self, correlations were observed between the implicit and explicit measures, again suggesting 
that the SIP is measuring constructs appropriately. 
 Finally, the Gender SIP showed that a strong bias for relating males with careers rather 
than families is the mechanism driving the males-career/female-family bias in the IAT. 
Although participants were faster to associate females with family rather than careers 
implicitly, the effect did not reach conventional levels of significance. In the Gender-SIP, 
implicit and explicit scores did not correlate and often the correlations showed negative 
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coefficients.  However, the SIP did correlate with an explicit measure assessing gender system 
justification and it made a unique contribution when predicting these explicit gender biases. 
The internal reliability of the SIP was also examined extensively. Except for the IAT 
and the SC-IAT, most other associative implicit measures of social cognition have poor 
reliability (Bosson et al., 2000; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Nosek, et al., 2007). The odd-
even split half reliability in the SIP was acceptable (average r = .403, ranging from r = .289 to 
r = .582), showing better internal reliability than most other associative measures. Although 
the IAT and the SC-IAT generally have higher internal reliabilities, participants in the current 
experiment completed a number of SIPs in one sitting, and fatigue could have contributed to 
the lower reliability. Other propositional implicit measures such as the IRAP and RRT have 
reported similar levels of internal reliability (De Houwer et al., 2015; Golijani-Moghaddam et 
al., 2013).  Thus, initial evidence indicates that the SIP has a sufficient level of internal 
reliability to be used as an individual difference tool that measures implicit social cognition.   
A major advantage of using the SIP compared to the most popular implicit measures 
(IAT, SC-IAT) is that it is not limited by practice/experience effects, with the D-SIP scores 
remaining stable over time. This stability means that attitudes and stereotypes of participants 
who used the SIP many times can be compared with those who are completely new to the task. 
More practically, clinical or health psychologists can use the SIP to measure the success of a 
therapy at the individual level, without the need of a control condition. This practicality, as 
well as the added understanding of where changes in attitudes/stereotypes are occurring could 
initiate a new wave of individualised therapies aimed at tackling a specific bias in patients. 
Further research should be conducted to test if the methods that are successful at reducing 
implicit prejudice in the IAT (Lai et al., 2014) are also successful at reducing prejudice when 
measured with the SIP. 
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Simple is the word that is used for the “S” in the SIP acronym. As this word suggests, 
developing a user-friendly implicit measure was a central aim. None of the participants were 
removed from the analysis based on the D-SIP algorithm. In contrast, in the IRAP attrition rates 
of 20% or greater are not uncommon (Hughes et al., 2012). Furthermore, the SIP in the studies 
described above averaged 11-12 minutes to complete, while participants may need 20 minutes 
to complete the IRAP (De Houwer et al., 2015), because of the difficulty some participants 
have in meeting the criteria in the practice blocks. Importantly, the time to complete the SIP 
could be greatly reduced by using fewer test blocks throughout. With the inclusion of blocks 
measuring the affirming/positivity biases, a SIP that takes under 10 minutes to complete would 
likely be possible.   
Automaticity has been argued to be a central feature for a measure to be described as 
implicit, and hence, capable of capturing implicit beliefs (De Houwer & Moors, 2012; De 
Houwer et al., 2009). For example, the average response latency in the Nature SIP (Study 2) 
was 1,054ms with accuracy averaging 94.8%. The other SIP experiments showed similar 
results.  Response latencies in the SIP are similar if not faster than other implicit measures and 
the quick responses are likely due to participants having to store only one relational statement 
in memory. Therefore, the SIP certainly can be classified as an implicit measure on the basis 
of the speeded responses that are required and easily achieved throughout the task.  
Recommendations for using the SIP 
 
Based on the results reported here and other pilot studies conducted, some 
recommendations are given for researchers interested in using the SIP as a response latency 
measure for capturing individuals’ beliefs.  
First, it would be advised that piloting should be initially conducted, to test if the 
intended sample can respond quickly and with a high level of accuracy to the stimuli used. In 
the studies reported here, as each participant completed several SIPs, we purposely left the 
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median response latency criteria (1,800ms) longer than what pilot studies suggested could 
easily be met (1,600ms), due to potential fatigue. Barnes-Holmes, et al., (2010) recommended 
using a 2,000ms latency criterion rather than 3,000ms because it showed more accurate results 
and improved the internal reliability in the IRAP. If participants are completing only one SIP 
in a single session, then a 1,600ms or perhaps even a 1,500ms latency criteria would be optimal. 
Ensuring the faster response latency criteria does not greatly increase the percentage of error 
rates would also be important.          
Second, it is recommended that practice blocks always be included and test blocks 
should have at least 18 trials if not more. The effects that task switching (i.e., having 20 trial 
across 16 test blocks vs having 40 trials across 8 test blocks) can have on implicit bias scores 
and the internal reliability has never been tested systematically with any implicit measure. 
There is some evidence from other absolute implicit measures that having more trials per block 
improves the internal reliability. For example, Karpinski and Steinman, (2006) reported lower 
internal consistencies when 48 trials rather than 72 trials per block were used in the SC-IAT. 
The Single Target (ST)- IAT which is conceptually similar to the SC-IAT, had low internal 
consistency when 20 trials were used per block (Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 
2005), but when 35 trials were used the reliability was much improved (Bluemke & Friese, 
2008). Therefore, researchers should experiment with different block lengths, but with the same 
overall number of trials, to test the effects these changes have on implicit biases and reliability.  
Third, when analysing the SIP data, it is recommend using the D-algorithm adapted 
from Greenwald et al., (2003). Numerous other implicit tasks have reported that the D-
algorithm has an advantage over using raw latency scores (e.g., Nosek, Bar-Anan, Sriram, Axt, 
& Greenwald, 2014) because it generally increases the reliability, increases the correlation 
between the implicit and explicit measures and reduces the correlation between the implicit 
scores and the speed of responding (Greenwald et al.,2003; see Richetin, Costantini, Perugini, 
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& Schönbrodt, 2015, for potential improvements to D algorithm). When O’Shea et al., (2016) 
initially introduced the SIP, they advised that “Yes” responses should be compared with “Yes” 
responses and “No” responses compared with “No” across the test blocks. This method of 
analysis results in the same findings to the analytic method used above, but is disadvantaged 
by the fact that only a single rather than two response biases can be measured towards each 
category.  Consequently, it is advised that researchers use the analytic strategy used throughout 
the three studies above. 
  Fourth, although “absolute” has been used throughout the manuscript to describe the 
SIP’s ability to measure response biases towards separate categories, this label might be 
premature. All the studies conducted used a contrast/comparison category which may have 
influenced the results in a certain way. For example, previous research has suggested that using 
a different contrast category in the IAT (e.g., Karpinski, 2004; Robinson, Meier, Zetocha, & 
McCaul, 2005), and the IRAP (Hussey et al., 2016) can increase or decrease an individual’s 
implicit bias. Testing the effects of using the SIP with a strongly negative, a strongly positive 
and a neutral contrasting category would be illuminating and beneficial. The contrast categories 
will undoubtedly influence the relative results, but it remains to be seen if the compacted SIP 
trial types are influenced by a contrasting category. Of note, it is even possible that there is no 
such thing as an absolute attitude because it has been argued that all attitudes require some type 
of comparative judgement (Festinger, 1954). 
Finally, it is certainly possible to include sentences rather than single words in the SIP, 
to precisely measure the relationship between stimuli (e.g. “I am good” vs “I want to be good”). 
This method may allow for more control over the way that participants respond to the 
relationship between stimuli and therefore, allow for more control over the type of beliefs that 
scores on the SIP can detect (see De Houwer et al., 2015, for a similar argument). Furthermore, 
a personalised SIP (see Olson & Fazio, 2004) can be developed using the current methodology, 
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by simply replacing the category labels “positive” and “negative” with “I love” and “I hate”. 
A similar adaption would also be possible when creating an autobiographical SIP  (see Agosta 
& Sartori, 2013; Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008). Therefore, the 
versatility of the SIP allows it to be used in various research domains within and outside 
psychology. 
Conclusion 
 
This paper is the first to validate the SIP as a tool for obtaining an implicit measure of 
beliefs. Through three studies covering several attitude domains and a stereotype domain, we 
demonstrated that the SIP correlates with explicit measures, provides increased specificity of 
where an individual’s implicit biases lie, has acceptable reliability and is not limited by 
practice/experience effects. Determining whether the SIP can predict real life behaviours and 
directly comparing it with other implicit measures would be a fruitful next step to test its 
validity, utility and employability. Through new measures of implicit social cognition, 
researchers can gain an enhanced understanding of an individual’s implicit and explicit social 
cognition. The SIP appears to be a valuable tool in this pursuit.   
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Chapter 5: Some words are more like 
pictures: Word type response biases in 
reaction time tasks 
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Abstract 
Responding quickly to negative stimuli is evolutionarily advantageous. Generally, negative 
images are recognised and responded to faster than positive images. For words, the reverse is 
found: Positive words are normally recognised and responded to faster than negative words. 
Estes and Verges (2008) reported an exception. They showed that negative nouns are 
responded to more quickly than positive nouns in a valence judgement task (VJT). Crucially, 
nouns are inevitably the most concrete/imaginable words. Here we examine how the use of 
more abstract words (i.e., verbs/adjectives) influences reaction times in VJTs. Using secondary 
data and three experiments, we report that reaction times to negative images and nouns are 
faster than to positive images and nouns, but the reverse applies for verbs and adjectives. Other 
influential response biases are also discussed. The findings have substantial implications for 
the interpretation of results from various psychological tasks and can provide an explanation 
for previous counterintuitive findings in the literature.                    
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Introduction 
Quickly detecting and responding to images of negative/threatening stimuli such as 
snakes conveys many evolutionary advantages (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Indeed, faster 
reaction times (RTs) occur when participants search for negative facial expressions (anger) 
than when they search for positive expressions (such as happiness: Ohman, Lundqvist, & 
Esteves, 2001). This difference might be because negative stimuli tend to capture (preferential 
engagement: Pratto & John, 1991) and hold (delayed disengagement: Fox, Russo, Bowles, & 
Dutton, 2001) attention more than positive images. However, studies in linguistics often find 
the opposite — people respond faster to positive words than to negative words (Kuperman, 
Estes, Brysbaert, & Warriner, 2014). This response bias has been found in lexical decision-
making (Estes & Adelman, 2008), word recognition (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004) and 
emotional Stroop tasks (Larsen, Mercer, & Balota, 2006). 
One exception is found in Estes and Verges (2008). Using concrete nouns as stimuli, 
they found that participants responded faster to negative nouns than to positive nouns in a 
Valence Judgement Task (VJT), while the reverse occurred in a lexical decision-making task 
which was similar to previous findings (see also Nasrallah, Carmel, & Lavie, 2009). Thus, it 
appears at least that concrete words produce the same negative stimulus advantage as (naturally 
concrete) images when valence judgements are made. However, no research has considered 
whether comparable or different response biases will occur for verbs and adjectives in a VJT.  
Nouns are typically more concrete and more easily imagined than are adjectives 
(Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman, 2014; see also Carnaghi et al., 2008). We might, therefore, 
expect that nouns will be processed in a similar way to images, producing faster RTs for 
negative items in a VJT. In contrast, there is less evolutionary urgency to detect and respond 
to more abstract stimuli (typically conveyed by verbs and adjectives) because they are less 
likely to signal the presence of immediate environmental threats. VJTs are used in a host of 
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popular implicit measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003), the Single Category (SC)-IAT (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) and the Go/No-
Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001). Therefore, if nouns, verbs and adjectives 
influence valence-related RTs in different ways, the interpretation of the results drawn from 
such implicit tasks could be markedly different. More generally, the results will have an impact 
in many areas of research that solely present verbs, adjectives or nouns or their combination. 
A secondary aim was to uncover further biases that can influence responding on other 
psychological tasks.  A recent study (O’Shea et al., 2016) reported a Positive Framing Bias 
(PFB, Dodds et al., 2015; Matthews & Dylman, 2014) in a popular implicit RT task - the 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & 
Boles, 2010). This PFB occurs because participants prioritise positive over negative 
associations. O’Shea et al. (2016) described a new measure for estimating implicit attitudes 
(the Simple Implicit Procedure; SIP) that aimed to remove the PFB. Regardless, other positivity 
biases remained. For example, participants appeared biased towards making faster affirming 
responses (“Yes”) compared with negating responses (“No”) (see also Deutsch, Gawronski, & 
Strack, 2006). This affirming bias was especially pronounced when participants were 
associating any category (positive or negative) with positive words (O’Shea, Brown, & 
Watson, 2017, see also Mitchell, 2004; Proctor & Cho, 2006). We therefore examined whether 
participants were faster at sorting/associating affirming and positive words together and 
negating and negative words than the reverse associations.  
Overview 
The main aim of the present work was to determine the influence of word type (noun, 
verb, adjective) on valence judgement RTs. We also examined the effect of making affirming 
versus negating responses on RTs. In addition, we tested for response biases participants had 
in associating positive and negative words with affirming and negating words. Based on the 
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polarity correspondence principle (Proctor & Cho, 2006), we expected participants to more 
easily associate negating and negative words with each other and affirming and positive words 
with each other. We tested three specific hypotheses: 
H1: RTs in a VJT will be faster for concrete negative stimuli (images and nouns) than 
for positive stimuli. For abstract stimuli (verbs and adjectives), the reverse will be found 
(Studies 1-3). 
H2: RTs will be faster for affirming words than negating words (Studies 2-3). 
 H3: Participants’ RTs will be faster when associating affirming and positive words, and 
negating and negative words than the reverse (Study 2). 
Study 1 
Using secondary data, Study 1 tested whether people judged the valences of negative 
concrete stimuli (images and nouns) and positive abstract stimuli (adjectives) faster than they 
judged the valences of their antonyms in the Black-White (Race) IAT (Greenwald et al., 2003) 
and the Flower-Insect (Nature) IAT. In the Nature IAT, for example, participants are 
successively presented with various pictures of flowers and insects and positive and negative 
words. They must sort these stimuli into the correct category label at the top of the screen. In 
one of the two critical blocks, participants have to press the E key on a computer keyboard if a 
positive word or a name of a flower appears and press the I key if a negative word or a name 
of an insect appears (congruent task). In the other critical block, participants have to press E if 
a positive word or a name of an insect is shown and they must press the I key if a negative 
word or a name of a flower is shown (incongruent task). The basic idea underlying the IAT is 
that participants will make faster and more accurate responses when those responses are 
congruent with their current beliefs than when they are not.  
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Method 
Participants: For the race IAT, the sample consisted of 345 white participants, recruited 
through Reddit, who previously completed an online experiment (O’Shea, Brown, Watson, & 
Fincher, 2017). For the nature IAT, 88 participants recruited through Amazon Turk completed 
the task three times in succession (i.e., 1st, 2nd and 3rd Nature IAT, see Table 5.1 for number of 
trials in each block in the three Nature IATs) resulting in 264 usable scores in a study that 
examined practice effects (O’Shea, De Houwer, et al., 2017). 
Materials: The race IAT used the same stimuli and procedure as the standard race IAT 
used by Project Implicit (Greenwald et al., 2003; Nosek, Smyth, et al., 2007). Participants 
sorted greyscale pictures of black and white individuals as well as positive and negative 
adjectives into the appropriate categories. The category labels used were “African American”, 
“European American”, “Good” and “Bad”. The Flower-Insect IAT used only words (no 
pictures) referring to flowers and insects (all nouns), in addition to positively and negatively 
valenced adjectives. The category labels in this task were “Flower”, “Insect”, “Pleasant” and 
“Unpleasant”. Appendix 5 includes the stimuli used in the current experiment. 
Designs and Procedure: For the race IAT, a 2 × 2 repeated measures design was used 
with stimulus type (image, adjective) and valence (positive/non-threatening, 
negative/threatening) as within-subject factors. The nature IAT used another 2 × 2 repeated 
measures design with stimulus type (noun, adjective) and valence (positive/non-threatening, 
negative/threatening) as within-subject factors. The procedure was the same for both IATs, 
with domain-specific stimuli used for each task. After participants gave informed consent and 
completed some other tasks related to the source experiment, they read the instructions on how 
to complete the IAT. The instruction read: “You will be presented with a set of words to classify 
into groups. Classify items as quickly as you can while making as few mistakes as possible. 
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Going too slow or making too many mistakes will result in an uninterpretable score. Keep your 
index fingers on the E and I keys to enable rapid response”.  
The category labels used in each block remained at the top of the screen throughout a 
block of trials and the target word or image appeared at the centre. If a correct response was 
given, the target stimulus disappeared and a new target stimulus appeared after 400ms. If an 
incorrect response was given, a red X appeared directly below the target stimulus and both 
remained until the correct response was given. Table 5.1 summarises the number of trials and 
stimuli in each of the seven blocks of trials. When participants finished the IAT, they continued 
with the remaining tasks within the study followed by an online debrief form. 
 
Table 5.1: Number of trials and stimuli presented in the Race and Nature IAT blocks 
(Study 1). 
 Race & 1st Nature IAT      2nd & 3rd Nature IAT 
Block 
Number 
Number 
of trials 
 Stimuli presented Block 
Number 
Number 
of trials 
Stimuli presented 
1 20  Image (Race IAT)/ 
Noun (Nature IAT) 
 
1 10 Noun 
2 20  Adjective 2 10 Adjective 
3 20  Mixed (Image/Noun 
& Adjective) 
 
3 10 Mixed (Noun & 
Adjective)  
4 40  Mixed 4 20 Mixed 
5 40  Image/Noun 5 20 Noun 
6 20  Mixed 6 10 Mixed 
7 40  Mixed 7 20 Mixed 
 
Results 
The primary data obtained from IAT trials are RTs measured from the onset of the 
stimulus to a response. In this and the remaining studies, only correct responses were included 
in the analysis (correct responses > 93.5%). Mean RTs that were 3 standard deviations above 
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or below the mean RT in each cell (e.g., black person, flower, negative adjective) were removed 
from the analysis. If an individual’s data were removed from any cell, then that participant was 
removed from the analysis (N < 12). We first analysed the race IAT results to test for the  
predicted interaction between stimulus (image/adjective) and valence (positive/negative), and 
then tested for an interaction between word type (noun/adjective) and valence in the nature IAT 
 
  
 
Figure 5.1: (left) Interaction between stimulus type and valence for the Race IAT. (right) 
Interaction between stimulus type and valence for the Nature IAT  
 
For the race IAT, a 2 × 2 repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed 
that RTs were overall faster for images (M = 1238.05, SE = 9.23) than for words (M = 1278.38, 
SE = 10.03), F(1, 332) = 106.46, p < .001, ηρ² = .24. RTs were also faster for 
negative/threatening items (M = 1252.23, SE = 9.51) then for positive/non-threatening items 
(M = 1265.19, SE = 9.64), F(1, 332) = 17.17, p < .001, ηρ² = .05 . However, of most interest 
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was a significant stimulus type × valence interaction, F(1, 332) = 52.01, p < .001, ηρ² = .14, 
indicating that participants showed faster RTs to negative images and positive adjectives than 
to their antonyms (Figure 5.1)27.   
 For the nature IAT, RTs to nouns (M = 1230.74, SE = 9.29) were faster than RTs to 
adjectives (M = 1271.34, SE = 9.46), F(1, 253) = 7.56, p = .006, ηρ² = .03. There was also a 
significant word type × valence interaction, F(1, 253) = 23.25, p < .001, ηρ² = .08; participants 
showed faster RTs to negative nouns and positive adjectives than to their antonyms (Figure 
5.1). The main effect of valence was not significant, F(1, 253) = .82, p > .250, ηρ² = .00, 
(Positive: M = 1263.98, SE = 9.15; Negative: M = 1267.01, SE = 9.42).   
Discussion 
Overall the findings support H1. People processed (concrete) nouns in a similar way to 
how they processed images – showing faster RTs on a VJT to negative nouns and negative 
images than to positive nouns and positive images. In contrast, with (less concrete) adjectives, 
the reverse held: people showed faster RTs to positive adjectives than to negative adjectives. 
Study 2 
Study 2 again used the IAT but with completely new stimuli. The study tested whether 
the interaction between valence and word type (nouns/adjectives) occurred when using stimuli 
that were specifically matched on word length (Balota, Cortese, Sergent-Marshall, Spieler, & 
                                                 
27 Similar results were found using the raw data of the old-young and disabled-abled IAT 
made available to the authors by Project Implicit. For example, people were faster to sort 
pictures of old people and disabled people (presumably due to these groups evoking a 
fear/avoidance response, although salience could also be a potential explanation, see 
Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). In both these IATs, positive adjectives were also sorted 
faster than negative adjectives.   
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Yap, 2004), word frequency/contextual diversity (Adelman, Brown, & Quesada, 2006) and 
arousal (Kuperman et al., 2014). Furthermore, we evaluated participants’ RTs to positive and 
negative verbs (which fall between nouns and adjectives in terms of concreteness). Study 2 
also tested whether participants showed faster RTs to affirming words than negating words 
(H2) and, if participants showed faster RT for positive-affirming and negative-negating 
associations (H3). 
Method 
Participants: 168 participants (89 Males, 78 Females and 1 Other) took part in the 
online experiment and were recruited through Reddit (https://www.reddit.com/r/SampleSize/) 
over a three-month period. The majority of the sample were white (87%) and were mainly from 
the US (61%). 152 participants were in or had completed education above high school level 
and the mean age of the sample was 24.9 (SD = 6.86). Participation was voluntary. In order to 
increase the sample size and encourage appropriate responses, participants were informed that 
the “top 4 fastest and most accurate people to sort words will win $20”.  
Materials  
Demographic information: Participants’ gender, age, race, education and country of 
residence were obtained through an online questionnaire. 
 Implicit Association Test (IAT): Three IATs were presented, one using nouns, one using 
verbs and one using adjectives. The three IATs also required participants to sort affirming (e.g., 
True, Yes) and negating words (e.g., False, No; see Table 5.2 for stimuli). The positive and 
negative nouns, verbs and adjectives were matched on word length, arousal and contextual 
diversity. For each word type, the positive and negative stimuli on the valence dimension were 
significantly different from one another based on the Warriner, Kuperman and Brysbaert 
(2013) ratings (ts > 15.65, ps < .001). Furthermore, the positive and negative valence scores 
for each of the word types were similarly different from one another. 
154 
 
On concreteness (measured using ratings from Brysbaert et al., 2014), the positive and 
negative nouns, verbs and adjectives all differed significantly from each other (Fs > 16.95, ps 
< .001). Nouns were the most concrete, followed by verbs and then adjectives. The category 
labels used in each IAT were “Support”, “Oppose”, “Positive” and “Negative”. “Support” and 
“Oppose” were used instead of the category labels “Affirm” and “Negate” on the expectation 
that participants would find it easier to associate “Negative” and “Negate” together simply 
because of the semantic similarity between these two category labels. Each IAT comprised 160 
trials divided into seven blocks (see Table 5.3 for items and number of trials in each IAT block). 
Equal numbers of positive and negative words as well as supporting and opposing words were 
used in blocks which used a particular stimulus type.  
 
Table 5.2: Stimuli used in the Noun, Verb and Adjective IAT as well as the VJT (Study 2-3). The 
support and oppose stimuli were used in all the tasks. 
Noun 
(Positive) 
Noun 
(Negative) 
Verb 
(Positive) 
Verb 
(Negative) 
Adjective 
(Positive) 
Adjective 
(Negative) 
Support 
(Affirm) 
Oppose 
(Negate) 
Cash Shark Smile Puke Cozy Scary Yes No 
Puppy Rat Hug Kidnap Nicer Horrible True False 
Gold Rapist Achieve Lie Glorious Lazy Agree Disagree 
Sun Vomit Flirt Cry Brave Bored Confirm Deny 
Cake Bomb Kiss Stab Amazing Nasty Accept  Reject 
Volunteer Terrorist Enjoy Irritate Friendly Rotten   
Treasure Disease Win Scare Exciting Ignorant   
Kitten Virus Create Sicken Jolly Failed   
Vehicle Death Overcome Panic Gentle Cruel   
Cinema Garbage Value Upset Wise Jealous   
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Table 5.3: Number of trials and stimuli presented in each IAT block (Study 2) and each VJT 
block (Study 3). 
 IAT VJT 
Block 
Number 
Number 
of trials 
 Stimuli presented Block 
Number 
Number 
of trials 
Stimuli presented 
1 20  Positive, Negative 1 30 Support, Oppose 
2 20  Support, Oppose 2 20 Noun 
3 20  Mixed (Support, 
Oppose, Positive, 
Negative) 
3 20 Verb 
4 20  Mixed 4 20 Adjective 
5 40  Positive, Negative 5 20 Noun 
6 20  Mixed 6 20 Verb 
7 20  Mixed 7 20 Adjective 
 
Design and Procedure: The experiment used a 3 (word type: nouns, verbs, adjectives) 
× 2 (valence: positive, negative) mixed design with valence as the within-subject factor and 
word type as the between-subject factor. After participants had given informed consent, they 
completed the demographic information section. Participants were then allocated randomly to 
either the noun or adjective condition. Data for the verb condition were collected after the noun 
and adjective conditions. Therefore, the word type factor was not fully randomised28.  
Participants in each condition completed the standard IAT as described in Study 1 with 
the domain-specific stimuli used for each of the three IATs. After participants completed the 
                                                 
28 See Appendix 5 where the findings were replicated using a fully randomised design, had a 
larger sample size (222 participants) and participants were incentivised (payment of $1 for 
completing the experiment) through a different recruitment platform (Amazon Mechanical 
Turk). 
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IAT, they had the option to input their email address to enter a competition that awarded $20 
to the top four most accurate participants. If scores were tied on accuracy, the award was given 
to the participants with the smallest mean RTs. Following this, participants read an online 
debriefing form. The full experiment can be viewed at 
https://brianpsychexperiments.warwick.ac.uk/Response/testa.html 
Results 
H1 nouns vs. verbs vs. adjectives. A mixed 3 (word type: noun, verb, adjective) × 2 
(valence: positive, negative) ANOVA revealed that RTs to positive words (M = 1214.42, SD 
= 139.19) were faster than to negative words (M = 1231.06, SD = 146.62), F(1, 164) = 12.55, 
p = .001, ηρ² = .07. Furthermore there was a significant word type × valence interaction, F(2, 
164) = 6.14, p = .003, ηρ² = .07. As shown in Figure 5.2, RTs were numerically faster to 
negative nouns than positive nouns, t(52) = .87, p > .25, but RTs were significantly slower for 
negative verbs and adjectives than for their antonyms, ts > 3.19, ps <.003. The main effect of 
word type was not significant, F(2, 164) = .58, p > .250, ηρ² = .01. 
H2 affirming words vs. negating words. A mixed 3 (word type: noun, verb, adjective) 
× 2 (response type: affirm, negate) revealed a main effect of response type, F(1,160) = 37.74, 
p < .001, ηρ² = .19. Participants were faster to sort words into the support category (M = 
1209.63, SD = 139.90) than into the oppose category (M = 1248.60, SD = 157.37). There was 
a significant difference between sorting the affirming (support) and negating (oppose) words 
in the verb, t(54) = 4.69, p < .001, the noun, t(53) = 3.99, p < .001 and adjective IATs, t(53) = 
2.104, p = .04 (see Figure 5.2). The main effect of word type and the word type × response type 
interaction was not significant, Fs < 1.73, ps > .18. 
H3 affirming-positive, negating-negative association biases. Individual’s D-IAT scores 
were computed using the standard procedure/algorithm used in IAT research (Greenwald et al., 
2003). Participants with error rates above 30% or RTs above 10,000ms or below 300ms on 
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more than 10% of trials were excluded (four participants). Scores above zero indicate 
participants were faster to respond to affirming and positive words, as well as negating and 
negative words.  In contrast, scores below zero indicate the reverse. We used a one-sample t-
test to determine whether participants D-IAT scores were significantly above or below zero. 
The results showed that participants had significantly faster RTs when associating affirming  
and positive words and negating and negative words in memory than the opposite, t(163) = 
41.49, p < .001, d = 3.24. Furthermore, participants were significantly faster to sort affirming  
and positive words (M = 1207.19, SD = 126.07), then to sort negating and negative words (M 
= 1233.76, SD = 139.81; t(163) = 6.88 , p < .001, d = 0.54. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: (left) Interaction between word type and valence. (right) Main effect of response 
type.  
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Discussion 
Using stimuli matched on numerous factors, we again found the predicted (H1) 
interaction between nouns (most concrete), verbs (less concrete) and adjectives (least concrete). 
In addition, participants had faster RTs when sorting positive adjectives and verbs than their 
antonyms, but for nouns, there was little difference. Participants were also faster to sort 
affirming words than negating words (supporting H2). Finally, participants had faster RTs 
when associating positive and affirming, and negating and negative, compared to the reverse 
association (supporting H3). 
Study 3 
Study 3 aimed to replicate previous findings (supporting H1 and H2) using a within-
subject design in which participants responded to the positive and negative nouns, verbs and 
adjectives as well as the affirming and negating words used in Study 2. Rather than using a 
standard IAT, we used a simpler approach in which only two (rather than four) concepts were 
presented within a block. This new task will test the generalisability of the effects, in addition 
to determining whether the same effects occur when participants complete just one sorting task 
(sort word types or response type) rather than two (sort word types and response type). 
Method 
Participants: The replication of Study 2 (see Appendix 5) had approximately 70 
participants in each cell in a between-subject design. We therefore set the stopping rule at 70 
participants for the current experiment which used a within-subject design. Recruitment was 
via Reddit. 40 males, 29 females and 1 other completed the experiment. The mean age of the 
sample was 26.4 (SD = 8.19), with a majority of white participants (>81%) from the US (70%) 
taking part. Over 61 participants had college/university degrees or were in education above 
high school level. 
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Materials: The stimuli were the same as Study 2. However, instead of the IAT, a 
simpler RT task (VJT) was used.  
Procedure: The experiment used a 3 (word type: nouns, verbs, adjectives) × 2 (valence: 
positive, negative) within-subject design. The major difference between the current study and 
the previous study was that only two categories appeared within each block throughout the 
task. The word that appeared at the centre of the screen had to be quickly and accurately sorted 
into one of two categories displayed at the top of the screen. If the word belonged to the 
category on the top left, pressing the “E” key was the correct response, and if the word belonged 
to the category on the top right, pressing the “I” key was the correct response. 
Overall, each participant completed 150 trials over seven blocks. Block 1 always had 
30 trials with the “Support” and “Oppose” category labels as well as the corresponding stimuli. 
Blocks 2-4 comprised of one block of nouns, one block of verbs and one block of adjectives 
with block order randomised. For each participant, the order of blocks 5-7 was the same as the 
order of blocks 2-4. All other aspects of the VJT were the same as the IAT (see 
https://brianpsychexperiments.warwick.ac.uk/Response/testc.html for the full experiment). 
Results 
A 3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with word type (noun, verb and adjective) and 
valence (positive and negative) as factors revealed a significant main effect of word type F(2, 
130) = 16.23, p < .001, ηρ² = .20, and a significant word type × valence interaction, F(2, 130) 
= 8.07, p < .001, ηρ² = .11. As shown in Figure 5.3, participants responded faster to both 
positive adjectives, t(65) = 2.32, p = .023 and verbs, t(65) = 2.78, p = .007, but numerically 
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slower to positive nouns, t(65) = 1.90, p = .06229 relative to their antonyms. The main effect of 
valence was not significant, F(1, 65) = 2.60, p = .112, ηρ² = .04. With respect to response type, 
a paired samples t-test showed that affirming/support responses (M = 1081.70, SD = 90.96) 
were faster than negating/oppose responses (M = 1108.79, SD = 113.85; Figure 5.3), t(66) = 
2.54, p = .013, d = .31 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: (left) Interaction between word type and valence. (right) Main effect of response 
type. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Given our directional prediction and the previous findings, we would expect that negative 
nouns would be responded to faster than negative nouns and so there is some justification for 
treating this test as one-tailed which would then be significant at the .05 level. 
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Discussion 
Study 3 replicated the findings from Studies 1-2, showing that people responded faster 
to negative nouns, positive verbs and positive adjectives than to their antonyms. The expected 
interaction between word type and valence was also replicated (H1). We again found that 
participants were faster at sorting affirming words than sorting negating words (H2). This study 
provides strong supporting evidence for H1 and H2 using a within-subject design. 
General discussion 
We predicted that highly concrete words such as nouns would be processed like images, 
resulting in faster RTs to negative than to positive stimuli on a VJT. We expected that this 
would not occur with less concrete words because they convey more abstract concepts which 
are less likely to signal an immediate environmental threat. Therefore, H1 predicted the 
presence of a word type × valence interaction – which we found in all three studies. This finding 
has important implications for many psychological tasks in which different types of word 
stimuli are separated or mixed. Systematic analysis of the influence that word type has in the 
most popular measures of implicit attitudes (IAT, SC-IAT, GNAT, Brief IAT) is therefore 
warranted. 
An additional explanation for the slower RTs to negative verbs and adjectives than to 
their antonyms is that people might perceive these negative words as relating to themselves 
rather than an external threat in the environment. This perception may evoke an ego-threat, 
lowering an individual’s self-esteem and emotional stability (Waller, Watkins, Shuck, & 
McManus, 1996). This ego-threat response potentially inhibits the processing of negative 
verbs/adjectives in order to protect an individual’s self-esteem (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). A common finding in implicit self-esteem research is that both 
normative and depressed samples are faster to associate positive rather than negative adjectives 
with the self  (De Raedt, Schacht, Franck, & De Houwer, 2006). The current research suggests 
162 
 
that it might be more appropriate to use nouns instead of adjectives in the self-esteem IAT, as 
this change may improve the detection of those with negative self-biases. 
 H2 predicted that participants would show faster RTs to affirming words (True, Yes) 
than to negating words (False, No). A between-subject analysis (Study 2) and a within-subject 
analysis (Study 3) found this to be true. This bias has major implications for many tasks that 
contain affirming/negating components such as the IRAP (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et 
al., 2010), the SIP (O’Shea, Brown, & Watson, 2017) and the Relational Responding Task (De 
Houwer et al., 2015) to name just three. This affirming bias will lead to an over-inflation of 
estimates of positivity to any category (e.g., flowers or insects) associated with positive words. 
 Our final hypothesis (H3) predicted that people are more likely to store affirming-
positive, and negating-negative word associations in memory than the opposite associations 
(see Proctor & Cho, 2006, for an explanation of why this occurs). Using the IAT, Study 2 
showed this to be the case yielding an extremely large effect size. Various measures of implicit 
attitudes (ST-IAT, GNAT) are likely to be affected by this bias which could result in inflated 
positive/negative attitudes towards concepts/categories. 
Limitations 
One potential limitation is that we used a web-based rather than a tightly controlled 
experimental-based approach (but see Briones & Benham, 2017). However, even if our data 
were noisy, this cannot account for the differences found between the images and word types. 
Another limitation is that we did not determine the specific level of concreteness which results 
in a switchover from faster to slower responses for negative stimuli. Determining this would 
be a useful goal for future research, but nonetheless, this issue does not undermine our main 
findings. 
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Conclusion 
Overall, our study illustrates previously unknown issues in the use of nouns, verbs and 
adjectives that can have serious consequences for measures of implicit attitudes and likely 
many other tasks. Pre-testing the positive and negative valenced words used in implicit tasks 
(especially words used in absolute implicit task) is necessary to ensure RTs to each item are 
matched as closely as possible. Furthermore, researchers should be aware that faster RTs are 
likely to occur whenever affirming, rather than negating, responses are used. Greatest caution 
is needed when positive items must be affirmed and when negative items are to be negated. All 
these biases will influence participants’ RTs as well as the subsequent interpretations made by 
researchers and therefore, must be taken into account. 
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Chapter 6: Disgust versus fear: Using 
the SIP to measure racial prejudice  
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Abstract 
Both high rates of naturally occurring disease rates in the environment and experimental 
presentation of disease primes lead to heightened prejudice towards out-groups. The SIP has 
been shown not to be subject to practice/experience effects over time (Chapter 4). Therefore, 
any changes from baseline implicit biases detected using the SIP, following a terror or disease 
priming induction, will be likely due to the primes. It was found that white female participants 
had an implicit preference for whites relative to blacks and that this bias remained stable over 
time, regardless whether participants were primed with disease or terrorism images. Similar 
findings were found for participants’ explicit biases (i.e., stronger anti-black/pro-white biases) 
and the relations between the implicit and explicit measures were significant. Unexpectedly, 
before viewing the disease and terror primes, the white female participants reported that white 
people are more likely to use faster life history strategies (e.g., more impulsive strategies; 
strategies of lower investment in education and their children) than black people. However, 
following the primes, they reported that both white and black people used similar life history 
strategies (i.e., scores converged). Gender differences, particularly tending and befriending 
responses, and sexual strategies are invoked to explain the findings. It is also possible that the 
SIP is not influenced by context effects but instead measures stable, long-term, early 
socialisation biases.     
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Introduction 
Many studies show that outcome scores on implicit measures may decrease, increase 
or can even reverse as a function of the context (Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010). For example, 
a reduction in anti-black/pro-white biases on the IAT occurs after: (1) showing participants 
images of disliked white individuals (e.g., serial killers) and admired black individuals (e.g., 
Martin Luther King; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; see also Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 
2004) (2) showing participants a movie clip of black individuals in a positive situational context 
compared to a negative one (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001) and (3) participants interact with 
a black experimenter (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). Lai et al., (2014) repeatedly tested 
17 interventions that had previously been effective at reducing implicit racial prejudice across 
various labs. They found that only eight interventions were consistently effective at reducing 
implicit racial prejudice. These were typically interventions that invoked high self-involvement 
or linked white people with negativity and black people with positivity.  None of the 17 
interventions consistently reduced explicit racial biases.  
When implicit measures were initially developed, there was a dominant assumption that 
the associations they assessed represented a history of learning, influenced by early 
socialisation, and therefore must be stable over time and difficult to change (Rudman, 2004; 
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). The findings described above led researchers to 
hypothesise that implicit measures capture biases that are constructed on the spot (e.g., 
Schwarz, 2007, constructionist account), while others argued that implicit representation are 
stable across time but that contextual information only changes the representation of a specific 
target object (e.g., Fazio, 2007, stable representation account). For example, an individual can 
express negative biases towards black people as a group but the same individual can have 
positive biases towards specific black people, such as Barack Obama or Martin Luther King.  
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Recently Lai et al. (2016) assessed the effectiveness of the 8 best interventions (see Lai 
et al., 2014) in reducing racial prejudice both immediately following the intervention and over 
time (between one and four days). Explicit attitudes remained stable throughout but implicit 
prejudice was reduced immediately following an intervention. However, reassessment of 
participants after a day or a few days showed that the interventions were not effective in the 
long term because participants’ racial prejudice increased to similar levels as seen in the control 
condition. Three explanations were proposed to explain these findings.  (1) Effective long-term 
mechanisms have not yet been developed, (2) interventions need to be longer and more 
intensive and (3) interventions could be more effective on children than adults. Nevertheless, 
these findings are more in line with Fazio’s (2007) stable representations in memory account 
because implicit representation rebounded back to initial/original levels of implicit prejudice.  
There is also the possibility that the interventions used were not actually changing 
implicit prejudice per se, but were instead changing non-associative factors that are related to 
IAT performance (e.g., Calanchini, Sherman, Klauer, & Lai, 2014). For example, changes in 
IAT scores might have reflected temporary changes in task performance, rather than altering 
associations in memory (Lai et al., 2016). This possibility is especially likely when participants 
try to fake or exert strategic control over the outcome of their IAT score (see Blair, 2002; 
Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005). The current experiment will test the extent to which the SIP is 
influenced by context effects by using disease primes, which have previously been shown 
(Chapter 2) to increase anti-black/pro-white biases in the IAT. Other studies (e.g., Duncan & 
Schaller, 2009; Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2007) have also shown that disease primes increase 
prejudice towards out-groups.     
      One of the advantages of using the SIP is that it allows a researcher to gain an in-depth 
understanding of what mechanisms are driving an individual’s prejudice. This is because the 
SIP measures attitudes towards separate concepts or categories (i.e., attitudes towards white 
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and black people can be separately explored). This contrasts with the IAT, which can only 
measure attitudes relatively (i.e., attitudes towards white people relative to black people). 
Therefore, the SIP can identify the mechanisms that result in an increase in anti-black/pro-
white biases for individuals primed with diseases and subsequently measured with the SIP (i.e., 
pro-white bias increasing, anti-black bias increasing, or both). Another advantage of the SIP is 
that it does not have a practice effect problem like the IAT (see Chapter 4, Study 3). This means 
that the SIP can be used pre- and post-intervention, allowing researchers to measure changes 
in individuals’ attitudes over time without needing a control condition.  
The SIP has an affirming bias (see Chapter 4, Study 1 & 2) but this flaw can be 
overcome through a pre- and post-intervention design. Prior to an intervention, affirming biases 
towards the target attitude object (e.g., black or white people) can be determined (baseline), 
and following the intervention when the SIP is repeated, changes in biases can be compared to 
the baseline SIP with the affirming bias. O’Shea and colleagues (Chapter 2, Study 3) used a 
between-subject design and showed that disease primes increased implicit anti-black/pro-white 
biases compared to a terror and control condition. For the explicit attitudes, both the disease 
and terrorism condition showed increased anti-black/pro-white biases compared to the control. 
Of note, when the data were split by gender (see Appendix 2), only males showed an increase 
in their implicit and explicit anti-black/pro-white biases in the disease condition compared to 
the control condition.  
A potential explanation for these findings is that fewer females (170) than males (224) 
completed the experiment and that no significant differences were observed for females due to 
power issues arising from the smaller sample size. Additionally, the size of the effect linking 
disease primes to increased males’ prejudice was, while significant, small. Consequently, the 
between-subject experimental design used might not have been optimal to detect any small, 
but observable, effects of disease primes increasing prejudice for females. Perhaps a within-
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subject design would be more suited to detect the effects of disease primes on females’ implicit 
and explicit biases.   
Present study 
To examine this idea, the current experiment used a within-subject design across a 
control (baseline/pre) and intervention30/post time points because the SIP allows such a design 
to be used. This experiment aims to build on the existing evidence by determining whether 
environmental threats (e.g. disease & terrorism) increase females’ prejudice towards black 
people. A large body of evidence has found that males express increased prejudice towards 
out-groups compared to females (e.g., McDonald, Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012, Chapter 2, 
Studies 1-3). Some studies have also reported gender differences in response to disease primes, 
with males, but not females, often showing increased implicit prejudice towards out-group 
(Klavina, Buunk, & Pollet, 2011). Females often display tending and befriending behaviours, 
resulting in more empathetic and caring responses compared to males (Taylor et al., 2000). 
This tending and befriending response could inhibit a rise in prejudicial attitudes occurring for 
females following disease primes.   
Recent evidence has also shown that females express increased attraction to out-group 
males as their fertility increases due to the need to create genetic diversity in their offspring to 
improve evolutionary fitness (Salvatore, Meltzer, March, & Gaertner, 2017). Importantly, 
females commonly express increased vulnerabilities to disease (Duncan, Schaller, & Park, 
2009), which is related to a various of behaviours (i.e., prejudice towards out-group, 
                                                 
30 The term “intervention” often denotes a method aimed at improving a situation (e.g., 
reducing racial prejudice). However, in the current study the intervention aims to increase 
racial prejudice by use of disease or terror images to prime disgust or fear. Therefore, instead 
of using the term “intervention”, the term “threat priming” will be used.    
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conservatism, higher religious belief, see Chapter 2). On the basis of this conflicting evidence, 
two predictions can be made regarding the effects of the disease primes. (1) Primes will 
increase white females’ anti-black/pro-white biases and this finding would be more in line with 
PST, (2) The primes will not influence implicit biases (i.e., biases remain stable over time) and 
this finding would be more in line with Taylor’s tending and befriending hypothesis. 
In line with previous research on implicit and explicit attitude change using within-
subject designs, explicit attitudes are expected to remain stable over time even when changes 
are observed for implicit attitudes (Lai et al., 2014, 2016). The lack of explicit attitude change 
are expected because only one or two of the same items are assessed in close succession, pre- 
and post-threat primes (i.e., measuring explicit attitudes towards black people and ten minutes 
later using the same explicit self-report measure to assess attitudes towards black people again). 
Therefore, it is easy for participants to remember how they had previously responded on the 
explicit measure. To appear consistent and not easily manipulated by the experimenter, 
participants might be matching how they had previously responded. Therefore, the current 
experiment used the standard explicit bipolar and feeling thermometer scales that have been 
used in previous research; people’s responses on these scales normally remain stable over time. 
In addition, a much longer questionnaire relating to life history strategies (e.g., Kaplan & 
Gangestad, 2015), which uses different but similar questions, was used pre- and post-threat 
primes. Using a within-subject design, it is expected that the longer life history scale would 
have a better chance of detecting changes in participants’ explicit attitudes over time. Based on 
prior research (Williams, Sng, & Neuberg, 2016), it was predicted that the sample would report 
that black people use faster life history strategies than white people.  
Method 
Participants: 90 participants took part in the study. However, 20 were discarded 
because they did not select white as their race. Five remaining white males were also excluded 
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because this experiment aimed to measure biases only in white females 31. Therefore, the final 
sample was composed of 65 female participants. Of these, 52 described themselves as 
English/British, with the others being from European countries and one individual from Russia.  
The mean age of the sample was 18.82 (SD = .66). Participants were politically moderate (M 
= 3.58, SD = 1.60) and mainly non-religious/slightly religious (M = 1. 52, SD = .64). 31 
participants were assigned to the disease condition and 34 to the terrorism condition. All 
participants were first-year psychology students and received course credit for taking part.       
Materials   
  
Demographic information was obtained via an online questionnaire relating to 
participants’ gender, age, race, nationality, political ideology (1 = Strongly Liberal to 7 = 
Strongly Conservative) and religious belief (1 = not at all religious to 4 = strongly religious). 
Simple Implicit Procedure (SIP): The SIP was programmed using Blitzmax 
(www.blitzbasic.com/Products/blitzmax.php), running on an Intel Windows 7 desktop, 
attached to a 22” LCD screen with a resolution of 1440 x 900 pixels.  A single trial consisted 
of three elements:  
(1) on the top of the screen one of 16 positive or negative target stimuli/words appeared 
(see Table 6.1 for stimuli) 
(2) a category label appeared at the centre of the screen which was one of 18 stimuli 
composed of 3 words referring to black people, 3 words referring to white people and 12 images 
of a single black or white individual’s face. The majority of these items were taken from the 
standard IAT used by Project Implicit (see Nosek et al., 2007) 
                                                 
31 In order to receive course credit, non-white and male psychology students also had to be 
accepted to take part in the experiment. No differences apart from slightly increased pro-
white/anti-black biases were shown if the white males were included in the analysis.   
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(3) “Yes”, “Space” and “No” response options labels appeared simultaneously at the 
bottom of the screen. The word “Space” always appeared at the bottom centre of the screen, 
with the word “Yes” at the bottom left and “No” at the bottom right of the screen for half of 
the participants. The other half had “Yes” on the right and “No” on the left of the screen 
throughout the task (counterbalanced across participants, see Figure 6.1). The response labels 
and keypresses were spatially congruent (i.e., an “E” keypress corresponded to the response 
label on the left and an “O” keypress corresponded to the response label on the right of the 
screen, and “Space” corresponded to the space bar key).  
Table 6.1: Stimuli used in the SIP.  
Positive Target Stimuli Negative Target Stimuli 
Joy Agony 
Love Terrible 
Peace Horrible 
Wonderful Nasty 
Pleasure Evil 
Glorious Awful 
Laughter Failure 
Happy Hurt 
European/White Category Label African/Black Category Label 
Six images of white people (3 males) Six images of black people (3 males) 
White Person Black Person 
European African 
British White British Black 
Response Options: True, False, Space. 
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Questionnaires: Explicit attitudes were obtained using two separate questionnaires (QA 
and QB) that measured comparable constructs, but used different terminology to measure these 
constructs.  One was used following the control primes, while the other was used following the 
threat primes (counterbalanced across participants). The Cronbach's alphas for QA and QB 
were moderate (α= .68 and .72 respectively). Each questionnaire included 22 questions relating 
to life history strategies used by both black and white people. These questions were taken from 
Williams, Sng and Neuberg (2016) and included items related to impulsiveness, opportunistic 
behaviours, investments in education, investment in children and sexual unrestrictedness. A 
Likert scale ranging from 1 to 6 was used for each question, with higher scores indicating a 
faster life history strategy (i.e., more impulsive, higher risk taking, lower investment in 
education and their children and less sexual restrictiveness). One questionnaire (QA) also 
measured how warm or cold participants felt towards black and white people using a feeling 
thermometers (0 = very cold, 5 = neutral and 10 = very warm). The other questionnaire (QB) 
measured attitudes towards black people relative to white people using a bipolar Likert scale 
(response options ranged from 1 to 10) (see Appendix 6 for items). 
 Control, disgust and terror images: A total of 90 images were used as primes in the 
experiment. 30 of the images acted as controls; these included 15 images of individual 
buildings and 15 of furniture items. 30 images showed people with infections and diseases 
which aimed to evoke disgust. The final 30 images included scenes of destruction and gun 
wielding individuals and these aimed to prime terrorism.  All these images were taken from 
study 3 reported in Chapter 2. The same number of black and white individuals were shown in 
the disease prime and terrorism prime condition. 
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Figure 6.1: Screen shot examples of the four SIP trial types. Asterisks indicate the correct 
response option to press on each block. For each trial type, latency differences are compared 
between the correct “Yes” and “No” responses across the pro-white and the anti-white blocks, 
and the pro-black and anti-black blocks. 
 
Design and procedure 
 
The experiment used a 4 (SIP trial type: White-Positive, White-Negative, Black-Positive, 
Black-Negative) × 2 (time: pre-threat primes, post-threat primes) × 2 (prime: disease, 
terrorism) mixed design. The SIP trial type and time were within-subject factors and prime was 
a between-subject factor. Participants completed the experiment individually in a small well-
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lit room. After giving informed consent, participants were directed towards an online survey 
which collected demographic information. Following these questions, participants viewed the 
30 control images (order randomised for each participant) for as long as they needed but a 
minimum of 30 seconds had to elapse before they could continue to their assigned explicit 
questionnaire (i.e., QA or QB that was counterbalanced across participants).  Before 
completing their assigned explicit questionnaire, the experimenter informed each participant to 
“try avoid constantly selecting the neutral option”. This statement was included because pilot 
testing revealed that the neutral option was usually selected. To comply with ethics a neutral 
option had to be included.  
Following the baseline questionnaire, participants viewed the same control images for 
at least 30 seconds but in a different randomised order. Each participant then completed the 
baseline SIP. On-screen instructions informed participants that: “In this task, you will have to 
respond to statements in the appropriate fashion as fast and as accurately as possible” and the 
experimenter verbally explained how the task was to be performed. Each participant was 
required to successfully complete the practice blocks which included a minimum of four blocks 
of trials.  For each practice block, participants had to respond in accordance with one of four 
rules across a block of trials.  
These response rules were (1) “On this block respond as if European/White Person is 
POSITIVE” (pro-white), (2) “On this block respond as if European/White Person is 
NEGATIVE” (anti-white), (3) “On this block respond as if African/Black Person is 
POSITIVE” (pro-black) and (4) “On this block respond as if African/Black Person is 
NEGATIVE” (anti-black). Each participant viewed these four response rules in random order. 
For example, if a participant was completing the block “respond as if European/White Person 
is Negative”, when a positive word and a picture/word of a white person appeared, “No” was 
the correct response. If a negative word appeared with a picture/word of a white person, “Yes” 
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was the correct option. If a picture/word of a black person was shown and regardless if the 
target word was positive or negative, “Space” was the correct response option.  
Each practice block had 10 trials, which included 4 “Space”, 3 “Yes” and 3 “No” 
response trials. Trials were presented quasi-randomly, such that the same trial type could not 
be repeated across two successive trials. If a correct response was made, the screen was cleared 
for 400ms before the next trial’s stimuli appeared. If an incorrect response was made, a red 
“X” appeared below the category label and remained there until the correct response was 
selected. Following each block, participants’ median accuracy and response latency were 
presented on screen and if the combined scores across the 4 practice blocks averaged ≥ 80% 
accuracy and ≤ 1,800ms response latency, participants continued to the test blocks. These 
criteria were used to ensure that participants understood and complied with each block’s 
response rule. If participants did not meet the criteria, the 4 practice blocks were repeated. If 
they failed to meet the accuracy and response latency criteria on the second attempt, the study 
ended and they were thanked and debriefed.  
After completing the practice blocks successfully, participants were informed on screen 
to “press space bar to begin the test blocks”.  For the test blocks, participants completed 8 
blocks (i.e., a random order of the 4 response rule blocks and when they were completed, the 
same random order of the 4 response rule blocks had to be completed again). Each test block 
contained 22 trials which consisted of 6 “Space” bar, 8 “Yes” and 8 “No” response trials. When 
all the 8 blocks were completed, participants were informed on screen that the task was over 
and instructed to tell the experimenter. Participants were then shown either the disgust or 
terrorism primes, using a similar procedure to the baseline/control primes (image set was 
counterbalanced across participants). The explicit questionnaire that participants had not 
previously completed (either QA or QB) was presented and then the same images 
(disgust/terror) were observed again but in a different random order for at least another 30 
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seconds. The same SIP as the baseline SIP was completed following the primes but it did not 
include the practice blocks because participants had already completed the task with the exact 
same stimuli. When the SIP was completed, participants were thanked and debriefed. Figure 
6.2 shows a diagram illustrating the procedure. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Diagram of the procedure used in the experiment. The QA and QB switched 
location for each participant (counterbalanced). Allocation to the disease or terrorism priming 
condition was also counterbalanced across participants.     
 
Results 
The primary data obtained from the SIP are raw latency scores, defined as the time in 
milliseconds that elapsed between the onset of the stimulus and the correct response being 
made by the participant. The dependent variable was the mean “No” minus “Yes” RT, for each 
of the four trial types across the pro-white and anti-white blocks as well as the pro-black and 
anti-black blocks. For the White Person-Positive and Black Person-Positive, values above zero 
indicate a positive bias and negative values indicate a negative bias. In contrast, both the White 
Person-Negative and Black Person-Negative trial types were multiplied by -1. The purpose of 
this was to match the valenced output of the white and black person trial types, such that scores 
above zero indicate a positive bias and scores below zero indicate a negative bias.  
The steps involved in calculating both the absolute and relative D–SIP scores are as 
follows: (1) only response latency data from the 16 test blocks were used; (2) latencies above 
10,000ms were discarded; (3) if latencies from more than 10% of a participant’s trials 
throughout the 16 test blocks were less than 300ms, that participant was removed from the 
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analysis; (4) for each SIP task, 16 individual standard deviations were calculated for each trial 
type across the 16 test blocks (White - Positive, White - Negative, Black - Positive, Black -
Negative × 4 = repeating blocks); (5) 16 mean latencies were calculated for both the “Yes” and 
“No” responses for each trial type across the 16 test blocks; (6) difference scores were 
calculated for each trial type by subtracting mean latencies of  “Yes” responses from mean 
latencies of “No” responses in each test block pair (i.e., pro-white block and anti–white block; 
pro-black block and anti-black block); (7) each difference score was then divided by its 
corresponding standard deviation from step 4, yielding 16 D-SIP scores, one score for each 
trial type across the 16 test blocks; (8) four overall trial type D-SIP scores were calculated by 
averaging the four scores for each of the four trial types across the blocks (these calculations 
revealed the absolute/non-relative separate trial type results); (9) averaging the positive and 
negative trial type for each category showed the absolute/non-relative compacted trial type 
results); (10) To compute the relative comparison, equivalent to that of the IAT, an overall 
relative D-SIP score was calculated by subtracting the compacted Black score from the 
compacted White score.  
The baseline D-SIP absolute trial type data were subjected to a 4 × 2 mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with trial-type (white positive, white negative, black positive and black 
negative) as the within-subject variable, and condition (disease and terror)32 as the between-
subject variable. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of trial type, F(3, 63) = 42.87, 
p < .001, ηρ² = .41, but all other results were non-significant (Fs < 1.49 , ps > .23).  Figure 6.3 
clearly shows why the main effect of trial type occurs by presenting the mean D-SIP scores for 
                                                 
32 For the baseline SIP, the conditions (disease & terror) should not influence the results 
because all participants saw the same furniture and building (control condition) at baseline.    
179 
 
the four individual trial types. The compacted White and compacted Black trial types as well 
as the relative/overall D-SIP score are also included in Figure 6.3.  
Several one-sample t-tests were conducted to verify which of the absolute trial types 
scores, as well as the relative/overall D-SIP score, differed significantly from zero. The White-
Positive, Black-Positive, compacted White and compacted Black scores were significantly 
above zero, ts > 4.75, p < .001. The White-Negative and Black-Negative trial types were a non-
significant distance away from zero, ts < 1.43, p > .16. Finally, the overall D-SIP score was a 
significant distance above zero, t(64) = 2.07, p = .043, indicating that participants overall had 
a stronger anti-black/pro-white bias.    
Like the baseline SIP scores, the post threat primes D-SIP’s individual trial type data 
were subjected to a 4 × 2 mixed repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis again showed a 
significant main effect of trial type F(3, 63) = 43.99, p < .001, ηρ² = .41, but no effect of 
condition or interaction  (Fs < 1.90 , ps > .17).  Figure 6.4 shows the mean D-SIP scores for 
the four individual trial types, the compacted White and Black trial types and the 
relative/overall D-SIP score following the disease and terrorism primes. A 4 × 2 × 2 mixed 
ANOVA with trial type and time as within-subject factors and condition as the between subject 
factor showed all the main effects and interactions to be non-significant, Fs < 3.54, ps > .07.  
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Figure 6.3: Baseline Race SIP: Mean D-SIP scores for the four individual trial types, the 
compacted trial types and the relative/overall D-SIP results are shown. For the positive trial 
types (i.e., relating white and black people with positive words) positive D-SIP scores reflect 
faster “Yes” than “No” responses, while negative scores reflect faster “No” than “Yes” 
responses. For negative trial types (i.e., relating black and white people with negative words) 
positive D-SIP scores indicate a faster “No” than “Yes” response and negative D-SIP scores 
are showing a faster “Yes” rather than “No” response.  95% confidence interval error bars have 
been included. Error bars that cross the zero mark indicate a statistically neutral attitude; those 
that do not cross zero indicate a significant positive or negative attitude.  
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Figure 6.4: Post threat primes Race SIP: Mean D-SIP scores for the four individual trial types, 
the compacted trial types and the relative/overall D-SIP results are shown.  95% confidence 
interval error bars have been included. 
 
A number of one-sample t-tests were conducted on the SIP following the threat primes 
to verify which of the absolute trial types scores, including the relative/overall D-SIP score, 
differed significantly from zero. As in the baseline findings, the White-Positive, Black-
Positive, compacted White and compacted Black scores were significantly above zero, ts > 
4.75, p < .001. The White-Negative, t(64) = 1.26, p > .250,  and Black-Negative, t(64) = 1.76, 
p = .083 trial types did not differ from zero. In contrast to the baseline findings, the relative D-
SIP score did not differ from zero, t(64) = .91, p > .365, which could be taken to indicate a 
neutral attitude towards black people relative to white people.  
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To test the internal reliability in the SIP, separate D-SIP scores were calculated for odd 
and even trials.  The correlation between scores on the odd and even trials was significant, r = 
.276, n = 65, p = .026 for the baseline SIP and, r = .273, n = 65, p = .028, for the SIP after the 
threat primes. The baseline overall D-SIP score and the priming D-SIP score were correlated 
to assess the test-retest reliability across the two SIPs. The correlation was significant, r(65) = 
.319, p = .01, indicating that the SIP appears to be stable and reliable over time.  
QA and QB results:  Participants completed both the bipolar explicit measure and the 
unipolar feeling thermometers within the experiment. Using the two unipolar feeling 
thermometers, a relative score was calculated for each participant by subtracting their black 
feeling thermometer score from their white feeling thermometer score. This relative unipolar 
score was calculated to match the bipolar explicit (relative) score.  The relative baseline explicit 
scores and the relative post-threat primes explicit scores were entered into a mixed 2 × 2 
ANOVA, with time as the within-subject factor (baseline explicit vs. post-primes explicit) and 
condition (disease & terror) as the between-subject factor.  The threat primes did not have any 
effect on relative explicit attitudes (Fs < .58, ps > .45).  A one-sample t-test on the relative 
explicit scores found that participants’ scores were significantly higher than neutral indicating 
a stronger anti-black/pro-white bias, at the baseline, t(62) = 4.71, p < .001, and following the 
threat primes, t(64) = 4.51, p < .001. 
The pre- and post-threat primes life history questionnaire assessed life strategies used 
by both white and black individuals. A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA was used to test the effects 
of race (white and black), time (pre- and post-priming threat) and priming threat (terrorism and 
disease). Both race and time were within-subject factors and priming threat was a between-
subject factor.  There was a main effect of race, F(1, 63) = 9.11, p < .01, ηρ² = .13,  with white 
people being unexpectedly viewed as having a faster life history (i.e., more impulsive, more 
sexually promiscuous, etc.; M  = 4.14) than black people (M = 3.88). There was also a 
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significant interaction between race and time, F(1, 63) = 36.76, p < .001, ηρ² = .37; such that 
white people were viewed as having a faster life history than black people at baseline, t(64) = 
5.35, p < .001, while after the threat primes there was no difference between the two races, 
t(64) = .31, p > .05, (see Figure 6.5). No other significant effects were found, Fs < .2.84, ps > 
.10.     
Implicit - Explicit Correlations: Table 6.2 shows a correlation matrix of data obtained 
from the explicit White and Black feeling thermometers, the relative feeling thermometer and 
the single item bipolar explicit measure. All these scores were correlated with the scores from 
the compacted White trial type, compacted Black trial types and relative overall D-SIP score.          
 
Figure 6.5: Interaction between race and time for participants’ life history scores. 
184 
 
Table 6.2: Matrix of correlations between implicit and explicit measures  
   SIP_White  SIP_Black  SIP_Therm  SIP_Bipolar  Therm_White  Therm_Black  Explicit_Therm  Explicit_Bipolar  
SIP_White   —   0.032   0.661***   0.272*    0.129   -0.108   0.338**   0.174   
SIP_Black       —   -0.729***    -0.220†   0.127   0.234†   -0.208   -0.260*    
SIP_Therm           —   0.352 **   -0.008   -0.245†   0.378**    0.314*    
SIP_Bipolar               —   -0.124   -0.179   0.125   0.229†   
Therm_White                   —   0.777***   0.052   -0.114   
Therm_Black                       —   -0.588**    -0.534***   
Explicit_Therm                           —   0.701***   
Explicit_Bipolar                               —   
 
†p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
Note: Scores in bold indicate the most important correlations measuring the same construct. SIP_White and SIP_Black are the respective compacted SIP 
scores. SIP_Therm (Therm = Feeling Thermometer) are the relative SIP scores carried out during the same phase as the feeling thermometers. SIP_Bipolar 
are the relative SIP scores carried out during the same phase as the bipolar scale. Therm_White & Therm_Black are the respective feeling thermometer scores. 
Explicit_Therm are relative scores calculated using the Therm_White and Therm_Black scores. Explicit_Bipolar are the bipolar scale scores.   
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Of most relevance, the scores from relative feeling thermometer significantly correlated 
with the scores from the SIP (SIP_Therm). Also, the scores from explicit bipolar measure 
marginally correlated with the scores from the SIP (SIP_Bipolar). When the scores from the 
compacted White (SIP_White) and compacted Black (SIP_Black) trial types were correlated with 
the White and Black feeling thermometers, no significant correlations were found. However, both 
the compacted SIP scores showed a positive correlation with the feeling thermometers, consistent 
with the suggestion that the implicit and explicit measures were measuring racial biases similarly. 
To further address the usefulness of the SIP’s absolute measurement, another correlation was 
performed (see Chapter 4 for more details). Each individual’s White SIP score and explicit White 
feeling thermometer score and the same individual’s Black SIP score and Black feeling 
thermometer score were included in the same correlation. For this analysis, we found a significant 
correlation, r = .211, n = 125, p = .02.  
Based on the previous correlation, two additional correlation scores are reported. Each of 
these correlations report scores that alternate between using White implicit and explicit scores to 
Black implicit and explicit scores across each participant. For example, analysis 1 (cut 1) will 
include: participant 1 = White, participant 2 = Black, participant 3 = White, etc. While analysis 2 
(cut 2) will include: participant 1 = Black, participant 2 = White, participant 3 = Black, etc. For 
cut 1, the correlation was in the same direction but not significant, r = .108, n = 63, p = .298, 
whereas for cut 2 a significant correlation was shown, r = .320, n = 63, p = .011 
Discussion 
 The current experiment aimed to build on the preliminary evidence described in Chapter 2 
(see Appendix 2), that females’ implicit and explicit anti-black/pro-white scores do not increase 
following disease or terrorism primes. A new implicit measure called the Simple Implicit 
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Procedure (SIP) was used and allowed a within-subjects experimental design to be used because 
it does not have a practice effect limitation like the IAT (see Chapter 4, Study 3).  The most 
important finding from this experiment is that exposure to threatening primes (diseases or 
terrorism) did not increase females’ anti-black/pro-white bias on either implicit (using the SIP) or 
explicit (using the bipolar measure and the feeling thermometers) measures. These findings 
provide further preliminary evidence that females do not respond negatively towards out-groups 
when experiencing disease and terror threats.  
 Although the scores from the overall D-SIP technically showed neutral implicit attitudes 
towards black and white people following the threatening primes, it should be noted that at 
baseline, females had an implicit anti-black/pro-white bias. Using the explicit bipolar and feeling 
thermometer, anti-black/pro-white biases remained stable, pre- and post- the threat primes. These 
findings indicate that females initially had implicit and explicit pro-in-group/anti-outgroup biases. 
These biases essentially remained stable for explicit attitudes but slightly reduced (although not 
significantly) for implicit attitudes, following the terrorism and disease threats. How can we 
explain the current results, particularly at the implicit level? 
To help answer this, Taylor et al.'s (2000) tending and befriending hypothesis but 
particularly the befriending aspect could be used. For example, following a stressful situation, 
females’ affiliative behaviours increase (in order to form new alliances), ameliorating their stress 
response during threatening situations. In contrast, males are more likely to exhibit a fight or flight 
response when they experience stressful situations and to appraise out-groups more negatively 
compared to females (see  Klavina et al., 2011; McDonald et al., 2012). Therefore, it is likely that 
threatening primes are especially likely to heighten males’ prejudice towards out-groups.    
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The current experiment did not determine when females’ anti-black/pro-white biases will 
remain stable, increase or decrease over time. A factor explaining the stability in females’ implicit 
bias could be due to the disease and terror threats being very general (i.e., showing images of 
males, females, children and adults with black, brown and white skin tone). If the threats were 
described and shown as coming from a specific group, increased prejudice in females towards the 
targeted group is more likely. For example, heightened prejudice against black people is likely to 
be observed if females are primed with exaggerated threats that specifically black people harbour 
deadly diseases or are extremely likely to kill or rape women (e.g., Navarrete, Fessler, Fleischman, 
& Geyer, 2009)             
Correlations were shown between the implicit and explicit measures which indicates that 
the SIP is capable of accurately measuring meaningful constructs. Previous research has 
highlighted the fact that correlations are often not found between implicit and explicit measures, 
particularly for socially sensitive topics like racial prejudice (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Therefore, 
perhaps simply asking participants to avoid constantly selecting neutral, as was done in this 
experiment, could be sufficient to reduce socially desirable responding and increase the 
correlations between the implicit and explicit measures. In addition, there was appropriate internal 
reliability in the SIP, pre- and post-the threat primes, and the internal reliability in the current 
experiment was similar to the internal reliability for SIPs that measured several different constructs 
in one sitting (see Chapter 4). It should be noted that the SIPs used in the current experiment had 
less trials then the SIPs used in Chapter 4 (176 trials vs. 288 trials) which could have weakened 
the internal reliability. Other methods such as increasing the length of each block of trials should 
be tested to address whether this factor increases the internal reliability of the SIP.      
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Unexpectedly (see Williams et al., 2016), females initially viewed white people as having 
a faster life history than black people. This is arguably a more negative bias towards white people 
relative to black because having a faster life history implies more impulsivity, sexual risk taking 
and less investment in children and education. Since William et al.’s (2016) research was carried 
out in the U.S and the current experiment was conducted in the UK, variations in exposure to 
different races from deprived areas might explain the current findings. For example, perhaps 
students from the UK have more encounters with white rather than black people from “desperate” 
environments compared to students in the US. More research is needed to determine whether other 
races or cultural minorities (e.g., travellers/gypsies) in other countries are stereotyped as using fast 
life history strategies.  
We observed that following the threatening primes, views about the life history of white 
and black people converged such that the participants saw each race as having a similar life history 
strategy.  This finding could again be explained by Taylor et al.'s (2000) tending and befriending 
hypothesis, according to which stressful situations may induce females to become equally 
accepting/critical towards in and out-groups. This strategy could increase their potential of gaining 
new affiliations. The explicit bipolar and thermometer scores remained stable (anti-black/pro-
white) following the threatening primes but this could be due to the participants aiming to appear 
consistent across the two time points, and is consistent with previous research (Lai et al., 2014, 
2016).  
Limitations and conclusion 
 A similar experiment to the current one (i.e., using the SIP and a within-subject design) 
should be conducted with male participants to provide confirming evidence that disease primes 
increase males’ prejudice towards out-groups. Measuring life history biases among males would 
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also be revealing, as a divergence rather than a convergence in preferential biases towards their in-
group and increased prejudice towards their out-group would be expected, based on the male 
warrior hypothesis (McDonald et al., 2012). In addition, collecting data from black males and 
females is important to determine whether increased prejudice towards white people occurs for 
only black males experiencing disease threats. 
 A further limitation of the study is that as the SIP is relatively new, potential flaws or biases 
due to the procedural set-up cannot be ruled out. Chapter 4 (Study 2) explains a method to remove 
the affirming bias in the SIP (i.e., participants express positive biases when connecting any attitude 
object with positive words). The affirming bias likely resulted in an inflated pro-white and pro-
black bias on the positive target words trial types. However, this potential problem only affects the 
absolute results while the relative overall D-SIP results remain accurate, because the affirming bias 
essentially gets cancelled out. Nevertheless, the current experiment aimed to measure changes in 
biases following threatening primes when the extent of an individual’s positivity bias had already 
been determined (baseline SIP). Therefore, changes in the absolute SIP score following the primes 
would also be accurate at measuring increases or decrease in racial biases towards black and white 
people. Unfortunately, no changes occurred and therefore on this occasion the unique benefit of 
the SIP cannot be emphasised.  
Another potential explanation for the stability of females’ implicit bias over time is that the 
SIP, unlike the IAT and most other implicit measures, is not influenced by context or situational 
factors. Of note, when an intervention/prime does not impact/change the attribute being measured, 
the absence of an effect of the intervention/prime on the SIP says nothing about the validity of the 
SIP (De Houwer et al., 2009). If the SIP is impervious to situational influences, then it would not 
be suited for the experimental design used here. This factor could also explain females’ implicit 
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biases remaining stable over time. More optimistically, if the SIP is not influenced by context 
effects then it could provide a context independent assessment of a person’s “true” implicit social 
representations. Therefore, the SIP may be addressing more long term early socialisation biases 
which were initially what implicit measures were believed to be assessing (e.g., Rudman, 2004; 
Wilson et al., 2000). More basic research is needed to test whether scores on the SIP are influenced 
by contextual effects.   
Overall, this experiment builds on the preliminary evidence that females do not express 
increased prejudice both implicitly and explicitly towards racial out-groups after experiencing 
disease or terrorism primes. Although stronger explicit and implicit biases in favour of white 
people relative to black people were shown at the baseline, neutral attitudes were observed 
implicitly following the threatening primes, possibly due to an unconscious/natural befriending 
response in females that is evoked under stressful situations. Perhaps, when a threatening situation 
or event is encountered, females respond in a more composed and fair manner towards racial out-
groups. This finding could have implications for those making important decisions (e.g., political 
leaders, police, army personnel) that can greatly impact groups/individuals associated with 
terrorism or disease outbreaks. Developing a better understanding of how males and females 
respond towards out-groups when encountering stressful and threatening situations could assist in 
reducing conflicts and discrimination.    
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Chapter 7: Concluding remarks and 
future directions 
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As reported in five empirical chapters (Chapter 2-6), I used measures of implicit attitudes 
to advance knowledge in implicit social cognition research and provide evidence supporting 
parasite-stress theory. Chapter 1 introduced the historical origins of implicit social cognition and 
described how the Implicit Association Test (IAT: Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) greatly 
accelerated and expanded the type of research carried out by social psychologists relating 
specifically to the areas of attitudes, stereotypes and the self. Chapter 2 introduced parasite-stress 
theory (PST; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014) which was heavily influenced by Behavioural Immune 
System (BIS) research (Murray & Schaller, 2016) and which aimed to explain the influence that 
infectious diseases can have on intergroup relations and societal values or belief systems.  
In Chapter 2, secondary data made available by Project Implicit were used to test a 
hypothesis based on PST -  that residents of states across the US and countries across the world 
with higher disease rates will show increased prejudice towards racial out-groups, relative to US 
states and countries with lower disease rates. The Project Implicit dataset provided thousands of 
responses from individuals measuring implicit (using the IAT) and explicit (using questionnaires) 
attitudes including important demographic information of the participants (e.g., their age, gender, 
education, political ideology and religious belief). Even when controlling for these individual 
characteristics and several other state or country level factors often used in prejudice research, both 
black and white respondents across the US and white respondents across the world showed 
increased anti-out-group/pro-in-group biases in regions that had higher disease rates.  
The experimental results from Study 3 in Chapter 2 were also used to test a hypothesis 
based on PST- that being primed with images of diseases will increase prejudice towards racial 
out-groups compared to a control condition (i.e., being primed with images of furniture and 
buildings). A terror threat prime condition was also included to determine whether priming by any 
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threat caused an increase in prejudice towards racial out-groups or whether any increase was 
selective for disease-related threat primes. 
Considering the explicit attitudes of the white participants, both the disease and terrorism 
primes increased anti-black/pro-white prejudice compared to the control primes. However, for the 
implicit attitudes of the same participants, only the disease primes increased anti-black/pro-white 
prejudice compared with the control and terror threat conditions. This finding is in line with other 
studies in which disease primes had a unique effect of increasing implicit prejudice compared to 
primes depicting accident-related images (for review see Murray & Schaller, 2016).  
Of note, males consistently expressed more prejudice towards out-groups than females. 
When the experimental data were analysed separately for males and females, only males showed 
increased anti-black/pro-white prejudice both on implicit and explicit measures. Although an 
interaction did not occur between the priming conditions and gender, further research was needed 
to determine whether disease primes increase white females anti-black/pro-white prejudice. 
Answering this question was one of the aims of the work presented in Chapter 6.  
A major limitation of the findings from Chapter 2 was that the IAT can only measure 
attitudes in a relative way, (i.e., the IAT measures implicit attitudes towards black people relative 
to white people). Consequently, use of an absolute implicit measure (i.e., one that can measure 
implicit attitudes towards black and white people separately) such as the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure, (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010) would enable a deeper understanding 
of the mechanisms driving implicit prejudice to be gained (e.g., do participants have a strong pro-
in-group preference, a strong prejudice towards racial out-groups, or some combination of these 
two effects?).  
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The IRAP is a relatively new measure of absolute implicit attitudes and although it has 
been used a number of times with clinical or vulnerable samples (Vahey, et al., 2015), there is a 
dearth of basic research scrutinising its validity. The work presented in Chapter 3 aimed to test 
whether some of the typical findings when using the IRAP (e.g., a normative sample had a positive 
bias towards death and dying; Hussey, et al., 2015) might be explained not by implicit 
attitudes/biases, but instead by other cognitive biases not related to implicit attitudes. Specifically, 
it was hypothesised that when participants have to store a positive and negative statement in 
memory (as they do in the IRAP), they will use a cognitive heuristic to simplify the task and store 
only one of the statements in memory (i.e., almost always the positive statement)   
Positivity biases are inherent to the English language (Dodds et al., 2015; Matthews & 
Dylman, 2014) and the human propensity toward optimism (e.g., Peterson, 2000) were used to 
explain this positive framing bias (PFB) when participants used the IRAP. The PFB results in 
scores in the IRAP overestimating the positivity of implicit attitudes towards any object (e.g., non-
words, insect, fat people). Importantly, the PFB could easily be manipulated/reversed by 
instructing participants to focus and store the negative statement in memory. This finding further 
questions the validity of the IRAP’s estimates of absolute implicit attitudes, because the estimates 
can be influenced by how the instructions are presented. Moreover, completely controlling for 
instructional presentations at the individual level is not possible with the IRAP.  
These flaws with the IRAP would have made the interpretations of future results more 
challenging. Therefore, the IRAP was not used again to examine absolute racial biases when 
individuals had been primed with diseases. However, I did not want to abandon the core features 
of how the IRAP measures implicit biases, particularly the affirming and negating aspect of the 
task. Compared with implicit measures that use a sorting task (e.g., IAT, GNAT and SC-IAT), the 
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affirming and negating response options allow for a more in-depth understanding of the 
mechanisms driving implicit biases. In addition, implicit measures that use a sorting task can only 
measure the strength of the association between items, while tasks with affirming and negating 
response options allow researchers to better understand how two concepts (i.e., “I” and “good”) 
are related together (i.e., “I am good” vs “I want to be good”).       
In Chapter 4, I introduced a new implicit measure named the Simple Implicit Procedure 
(SIP) which also uses affirming and negating response options. The SIP was developed to remove 
the PFB apparent in the IRAP by requiring participants to store only one statement (either positive 
or negative) in memory during each block of trials. This new procedure was successful at removing 
the PFB. However, another response bias became apparent that influences the SIP’s absolute 
results and would be likely to influence any other task that uses affirming and negating response 
options. The bias can be described as an affirming bias and results from participants being faster 
to press “Yes” than “No”, particularly on positive word trials. The PFB in the IRAP is also 
influenced by this affirming bias but determining the magnitude of each influence (i.e., PFB and 
affirming bias) on estimates of implicit attitudes is difficult.  
The affirming bias in the SIP results in an over-inflation of the estimates of implicit biases 
towards any object. I developed a method to eliminate the affirming bias in the SIP by measuring 
participants’ response biases towards non-words. If neutral scores are not shown when using the 
non-words SIP then these scores would be indicating a response bias (i.e., normally participants 
showed an affirming bias, rather than neutral scores or a negating bias). Then each participant’s 
response bias on the non-word SIP was used to correct/transform their scores on other SIP tasks 
they completed. When this method was used, the scores on the absolute trial types (i.e., separate 
score for flowers and insects) in the SIP were in line with expectations (e.g., strong negative biases 
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towards criminals and insects and positive biases towards carers and flowers). The relative results 
in the SIP were always in line with expectations and previous IAT results because the affirming 
biases get cancelled out when the scores from the relevant conditions are combined. 
     The measured internal reliability of the SIP suggests it is suitable to measure individual 
differences in implicit bias scores. The implicit and explicit relative/bipolar scores positively 
correlated and the directionality of the absolute scores were always positively related for non-
socially sensitive topics. In a socially sensitive domain (i.e., relating male and female names with 
career and family words) it was found that the scores from the implicit and explicit measures 
negatively correlated and the implicit measure was better than the explicit measure at predicting 
responses on a scale addressing those most/least likely to uphold and maintain gender inequalities.  
In Chapter 5, I confirmed that participants are strongly biased towards responding faster to 
affirming words than negating words and that they are also faster to associate positive with 
affirming and negative with negating words than the reverse associations. Furthermore, the work 
presented in this chapter showed that participants are faster overall to sort positive and affirming 
than negative and negating words. These findings clearly show why the affirming bias occurs in 
the SIP.  
Chapter 5 also examined the influence that word type (i.e., nouns, verbs and adjectives) 
can have on processing RTs in implicit measures. Using secondary data as well as three 
experiments that used words that were controlled for on a number of important dimensions, it was 
shown that participants responded faster to negative nouns than positive nouns, while for verbs 
and adjectives the reverse occurred. Participants also showed faster RTs when responding to 
negative images than positive images. Therefore, it appears that nouns are processed in a similar 
fashion to images in valence judgement RT tasks. Although it was not the scope of this thesis to 
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determine how exactly these word type biases could influence outcomes on implicit measures, it 
suggests that the choice of words used will have potentially important influences in any RT task 
that uses words, especially for absolute implicit measures.          
As described and shown empirically in Chapter 4, another major advantage that the SIP 
has over sorting tasks like the IAT is that it is not limited by practice/experience effects. This 
benefit allows researchers to use a within-subject design to test implicit biases pre-and post an 
intervention. Preliminary evidence presented in Chapter 2 (see Appendix 2) indicated that, 
compared to females, white males expressed stronger prejudice towards black people when primed 
with diseases. The experiment in Chapter 2 used a between-subject design and was also limited by 
the IAT being only able to show relative rather than absolute results. Consequently, in Chapter 6, 
the SIP was used which allowed for absolute attitudes to be measured. It also enabled a within-
subject design to be used, pre-and post-threatening primes, to measure the influence they had on 
implicit anti-black and pro-white attitudes. 
Using white female participants, the results showed using the SIP and explicit measures, 
that neither the disease nor the terror priming condition increased anti-black/pro-white prejudice. 
These results were in line with previous findings (Chapter 2, Appendix 2). However, not enough 
white males completed the experiment to enable testing of previous findings that disease primes 
increase males’ implicit and explicit anti-black/pro-white prejudice. Further research will need to 
use the SIP to explore the influence of disease primes on males’ prejudice. If an increase in implicit 
prejudice is not observed for males when using the SIP, then more basic research addressing 
whether the SIP is immune to context effects (i.e., disease primes) will be required. If this basic 
research shows that the SIP measures stable, long-term, early socialisation implicit biases that are 
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not influenced by contextual influences, then the SIP would not be suitable for measuring 
immediate changes in implicit biases.  
Prior to this thesis, the only implicit measure that has been scrutinised for 
practice/experience was the IAT but it is likely that other implicit measures also suffer from this 
limitation. I am currently working on a project testing practice effects in other implicit measures. 
Preliminary evidence indicates that the SC-IAT is also limited by practice effects but no practice 
effects have yet been seen with the GNAT. The major difference between the IAT/SC-IAT and 
the GNAT is that the GNAT has only one response option (space bar), while in IATs there are 
always two. In the GNAT, the space bar response is pressed when the stimulus presented at the 
centre of the screen matches one of the two categories at the top of the screen. If the stimulus does 
not match either of the two categories then participants make no response. Perhaps participants are 
encoding the space bar response as a “Yes” and the no space bar response as “No”.  If participants 
are encoding the space bar and no space bar response in this way, then the GNAT might have more 
similarities with the SIP’s affirming and negating task than the sorting task in the IAT. Therefore, 
having both affirming and negating response options within a task might be the reason why 
practice/experience effects do not occur in the SIP and the GNAT.  
More research is needed to test the influence that the biases described in this thesis (e.g., 
PFB, affirming bias and word type biases) might have on other implicit measures, particularly 
absolute implicit measures like the SC-IAT and the GNAT. For example, other preliminary 
evidence I gathered showed that participants had a positive bias towards neutral furniture items in 
the SC-IAT and the GNAT, while the same participants had a negative bias towards non-words.  
The negative bias toward non-words was explained by the polarity correspondence (i.e., “non” and 
“negative”; see Proctor & Cho, 2006) or semantic similarities between the category label “Non-
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Word” and “Negative”. If participants’ implicit biases towards non-words can be influenced by 
simply changing the category labels to “Special-Words” (a positive bias is expected) or “Stupid-
Words” (a negative bias is expected), estimates of implicit biases can be easily manipulated by 
changing the category labels. Of note, there was always positivity bias towards furniture and non-
words when the SIP was used. This finding suggests that the category labels used in the SIP are 
less likely to shift implicit biases from positive to negative estimates.  
Although much more basic research is needed before the SIP can be used with vulnerable 
populations, initial findings look promising. If the SIP is capable of measuring changes in 
participants’ implicit biases, then it could be used to test the effectiveness of intensive therapies 
(e.g., testing the long-term success of drug rehabilitation and determining which patients are most 
likely to relapse). The SIP could initiate a new wave of individualised clinical therapies aimed at 
tackling specific biases directly because of its ability to measure absolute implicit biases.  
The next step in the development of the SIP would be to develop it to run online. 
Developing the IAT to run online through Project Implicit was one of the major factors for its 
success. The ease with which people can complete the SIP would make transitioning the SIP from 
the laboratory to the internet more manageable. An online version of the SIP would make data 
collection much more efficient and cost effective, albeit with the potential cost of noisier data due 
to an inability to control for distraction in the participants’ environment and variations in 
individual’s computers.  
Another path worth exploring is the potential of using only images in measures of implicit 
attitudes to estimate individuals’ implicit biases. This procedure would remove the problems that 
result from using language/verbal stimuli (i.e., positivity bias, affirming bias and the influence of 
nouns, verbs and adjectives). We have tested the influence of responding to positive and negative 
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images which are presented at the top and bottom of the screen. Initial evidence indicates that 
people are faster to respond to negative/threatening images at the top of the screen than to positive 
or non-threatening images, while at the bottom of the screen, this difference is less pronounced 
and sometimes reverses. However, as shown in Chapter 5 there consistently appears to be a 
negativity bias with faster processing RTs for negative images compared to positive ones. Rather 
than measuring implicit biases, using only images in valence judgement RT tasks are likely 
measuring how salient or socially relevant the image is. 
Relating to PST, there are still many research questions that can be answered using Project 
Implicit datasets. This thesis has only described data from the Race IAT, but I have also obtained 
similar findings (i.e., increased prejudice in regions with higher disease rates) on the Old-Young 
IAT, Fat-Thin IAT, Straight-Homosexual IAT, Abled-Disables IAT, White-Native American IAT, 
and the White-Asian IAT. A caveat is that the pattern of increased prejudice in regions with higher 
disease rates towards out-groups did not always survive the inclusion of control factors. I have 
also shown that across the US, even when controlling for several important factors, respondents in 
regions with higher disease rates, have higher religious, conservative, right-wing and socially 
dominant worldviews. All these findings are in line with PST. There are also many personality 
factors (e.g., Big 5, social desirability, need for structure/closure) collected through Project 
Implicit that could be used to test many predictions from PST.   
To conclude, the work presented throughout this thesis has identified various biases (i.e., 
PFB, affirming biases, biases towards positive and negative, nouns, verbs and adjectives) that can 
greatly influence the results obtained from measures of implicit attitudes. I developed and 
empirically investigated a new method of measuring implicit attitudes (the SIP) which did not 
suffer from the PFB. Although an affirming bias occurs in the SIP, the bias can easily be measured 
201 
 
and removed for each participant, resulting in an accurate estimate of an individual’s implicit 
biases. The findings in this thesis also indicate the strong influence that disease rates can have on 
increasing prejudice towards racial out-groups, particularly for males. Finally, the work presented 
in this thesis provides the foundations for devising strategies aimed at understanding and 
ameliorating the precise mechanisms driving prejudice by using the SIP. With this improved 
understanding, the SIP’s results could be used to impact policy aiming to provide achievable 
methods of reducing or solving intergroup tensions.  
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At the individual level for white participants across the US, conservative, less religious, 
and older males displayed higher implicit and explicit anti-black/pro-white biases (ts > 4.55, ps < 
.001). All these findings are consistent with previous literature (Hodson & Dhont, 2015), except 
that research normally finds that amongst white participants people who are more religious express 
higher prejudice. The finding that less religious white individuals express more prejudice warrants 
further investigation. For black participants, older, more religious females displayed stronger 
implicit and explicit anti-white/pro-black biases (ts > 6.15, ps < .001). At the implicit level, black 
conservatives showed stronger anti-white/pro-black biases (t = 2.43, p < .05), while at the explicit 
level liberals showed stronger anti-black/pro-white biases (t = 20.30, ps < .001).  
Focusing on implicit attitudes, less educated white respondents showed the highest 
prejudice (t = -4.61, p < .001), while for explicit attitudes, less educated respondents showed the 
lowest prejudice towards black people (t = 30.46, p < .001). For black participants, a similar change 
in directionality was observed for education. For example, less educated respondents showed 
stronger implicit anti-white/pro-black biases (t = 2.43, p < .05), while for their explicit attitudes 
they expressed lower anti-white/pro-black biases (t = 33.18, p < .001). Therefore, for both black 
and white respondents, those with less education explicitly express more egalitarian views, while 
with implicit measures opposite findings were obtained. 
A post-hoc explanation for this finding is that those with less education are more likely to 
live in deprived areas, where they are exposed to various out-groups of a similar social status. This 
increased contact might reduce their explicit prejudice towards these out-groups to allow for 
peaceful co-existence. However, evolved survival mechanisms (e.g., disease avoidance) may be 
amplified in deprived environments to protect the individual and their in-group from potential 
threats (e.g., pathogens). 
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  For the cross-country analysis, the individual-level factors of being conservative, less 
religious, older, and male were again associated with increased anti-black/pro-white prejudice 
implicit and explicit attitudes (ts > 4.46, ps < .001). Similar to the US findings, we again find that 
those who were less educated were associated with increased implicit prejudice (ts > -2.25, ps < 
.001) while explicitly those less educated were associated with reduced prejudice towards black 
people (ts > 33.18, ps < .001) suggesting that the influence that education has on implicit and 
explicit prejudice warrants further investigation.    
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Table S2.1: Demographic characteristics of the participants from Project Implicit’s Race IAT (Years: 2006-2013) 
 
    
White World Respondents (N = 
1,347,295)   
White US Respondents 
 (N= 1,213,085)   
Black US Respondents  
(N=225,556) 
Characteristic N %   N %   N % 
Political Identification (M±SD) 3.67 ± 1.67   3.72 ± 1.68   3.53 ± 1.48  
Religiosity         
   Not at all Religious 141,153 10.20  124,212 10.20  13,826 6.10 
   Slightly Religious 332,921 24.70  308,447 25.40  45,629 20.20 
   Moderately Religious 329,188 24.40  313,282 25.80  85,686 38.00 
   Strongly Religious 140,979 10.50  134,659 11.20  50,756 22.60 
   Missing  403,054 29.90  332,485 27.40  29,659 13.10 
Gender          
   Female 756,246 56.10  693,685 57.20  147,573 65.40 
   Male  584,347 43.40  513,665 42.30  76,913 34.10 
   Missing/Other 6,702 0.50  5,735 0.50  1,070 0.50 
Age in Years (M±SD) 27.60 ± 12.13   27.58 ± 12.20   29.41 ± 11.63  
Education         
   High School Graduate or below 782,644 58.10  723,054 59.60  141,080 62.50 
  Anything above High School  553,781 41.10  480,413 39.60  82,437 36.50 
   Missing  10,870 0.80  9,618 0.80  2,039 0.90 
Reason for Visiting Project Implicit          
   Assignment for School 421,536 31.30  409,645 33.80  85,354 37.80 
   Recommendation of Teacher 59,944 4.40  54,737 4.50  12,057 5.30 
   Recommendation of Friend 40,147 3.00  33,816 2.80  5,283 2.30 
   Other   392,311 24.50  280,530 23.20  47,079 21.00 
   Missing   433,357 36.80   433,357 35.70   75,783 33.60 
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Table S2.2: Disease Rates (higher numbers indicate a greater anti-black/pro-white bias) and 
Ratio of Whites to Blacks (logged) Accounting for Segregation (lower scores indicate more black 
exposure) Predicting US State Level Implicit/Explicit Scores. 
   White Implicit Attitudes White Explicit Attitudes 
Predictor  
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
 
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
Disease Rates 0.018 0.004 5.02*** 0.082 0.011 7.72*** 
Race Exposure 
-2 Log Likelihood 
 -0.031 
  
0.012  
1063071.879 
-2.53* -0.051 0.037  
2676569.922 
-1.36 
  
†p<.10, *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Table S2.3: Disease Rates (higher numbers indicate a greater anti-black/pro-white bias) and 
Ratio of Whites to Blacks (not logged) Accounting for Segregation (lower scores indicate more 
black exposure) Predicting US State Level Implicit/Explicit Scores. 
   White Implicit Attitudes  White Explicit Attitudes 
Predictor  
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
 
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
Disease Rates 0.016 0.004 4.44*** 0.078 0.011 6.98*** 
Race Exposure 
-2 Log Likelihood 
 -0.001 
   
0.000  
1063079.716 
-2.64* -0.001 0.000  
2676577.039 
-1.76† 
  
 †p<.10, *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Table S2.4: Disease Rates (higher numbers indicate a greater anti-black/pro-white bias) and 
Proportion of Blacks to the Total State Population Accounting for Segregation (lower scores 
indicate more black exposure) Predicting US State Level Implicit/Explicit Scores. 
  White Implicit Attitudes White Explicit Attitudes 
Predictor  
B (est.)   
 
SE B 
 
t 
 
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
Disease Rates 0.005 0.005 0.93 0.043 0.016 2.65* 
Black Exposure 
-2 Log Likelihood 
 -0.406 
  
0.109  
1063061.002 
-3.74** -1.114 0.322  
2676556.432 
-3.47** 
  
†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Note: For Table S2.2-S2.4, scores in bold highlight the model with the best fit based on -2 Log 
Likelihood. 
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 Table S2.5: Disease Rates (higher numbers indicate a greater anti-black/pro-white bias) and 
Proportion of Blacks to the Total State Population Accounting for Segregation (lower scores 
indicate more black exposure), including the Interaction Predicting US State Level Scores. 
†p<.10, *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
Note: Comparing Supplementary Table 2.4 (no interaction) with Supplementary Table 2.5 
(interaction), we find that including the interaction between disease rates and black exposure 
improves the model. Using the conservative Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC), we show that 
there is strong evidence of an improved fit for the model including the interaction at the implicit 
level (Table 2.5 BIC = 1063085.22 versus Table 2.4 BIC = 1063088.71) but not at the explicit 
level (Table 2.5 BIC = 2676583.55 versus Table 2.4 BIC = 2676584.06). Therefore, the 
significant interaction term at the implicit level highlights the fact that white respondents living 
in states with higher disease rates and lower exposure to black people exhibit higher anti-
black/pro-white prejudice. This finding is in line with contact hypothesis. Including the 
interaction term for black respondents across the US and white respondents across the world did 
not improve the fit of their respective models.  
  White Implicit Attitudes White Explicit Attitudes 
Predictor  
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
 
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
Disease Rates 0.007 0.005 1.31 0.045 0.016 2.84** 
Black Exposure 
Disease*Exposure 
    -0.661 
0.156 
0.137 
     0.056 
-4.82*** 
2.80** 
-1.154 
0.256 
0.427 
0.173 
-3.60** 
          1.48 
-2 Log Likelihood  1063057.508   2676555.925  
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Table S2.6: Disease Rates (higher numbers indicate a greater anti-black/pro-white bias) and 
Ratio of Whites to Blacks (logged) Accounting for Segregation (higher scores indicate more 
white exposure) Predicting US State Level Implicit/Explicit Scores. 
  Black Implicit Attitudes  Black Explicit Attitudes 
Predictor   
B (est.) 
  
SE B 
  
t 
  
B (est.) 
  
SE B 
  
t 
Parasite Stress -0.025 0.004 -6.71*** -0.076 0.011 -6.98*** 
Race Exposure 
-2 Log Likelihood 
 0.008 
    
0.014  
222945.764 
0.61 0.086 0.039  
603433.464 
2.20* 
 †p<.10, *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
 
  
  
250 
 
Table S2.7: Disease Rates (higher numbers indicate a greater anti-black/pro-white bias) and 
Ratio of Whites to Blacks (not logged) Accounting for Segregation (higher scores indicate more 
white exposure) Predicting US State Level Implicit/Explicit Scores. 
   Black Implicit Attitudes  Black Explicit Attitudes 
Predictor   
B (est.) 
  
SE B 
  
t 
  
B (est.) 
  
SE B 
  
t 
Parasite Stress -0.021 0.004 -5.35*** -0.054 0.010 -5.45*** 
Race Exposure 
-2 Log Likelihood 
 0.001 
    
0.00  
222945.439 
2.79** 0.007 0.001  
603411.302 
5.88*** 
 †p<.10, *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Table S2.8: Disease Rates (higher numbers indicate a greater anti-black/pro-white bias) and 
Proportion of Whites to the Total State Population Accounting for Segregation (higher scores 
indicate more white exposure) Predicting US State Level Implicit/Explicit Scores. 
  Black Implicit Attitudes  Black Explicit Attitudes 
Predictor  
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
 
B (est.) 
 
SE B 
 
t 
Parasite Stress -0.026 0.003   -7.76*** -0.083 0.010 -8.65*** 
White Exposure 
-2 Log Likelihood 
0.000 
 
0.000 
222943.883 
-0.04 0.220 0.117 
603432.543 
1.88† 
†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Note: For Table 2.6-2.8, scores in bold highlight the model with the best fit based on -2 Log 
Likelihood. 
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Table S2.9: Correlational matric of the variables in study 3 (Experiment)  
   Implicit  Explicit  Gender  Education  Age  Political Religious  Illness  PBC  
Implicit  —   0.196  ***  0.094   -0.051   -0.041   0.139**    -0.001   0.055   0.041   
Explicit       —   0.173***    -0.061   -0.003   0.287***    -0.069   -0.045   0.041   
Gender           —   -0.119*    -0.058   0.126*    0.011   -0.019   -0.118    
Education              —   0.271***    -0.036   0.098   -0.042   -0.014   
Age                   —   -0.145**   0.034   -0.056   -0.013   
Political                       —   0.289***   -0.010   -0.077   
Religious                           —   0.030   0.002   
Illness                               —   0.091   
PBC                                   —   
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Study 3 Gender differences 
A separate analysis was carried out on male and female implicit and explicit scores across the 
three priming conditions (control, terror, diseases: see Table S2.10 for means and standard 
deviations). First focusing on female scores, a one-way between-subject ANOVA showed a 
non-significant result of priming condition for both the implicit F(2, 169) = 1.77, p  = .173, and 
explicit scores F(2, 169) = .30, p > .250. Males on the other hand showed a significant 
difference across the three conditions for both their IAT scores F(2, 223) = 3.20, p = .043, and 
their explicit scores  F(2, 221) = 4.23, p = .016.  
  Post-hoc LSD tests indicated that implicit attitudes scores in the disease condition were 
significantly greater than the control, t(158) = 2.30, p = .023. Implicit scores in the disease 
condition were also higher than scores in the terror threat condition, t(149) = 1.99, p = .048, 
and no significant difference was seen between the control and terror threat conditions, t(135) 
= .76, p > .250. For explicit attitudes, scores in both the terror, t(135) = 2.37, p = .019, and the 
disease condition, t(156) = 2.79, p = .007, were significantly higher than the control condition. 
No difference was seen between explicit scores in the terror and disease condition, t(147) = 
.42, p > .250. Throughout, the greatest increase in anti-black/pro-white bias was seen in the 
disease condition and this was especially true for males.    
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Table S2.10: Means and standard deviations for males and females implicit and explicit scores  
Variable                         Control                             Terror                  Disease 
Male M SD M SD M SD 
Implicit .31 .40 .33 .36 .44 .36 
Explicit .47 1.20 1.00 1.38 1.11 1.60 
Female M SD M SD M SD 
Implicit .26 .42 .26 .34 .38 .36 
Explicit .33 1.07 .48 1.30 .54 2.02 
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Figure S2.1: Females’ implicit and explicit scores in the control, terrorism and disease 
conditions. 95% confidence intervals error bars have been included.  
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Figure S2.2: Males’ implicit and explicit scores in the control, terrorism and disease conditions. 
95% confidence intervals error bars have been included. 
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Table S3.1: The Non-word and Social System IRAP Stimuli (absent/weak associations) 
Non-word IRAP   Social System IRAP 
Category 1: 
 Cug or Tal 
Category 2: 
 Vek or Pid 
Category 1: 
 Capitalism 
Category 2: 
 Socialism 
Target stimuli 
congruent with 
category 1: 
Target stimuli 
congruent with 
category 2 : 
Target stimuli 
congruent with 
category 1: 
Target stimuli 
congruent with 
category 2: 
Happy Problems Equality Poverty 
Alive Died Fair Inequality 
Positive Negative Community Greed 
Freedom Hated Wealth Dictator 
Care Bad Sharing Awful 
Lucky Sick Freedom Corrupt 
Response Option 1: 
True 
Response Option 2: 
False 
Response Option 1: 
True 
Response Option 2: 
False 
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Table S3.2: The Nature and Weight IRAP Stimuli (strong associations)  
Nature IRAP Weight IRAP 
(Category 1: Flower) 
Bluebell 
Daffodil 
Tulip 
(Category 2: Insect) 
Mosquito 
Spider 
Wasp 
(Category 1: Thin 
Person) 
6 different images of 
thin people 
(Category 2: Fat 
Person) 
6 different images 
of fat people 
Target stimuli 
congruent with 
category 1: 
Target stimuli 
congruent with 
category 2: 
Target stimuli 
congruent with 
category 1: 
Target stimuli 
congruent with 
category 2: 
Enjoy Unpleasant Good Bad 
Cheer Poison Active Sloppy 
Happy Evil Attractive Ugly 
Lovely Damage Healthy Mean 
Friend Ugly Popular Lazy 
Pleasing Hurt Nice Unhealthy 
Response Option 1: 
True 
Response Option 2: 
False 
Response Option 
1: True 
Response Option 2: 
False 
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The steps involved in calculating the D-IRAP scores were as follows (example given 
for the Weight IRAP version):  
(1) Only response latency data from the six test blocks were used; (2) latencies above 
10,000ms were discarded; (3) if latencies from more than 10% of a participant’s trials 
throughout the 6 test blocks were less than 300ms, that participant was removed from the 
analysis; (4) for each IRAP task, 12 standard deviations for the four trial type latencies (e.g., 
Thin Person-Congruent responses, Thin Person-Incongruent responses, Fat Person-
Incongruent responses, and Fat Person-Congruent responses) were calculated: four for the 
responses latencies from Test Blocks 1 and 2, four from the latencies from Test Blocks 3 and 
4, and a further four from Test Blocks 5 and 6;  (5) 24 mean latencies were then calculated for 
the four trial types in each of the six test blocks; (6) difference scores were calculated for each 
of the four trial types by subtracting mean latencies of the pro-Thin trials from mean latencies 
of the pro-Fat trials for each test block pair; (7) each difference score was then divided by its 
corresponding standard deviation from step 4, yielding 12 D-IRAP scores, one score for each 
trial type for each pair of test blocks; (8) four overall trial type D-IRAP scores were calculated 
by averaging the three scores for each of the four trial types across the three pairs of test blocks. 
These calculations revealed the absolute/non-relative results. To compute the relative 
comparison, equivalent to that of the IAT, an overall D-IRAP score was calculated by 
averaging all the 12 trial type D-IRAP scores obtained in step 7 above. 
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Assessing attitudes obtained for the individual IRAPs 
Each of the four IRAPs (Non-word, Social System, Nature, and Weight) was analysed 
separately using the estimates of implicit attitude scores to address more directly whether 
participants had particularly positive attitudes to categories presented with positive words in 
the positive and standard framing conditions compared to the negative framing condition.    
Non-word IRAP 
The absolute D-IRAP (estimate) data (see Figure S3.1; Top Left) for the Non-word 
IRAP were analysed with a 2 (stimulus category: category 1, category 2) × 2 (word valence: 
positive, negative) × 3 (framing condition: positive, standard, negative) mixed ANOVA. 
Stimulus category 1 consisted of the Non-words Cug and Tal, category 2 consisted of the Non-
words Vek and Pid. Framing condition was a between-subjects factor, stimulus category and 
word valence were within-subjects factors.  
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of IRAP word valence, F(1, 57) = 59.82, 
p < .001, ηρ² = .52; scores were higher for positive IRAP words than for negative IRAP words. 
There was also a significant main effect of framing condition, F(2, 57) = 42.86, p < .001, ηρ² 
= .61. The standard framing had a high mean D-IRAP (estimate) score (M = .22); the positive 
framing produced the highest mean D-IRAP (estimate) score (M = .45), and negative framing 
had the lowest (M = -.29). LSD pairwise comparisons showed that all the framing condition D-
IRAP (estimate) scores differed significantly from each other (all ts > 2.70, ps < .01). The main 
effect of IRAP category was not significant, F(1,57) = .10, p > .05, ηρ² = .00, and nor were any 
of the interactions (all Fs < 2.03, ps > .14).  
Follow-up t-tests tested whether each absolute D-IRAP (estimate) score differed from 
zero. A positive value indicates a positive attitude to the stimulus category and a negative value 
indicates a negative attitude. For the standard framing condition, scores were greater than zero 
when associating the Non-word stimuli with positive words (all ts > 5.19, ps < .001). Scores 
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did not differ from zero for associating Non-word stimuli with negative words (all ts < .69, ps 
> .50). For the positive framing condition, all D-IRAP (estimate) scores were significantly 
greater than zero (all ts > 3.12, ps < .01). For the negative framing condition scores were 
significantly below zero for associating Non-words with negative words (all ts > 3.44, ps < 
.01) but did not differ for associating Non-words with positive words (all ts < 1.58, ps > .13) 
33.  
Social System IRAP 
The absolute D-IRAP (estimate) Social System results showed a similar pattern to those 
of the Non-word IRAP and are shown in Figure S3.1 (Top Right). A 2 (stimulus category: 
Capitalism, Socialism) × 2 (word valence: positive, negative) × 3 (framing condition: standard, 
                                                 
33 Two pilot studies were conducted that used various response options to ensure that the 
word frequency or length of these response options was not causing the PFB. Pilot Study 1 
tested 20 participants and was similar in structure to the standard condition. Each participant 
completed three IRAPs which incorporated various combinations of Non-words and the 
positive and negative target words were taken from Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Power, 
Hayden, Milne, and Stewart (2006). The response options used in each IRAP were: ‘Similar’ 
and ‘Opposite’; ‘Similar’ and ‘Different’; ‘True’ and ‘False’. Pilot study 2 had two 
conditions, standard and negative framing, similarly to the current experiment, with fifteen 
different participants in each condition. Various Non-words were used and the same positive 
and negative words used in the Non-word IRAP above were presented. Each participant 
completed 5 IRAPs that had different response options (i.e. ‘Confirmation’ and ‘No’; Symbol 
of a Thumb Up and a Thumb Down; Picture of a Happy Face and a Sad Face; ‘Similar’ and 
‘Opposite’; ‘Not Different’ and ‘Different’). These pilot studies produced comparable results 
to the Non-word IRAP.    
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positive, negative) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of IRAP word valence, 
F(1, 57) = 27.51, p < .001, ηρ² = .33; positive IRAP words had higher scores than did negative 
IRAP words. There was also a significant main effect of framing condition, F(2, 57) = 17.46, 
p < .001, ηρ² = .38. A high mean D-IRAP (estimate) score was found for standard framing (M 
= .16), with the positive framing producing the highest (M = .34), and negative framing 
producing the lowest (M = -.14) values. LSD pairwise comparisons showed that all the framing 
condition D-IRAP (estimate) scores differed significantly from each other (all ts > 2.24, ps < 
.05). The main effect of IRAP category was not significant, F(1,57) = 1.76, p > .05, ηρ² = .03, 
and all the interactions were non-significant (all Fs < 2.46, ps > .09).  
Follow-up t-tests showed that in the standard condition scores were greater than zero 
for associating Capitalism and Socialism with positive words (all ts > 3.45, ps < .01), but scores 
did not differ from zero for associating Capitalism and Socialism with negative words (all ts < 
.44, ps > .67). In the positive framing condition, all but the Capitalism negative word 
association D-IRAP (estimate) scores (t =1.81, p =.09) were significantly greater than zero (all 
ts > 3.91, ps < .01). In the negative framing condition scores were significantly below zero for 
associating Capitalism and Socialism with negative words (all ts > 2.64 ps < .05) but did not 
differ for associating Capitalism and Socialism with positive words (all ts < 1.61, all ps > .13).  
Nature IRAP 
 A 2 (stimulus category: Flower, Insect) × 2 (word valence: positive, negative) × 3 
(framing condition: standard, positive, negative) mixed ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of IRAP word valence, F(1,57) = 49.98, p <.001, ηρ² = .47: positive IRAP words had 
higher scores than did negative IRAP words (see Figure S3.1; Bottom Left). This time a 
significant main effect was found for stimulus category, F(1,57) = 76.67, p <.001, ηρ² = .54: 
more positive attitudes were found for flowers than for insects. A significant main effect of 
framing condition was also found, F(2, 57) = 9.01, p < .001, ηρ² = .24. A mean D-IRAP 
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(estimate) score of .12 was found in the standard framing conditions. This score was elevated 
in the positive framing condition (M = .22), and reduced in the negative framing condition (M 
= -.01). LSD pairwise comparisons showed that the standard framing D-IRAP (estimate) score 
was significantly different from the negative framing score (t = 2.30, p < .05), and marginally 
different from the positive framing score (t = 1.94, p < .06). The positive and negative framing 
D-IRAP (estimate) scores also differed from each other (t = 4.25, p < .001). None of the 
interactions were found to be significant (all Fs < 1.40, ps > .24).  
Follow-up t-tests showed that in the standard condition scores were significantly greater 
than zero for associating flowers with positive words (t = 7.69, p < .001), and below zero for 
associating insects with negative words (t = 2.28, p < .05), but scores did not differ from zero 
when associating flowers with negative words or insects with positive words (all ts < 1.54, ps 
> .14). In the positive framing condition, scores were greater than zero for the flower and insect 
categories presented with positive words as well as the flower category presented with negative 
words (all ts > 2.75, ps < .05). The score for the insect category presented with negative words 
was significantly below zero (t = 2.36, p <.05). For the negative framing condition, scores were 
significantly above zero for the flower category presented with positive words (t = 5.87, p < 
.001) and below zero for the insect category presented with negative words (t = 5.02, p < .001). 
The other two D-IRAP (estimate) scores were not significantly different from zero (all ts <1.10, 
ps > .29). 
Weight IRAP 
A 2 (stimulus category: Thin Person, Fat Person) × 2 (word valence: positive, negative) 
× 3 (framing condition: standard, positive, negative) mixed ANOVA showed a significant main 
effect of IRAP word valence F(1, 57) = 26.86, p < .001, ηρ² = .32: positive IRAP words 
produced higher scores than negative IRAP words (see Figure S3.1; Bottom Right). A 
significant main effect was found for stimulus category, F(1, 57) = 37.79, p < .001, ηρ² = .39: 
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more positive attitudes were found for the Thin Person category than for the Fat Person 
category, and a significant main effect was also found for framing condition, F(1, 57) = 3.28, 
p < .05, ηρ² = .10. A positive mean D-IRAP (estimate) score was found in the standard framing 
condition (M = .16); this score was higher in the positive framing condition (M = .22) and lower 
in the negative framing condition (M = .07). LSD pairwise comparisons revealed that only the 
positive and the negative framing condition D-IRAP (estimate) scores differed from each other 
(t = 2.56, p < .05). The remaining interactions were non-significant (all Fs < .83, ps > .44). 
Follow-up t-tests showed that in the standard framing condition the absolute D-IRAP 
(estimate) scores for the Thin Person category presented with positive words and Thin Person 
category presented with negative words were significantly greater than zero (all ts > 2.68, ps < 
.05). The scores for the Fat Person category presented with negative words was significantly 
below zero (t = 2.17, p < .05) and the scores for the Fat Person category presented with positive 
words did not differ from zero (t = .371, p > .05). In the positive framing condition the scores 
for Thin Person positive words, Thin Person negative words and Fat person positive words 
were all significantly greater than zero (all ts > 2.31, ps < .05). Score for Fat Person negative 
words did not differ from zero (t = 1.24, p > .05). In the negative framing condition the scores 
for the Thin Person category presented with positive word was greater than zero (t = 3.99, p < 
.01) and the scores for the Fat Person category presented with negative words was below zero 
(t = 3.08, ps < .01). Both Thin Person negative word and Fat Person positive word scores did 
not differ from zero (all ts < 2.05, ps > .05). 
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Figure S3.1: (Top Left): The four mean absolute Non-word D-IRAP (estimate) scores for each 
of the three framing conditions. Bars above the zero line indicate a positive attitude towards 
the category under investigation. This occurs when True responses are faster than False 
responses for categories presented with positive words and also when False response are faster 
than True response for categories presented with negative words. Points below the zero line 
indicate a negative attitude. This occurs when False responses are faster than True response 
for positive word associations and also when True response are faster than False response for 
negative word associations. Error bars with 95% confidence intervals have been included. Error 
bars that cross the zero mark indicate a statistically neutral attitude; those that do not cross zero 
indicate a significant positive or negative attitude (see stars).  
 (Top Right): The four mean absolute Social System D-IRAP (estimate) scores for each of the 
framing conditions.  
(Bottom Left): The four mean absolute Nature D-IRAP (estimate) scores for each of the 
framing conditions.  
(Lower Right): The four mean absolute Weight D-IRAP estimate scores for each of the framing 
conditions.  
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• Study 1: Qualtrics demographic and explicit questionnaire link. 
https://warwickpsych.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_agEITuIdboAbPeJ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Study 2: Informed consent, demographic information and questionnaire (see below).   
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Informed Consent 
 
Study Title: Reaction Time Test  
 
Experimenters:  Brian O’Shea,         PhD Candidate     Email: b.oshea@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor:  Dr. Gordon Brown                Lecturer      Email: G.D.A.Brown@warwick.ac.u 
 
Description of Experiment: This experiment is a computer based task which requires 
participants to quickly associate positive and negative words towards different categories. The 
words Murderer and Rapist will be used in this study. A short questionnaire will be completed.  
 
In order to participate in this research study, it is necessary that you give your informed consent. 
By signing this you are indicating that you understand the nature of the research study, your 
role and that you agree to participate in the research.  Please consider the following points 
before signing: 
 
• I understand that I am participating in psychological research; 
• I understand that my identity will not be linked with my data, and that all information I 
provide will remain confidential; 
• I understand the research team will use anonymised data and quotes in presentations 
and publications; 
• I understand that I will be provided with an explanation of the research in which I 
participated;  
• I understand that participation in research is not required, is voluntary, and when the 
study has begun, I may refuse to participate further without penalty or prejudice.  
• I understand the anonymised data will be archived, to enable follow-up research, and 
for training future researchers. 
By signing this form I am stating that I am over 18 years of age, and that I understand the above 
information and consent to participate in this study being conducted. 
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Signature: _________________________________ Today’s Date: ____________ 
  (of participant) 
 
 
 
Please rate how positive or negative you feel towards a Criminal? (Mark somewhere 
on the thermometer). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please rate how positive or negative you feel towards a Carer? (Mark somewhere on 
the thermometer). 
 
 
 
Age: ___________________________ 
 
 
Nationality:_________________ 
 
(EXP.4) 
 
Sex: M /   F    (circle) 
 
Ethnicity (e.g. White British, Black British,  
Mixed, Asian Chinese):  
 
Write Ethnicity  here:     ________________________ 
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Please rate how positive or negative you feel towards words with ‘O/o’? (Mark 
somewhere on the thermometer). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please rate how positive or negative you feel towards words with ‘E/e’? (Mark 
somewhere on the thermometer). 
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Please rate how positive or negative you feel towards Insects? (Mark somewhere on the 
thermometer). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please rate how positive or negative you feel towards the word Flowers? (Mark 
somewhere on the thermometer). 
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Study 2 Replication (Amazon Turk Sample) 
This study replicated Study 2 but recruited participants from a different source in which 
all participants receive a monetary reward for taking part. This study also used a fully 
randomised design.  
Method 
Participants: 222 participants (125 males, 95 females, 1 other and 1 declined to disclose 
gender) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and received $1 for their 
participation. The average age of the participants was 35.9 years (SD = 10.59). Only 
participants from the US were selected to take part, 79% of the sample were white and the 
majority had an educational degree above high school level (>85%).   
Materials: The materials were the same as those in Study 2 with an additional question 
in the demographic information section to obtain the participants’ Amazon worker ID.  
Procedure: The procedure was essentially the same as that of Study 2 apart from the 
recruitment method, provision of monetary payment for participation and the use of a fully 
randomised design with respect to the word type factor.  
Results  
H1 nouns vs. verbs vs. adjectives. A mixed 3 × 2 ANOVA with word type as the 
between-subject factor and valence as the within-subject factor revealed the presence of a 
significant valence × word type interaction, F(2, 209) = 3.72, p = .026, ηρ² = .03. Positive nouns 
were responded to more quickly than negative nouns but the reverse held for adjectives 
(replicating the results of Study 1 and 2), and verbs acted more like adjectives than nouns 
(replicating the results of Study 2). The main effect of valence approached significance, F(1, 
209) = 3.67, p = .057, ηρ² = .02., and the main effect of word type was non-significant, F(2, 
209) = .834, p > .250, ηρ² = .00 (see Figure S5.1).   
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H2 affirming words vs. negating words.  A 3 × 2 mixed ANOVA with word type as the 
between subject factor and response option (support/affirm, oppose/negate) as the within 
subject factor, did not find the expected main effect of response option, F(1, 211) = 2.03, p = 
.156, ηρ² = .01, or a main effect of word type, F(1, 211) = .56, p > ,250, ηρ² = .00. However, 
there was a significant word type × response option interaction, F(2, 211) = 6.06, p = .003, ηρ² 
= .05. As shown in Figure S5.1, participants were faster to respond to affirming words than to 
negating words when performing the task with nouns, t(73) = 2.77, p = .007, as well as during 
the task with adjectives, t(70) = 2.17, p = .033 but not during the verb task, t(68) = 1.72, p = 
.09. Of note, if stricter data trimming procedures are used that cut participants who have mean 
RTs that are 3 SD above and below the global mean, then the predicted main effect of response 
option is found, F(1, 202) = 7.95, p = .005, ηρ² = .04.  No significant main effect of word type 
or interaction were shown, Fs > 2.36, ps > .097.       
H3 affirming-positive, negating-negative association biases. Applying the D-IAT 
algorithm, 22 participants were removed for not performing to the required criteria. Analysing 
the remaining D-IAT scores, we again found a significant difference between sorting affirming 
and positive words together and negating and negative words together rather than the reverse 
sorting task, t(201) = 40.41, p < .001, d = 2.84. Again, participants were faster to sort affirming 
and positive words (M = 1242.08, SD = 168.88). then to sort negating and negative words (M 
= 1253.792, SD = 171.92; t(211) = 2.43 , p < .05, d = 0.17. 
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Figure S5.1: (left) Interaction between word type and valence. (right) Interaction between 
response type and word type. 
 
Comparing the demographics and participants’ performance between Study 2 
(volunteered Reddit sample) and this replication (paid Amazon Turk sample) might indicate 
why the current study did not exactly replicate Study 2. We used a 2 × 2 chi-square test of 
independence to determine if the number of participants removed from the sample based on 
the D-IAT algorithm was equally distributed between Study 2 and this replication. The test 
revealed that participants were significantly more likely to be removed from the analysis in the 
Amazon Turk Sample than in the Reddit sample, X2(1, N = 390) = 8.71, p =.003. When 
analysing the variability in RTs (3 standard deviations above minus 3 standard deviation below 
the mean) to each of the word types, we found that the Amazon Turk sample had more 
variability in RTs when sorting the positive and negative words, t(10) = 11.20, p < .001, d = 
6.47, and the affirming and negating words, t(5.80) = 13.94, p < .001, d = 8.05. Of note, the 
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mean age of the Amazon Turk participants was higher than the Reddit participants (M =35.9, 
SD = 10.59 vs M = 24.94, SD = 6.86), t(378.66) = 12.29, p < .001, d = 1.22).  
Discussion 
This study replicated the main findings from Study 1 and Study 2 (H1 and H3), except 
that participants did not respond faster to affirming words than to negating words in the verb 
condition (H2). This result might reflect differences in age or motivation between the self-
interested volunteer (Reddit) and paid (Amazon Turk) participants, with the latter producing 
more variable and less accurate responses. Importantly, faster responses towards affirming 
words then to negative words were shown in the noun and adjective condition.   
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Table S5.1: Stimuli used in the Race IAT 
Category Labels Stimuli 
African American 6 greyscale images of black individuals (3 males, 3 females)   
European American 6 greyscale images of white individuals (3 males, 3 females)   
Good Glorious, Wonderful, Joy, Love, Peace, Pleasure, Laughter, Happy 
Bad Terrible, Evil, Horrible, Agony, Nasty, Awful, Failure, Hurt 
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Table S5.2: Stimuli used in the Nature IAT 
Category Labels A  Stimuli A 
Flower carnation, clover, daffodil, dandelion, gladiola, lily, pansy, sunflower  
Insect tarantula, bee, beetle, fly, grasshopper, hornet, mosquito, wasps  
Pleasant amazing, brilliant, fantastic, wonderful, pleasure, happy, joy, superb 
Unpleasant agony, terrible, brutal, disgusting, destroy, tragic, awful, hurt 
Category Labels B Stimuli B 
Flower aster, bluebell, iris, magnolia, orchid, petunia, poppy, violet 
Insect caterpillar, cricket, dragonfly, earwig, lice, maggot, bug, termite  
Pleasant splendid, great, friend, love, glorious, laughter, excellent, peace 
Unpleasant nasty, failure, evil, horrible, disaster, painful, sad, barbaric 
Category Labels C Stimuli C 
Flower buttercup, jasmine, marigold, peony, rose, shamrock, tulip 
Insect bedbug, moth, cockroach, flea, horsefly, locust, ant, tick 
Pleasant adore, delicious, enjoy, positive, fabulous, healthy, joyful, kind, 
Unpleasant abandoned, bleak, crushed, rotten, injure, hostile, suffer,  
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Qualtrics demographic and explicit questionnaire links 
 
QA Terror: https://warwickpsych.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bxBbVnsL7auEC9f 
QA Disease: https://warwickpsych.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_eRFX468j1i2B1ch 
QB Terror: https://warwickpsych.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_9ABnTc9sjACpqpD  
QB Disease:https://warwickpsych.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_7aO2Qg9GdvrQ9oh 
